

The history and future of Southeast Asia

1) The problem with China's non-invasion of Indochina

We saw in the previous article that the elite falsified history to explain why China never invaded Siberia.

In the same way, we might wonder how the elite dealt with the problem of the Southeast Asian states. Here too, there was no reason why China shouldn't have invaded this area, which was made up of kingdoms much weaker than its own.

There was, of course, the relatively powerful Khmer Empire, which controlled a large part of Indochina at its peak, say between 802 and 1227. But even then, it didn't amount to much compared to China in terms of military power.

The explanation that seems to have been chosen is that China more or less despised these kingdoms, which it considered barbaric. As a result, it established a **suzerainty relationship** with them. The kingdoms or empires of this region were its vassals and paid tribute.

But then, for this explanation to work, there had to be established states with a relatively advanced civilization. If there had only been primitive tribes, there would have been no reason for China not to take over the region. With technically and culturally advanced kingdoms, there was an exchange of equals in terms of civilization, which could eventually justify a vassalage relationship. That's still a very weak explanation for why China didn't invade this area. But, in the eyes of the general public, it can be accepted.

That's why the elite have invented a bunch of kingdoms and empires in this region that have been present for over 2000 years. A history "proven" by the presence of numerous monuments and artefacts.

But, in reality, these states never existed. As in China, there was virtually nothing in these regions, apart from a few scattered, primitive tribes.

Monuments and objects were made by European invaders in the 18th or 19th century, or even the 20th. And that's still going on today. New sites and artifacts are regularly "discovered" (recent example for China, the terracotta army of the Qin emperor, "discovered" in 1974). To get the point across, we regularly hear the story of the native who "by chance" discovered a site or ancient artifacts. A fashionable trick nowadays is to use satellite views to "reveal" the presence of this or that previously hidden site.

A clue in this direction concerns Khmer civilization. Indeed, we are told in this [extract](#):

*"the apparently brutal collapse of the Khmer Empire, followed by a fairly long period, after 1431, when the stories seem to disappear ; the successive capture of Anghor by the Siamese forces of the kingdom of Ayutthaya, and finally, the consequent relative absence of sources, chronicles and testimonies that followed, partly due to the vassalization of the kingdom, **to the extent that the memory of the empire was largely forgotten, turning into legendary myth, before its rediscovery in the mid-19th century.**"*

And [here](#):

*"The decline was then so pronounced that Cambodians came to forget the link that bound them to Angkorian civilization, **and had to wait for the work of French protectorate archaeologists at the end of the 19th century to reappropriate the heritage of the Khmer empire.**"*

So, the memory of the empire was largely forgotten. Yep, simply because it never existed. And it wasn't rediscovered in the 19th century, but invented in the 19th century; obviously by the French, since they controlled Cambodia at the time. For other countries in the region, it must have been the English, or the Dutch or the Portuguese who were responsible for inventing so-called thousand-year-old civilizations.

Note that the big temples and palaces are "discovered" most of the time in the middle of the jungle (or desert), in places where there were no people until

recently. It's certainly more practical to build them in areas where no one can come and see what's going on. And to prevent the workers from revealing the secret, it was enough to take lifelong prisoners, moved far from their birthplace.

Similarly, the religions adopted by these peoples were invented at this time.

That said, official history doesn't put too much emphasis on the history of vassalage, because in this case, it's very surprising that China didn't intervene to support vassals attacked by enemy non-vassal kingdoms. Normally, there should have been agreements of military support in exchange for vassalage and tributes.

And if they were all vassals of China, it's odd that the latter allowed certain wars to go on without intervening. After all, there was an aggressor and a victim. So China should have sided with the victim.

So, it's a very strange vassalage we're dealing with here. And it's understandable that official historians don't insist too much on this.

Perhaps in the future, the elite will invent something about it, to correct this incoherence.

And as this story of vassalage wasn't very convincing, the elite added to it the idea that China was a naturally peaceful empire, with little interest in military expansion, etc. So, if China didn't attack the southern states, it's also because it wasn't in its DNA in some way.

2) The problem of non-invasion of Australia by the countries of Indochina and Indonesia

There's another problem, this time concerning the **Indochinese** zone. Since official history invented kingdoms that were developed enough to justify that China didn't conquer them, the possibility arose that these kingdoms would invade **Australia**.

Of course, nothing of the sort happened, because in reality, there were only primitive tribes in Indochina. There was no advanced civilization and no kingdoms. But if official history invented a thousand-year history for this part of the world too, with advanced states from the beginning of our era, it didn't fit. The ships were supposed to be at least a little sophisticated, so they could sail to Australia without any problem. And they could do so all the more since official history invented migrations to the islands of the central Pacific Ocean by tribes in dugout canoes. What's more, the route to Australia is studded with islands in close proximity to one another. It was child's play to get there.

On the other hand, most of **Indonesia's** islands have been occupied, and again by fairly advanced states. And Indonesia is much closer to Australia than Indochina. So there was no reason why they shouldn't have gone all the way to Australia.

The fact that Indochina and Indonesia had not colonized Australia introduced an important quirk. The elite had to come up with an explanation.

The simplest reason is that these countries were busy doing other things, essentially fighting wars, whether external or internal, which also drained their resources in terms of men and equipment. So, in the Indochinese zone, there had to be several countries constantly at war with each other. The same applied to Indonesia. There also had to be numerous rises and falls of the dominant countries, again justifying the fact that they had other things to do than go and colonize the countries of the South-East. And in general, during the period of ascendancy, they fought mainly against neighboring countries, then, during the period of decline, they no longer had the energy and resources to colonize the south.

2.1) The history of Indochina

So let's analyze the history of Indochina to see if this is the case.

Already, from 68 to 550 AD, we have the kingdom of **Fou-nan or Funan**. Here's a map available on [Wikipedia](#):




So, when you see the map, it looks like a single state. And given the size of the territory, he could have sent expeditions to Australia. But in fact, it wasn't a state, but a confederation of several city-states, as [Wikipedia](#) explains:

*"According to these sources, Fou-nan originated in the 1st century CE, but archaeological research has found significant traces of sedentary settlements since at least the 4th century BC. Similarly, while Chinese observers describe a centralized regime, it is now commonly accepted **that it was more a confederation of city-states which, over time, either waged war against each other or formed a unified political entity.**"*

So, not only was it not a unified state, but the city-states that made it up were regularly at war with each other. Given these conditions, it's understandable that they had better things to do than go all the way to Australia.

But, even if it had been a unified and prosperous state, historians from the elite might argue that, given the rather remote era, technology and economics were not yet sufficiently developed to send ships that far.

In fact, by 400, the territory of this confederation had already been reduced northwards. This map on [Wikipedia](#) shows the state of Southeast Asia around 400.



We can see that Funan had already lost much of its territory.

From the end of the 6th century to the beginning of the 9th (802), i.e. around 200 years, the area was divided into several entities. The largest territorial entity was the **Chenla**. Here's the map available on [Wikipedia](#):



For a long time, there was talk of a unified kingdom. But then again, since the end of the 20th century, historians have been talking more about an aggregate of principalities which, over time, joined forces, regained their independence or went to war against each other.

[Wikipedia](#) states:

"The 8th century was a period of turmoil for the Khmers. The kingdom of Chenla first broke up into two rival kingdoms, the Chen-la of land (or Wentan for the Chinese) to the north and the Chen-la of water to the south, then into five principalities. Eventually, the Khmers had to accept the suzerainty of Java (in present-day Indonesia)."

So, the Chen-la entity lasted only 100 years, from 600 to 700. Between 700 and 800, it split into two kingdoms, then into five principalities. In the end, it probably didn't make much difference, since it was just an agglomeration of

principalities. But even so, the agglomerate was now divided into two, then five, removing any governmental cohesion in the region.

We are also told that the Khmers fell under the yoke of Java. It's not clear how much of the Khmer territory was controlled by Java. But we can assume that it was southern Cambodia. So, in addition to a division into several states, the south was under Javanese control. And of course, before that, there had been a war with the Javanese. All this explains why the Indochinese didn't go to colonize Australia at that time.

After the Chenla came the **Khmer Empire**, from 802 to 1431. First, a Javanese prince named Jayavarman II (802-850) unified the various Khmer principalities and freed them from the Javanese. Before long, the Khmer empire controlled almost the entire Indochina region.



Between 1002 and around 1100, the empire expanded eastwards, followed by a long war with the Chams ([Wikipedia](#)):

"Suryavarman I, who reigned between 1002 and 1050, prevailed over his rivals, founded a new dynasty and expanded the kingdom westwards. The end of the 10th century was marked by an incursion from the Chams to the east. Conflicts with the Cham were another feature of Khmer history: there was even talk of a "hundred-year war" between them from 1130 to 1227."

So, throughout all this time, the empire is at war with the west or the east, but never goes south.

The decline began as early as 1285 ([Wikipedia](#)).

"Decline: 1285-1430 approx."

After the death of Jayavarman VII, Cambodia plunged into a form of decline, the exact nature of which is still a matter of debate in the scientific community."

This map shows that by 1300, the empire had become much smaller. Several kingdoms appeared or expanded at the expense of the Khmer empire.



Southeast Asia circa 1300

And by 1400, it was even more divided:



Southeast Asia circa 1400

After the Khmer period, Cambodia entered the Dark Ages.



Situation circa 1540

There were then 5 different states.

During the 15th century, Cambodia appears to have been under Siamese rule. Then, in the 16th century, it came under Vietnamese rule. Again, in the 17th century, it came under Siamese rule. From 1767 onwards, the alternation of Vietnamese and Siamese domination accelerated. And at times, the country was divided into two parts.

In short, from the 15th century to the end of the 18th century, the two dominant powers were Siam and Vietnam. But both experienced repeated declines in power. And all they were able to invade during their brief period of prosperity was Cambodia.

In 1863, King Norodom signed a Cambodian protectorate treaty with France.

Regarding Siam, it was far from being in a comfortable situation throughout these years. Indeed, [here](#) we have:

*"The kingdom of Siam was founded in 1350 by a Thai prince who founded Ayutthaya and ascended to the throne as Ramathibodi I. **Siam fought against the Khmer Empire, the kingdom of Sukhothai and the kingdom of Lanna.** In 1431, it conquered the Khmer capital, Angkor. In 1438, he completely absorbed the kingdom of Sukhothai."*

As for the Khmer empire, it seems that it didn't absorb it. The latter just became his vassal, which is obviously very different. The Khmer state survived, but in a situation of vassalage.

In all these manipulations of history by the elite, religions and cultures are useful. In fact, they can vary from one era or country to another. And one of the advantages is that it justifies the abandonment or even destruction of certain monuments, archives, etc. Because otherwise, the question arises as to why these grandiose monuments were not used by subsequent generations. But, if they were religious monuments, or displayed religious signs, and the descendants had a different religion, quite rigorist and therefore not tolerating the presence of other religions, that would justify not using them anymore. And having two countries with different cultures makes it possible to justify the fact that one has totally eradicated the culture of the other. This is the case here with **Vietnam and Khmer culture.**

"In 1660, Cambodia began to pay a tribute of vassalage to the Lê of Vietnam.

*The Khmer state, then in decline, was divided into three Vietnamese "residences" under the control of a Vietnamese Resident General at the Cambodian Court in Oudong. **The Vietnamese then set about destroying the vestiges of Khmer civilization,** to the extent that in the border province of An Giang at Châu Đốc, this operation became (as with the Chams) a form of "genocide" by cultural assimilation in the replacement of one social and cultural organization by another. **Buddhist temples (pagodons) and altars were destroyed,** Vietnamese clothing and hairstyles became compulsory, the place names of villages and provinces were Vietnamized and, finally, the title of King was abolished for the rulers of Cambodia.*

All in all, what we call here "genocide" and in the Far East a "cultural revolution", is much more the elimination of lifestyles and ways of thinking and acting, rather than the physical elimination of people."

In this way, historians can justify the fact that a culture or religion has been totally forgotten until recently. When, in fact, it was simply invented recently.

Periods of cultural influence are also useful in explaining why a powerful, stable kingdom has not decided to conquer new territories. This kingdom is at the height of its power; why doesn't it try to conquer this or that territory? Well, it's because the king prefers to develop the arts, culture, trade, etc. This isn't a period of lost opportunities for the kingdom's territorial development; no, it's a golden age.

Conclusion

So, for over 1,000 years, it was impossible for countries in the Indochina zone to expand southwards. Either such and such a kingdom was on the rise, but extended north, west or east, but not south. Or it was also expanding southwards, but by the time it had gained a few territories, it was already beginning to fall. Or, we had several small kingdoms too weak to expand southwards. All the more so as they were at war with each other.

In addition to problems specific to this Indochinese zone, we'll see in the next chapter that for most of the time, there was a powerful empire in Indonesia, especially on the island of Sumatra, closest to Indochina. So, even if some Indochinese kingdoms were keen to expand southwards, they were mostly blocked by the then-dominant empire.

And not only did these empires block them, they often controlled territories in southern Indochina (mainly Malaysia), and sometimes attacked the Indochinese kingdoms.

So it's a bit like the Chinese situation, but geographically reversed. In this case, it's the states of the far south that invade the Indochinese states, which explains why the latter were never able to expand southwards.

It should be noted that, as the countries or city-states of Indochina were regularly at war with each other, it must have been difficult for them to invest in both an army and a navy. This is another reason why they were unable to expand into Indonesia and Australia.

So, weakness, instability, decadence, wars and the presence of forces to the south (in Indonesia) meant that the countries of the Indochina zone were never able to expand into Indonesia and then Australia.

But there also had to be advanced states to the south to justify the Indochinese not colonizing it and then pushing on to Australia. This again shifts the problem of Australia's non-colonization southwards, towards the Indonesian states. So we need to analyze what happened there.

2.2) The history of the Indonesian countries

As in Indochina, the Indonesian islands were virtually uninhabited. There were only scattered tribes and no advanced civilization. That's why it was so easy for the Europeans to take control. But here too, the elite had to invent great kingdoms and millennia-old civilizations, because otherwise, it would have been very difficult to explain why the Indochinese kingdoms, or China itself, didn't colonize Indonesia, and then Australia.

So the elite had to invent powerful Indonesian civilizations to act as a lock on Chinese or Indochinese colonization to the south and southeast.

And of course, they had to explain why these Indonesian civilizations didn't colonize Australia. That's what we're going to see now.

Indonesia is made up of several islands, so here's a map to help you find your way around.



I'm going to analyze the situation in chronological order.

2.2.1) The 500-1450 period

You'll find some very good timeline maps on Youtube, both for Indonesia in general and for specific Indonesian islands. And these maps are often very accurate. Several people offer them. The only problem is that the maps contradict each other, often significantly depending on the author. This means that many of the proposed maps are wrong, to a greater or lesser extent.

We don't know if it's because some of the authors have made a mess of things, or if they've invented something based on very fragmented information that doesn't meet with consensus (in many cases, there seems to be very little precise information on the state of a given area at a given time), or if they're trying to impose a version of history out of nationalism (the authors are all Indonesians, apparently, and there's opposition between the inhabitants of Sumatra, Java, Malaysia, the Philippines, etc.), or if they are agents of the elite who seek to maintain maximum confusion about the history of the region and the possibility of changing the official story if clever people start to understand what's going on.

But there is information common to all the different maps. We can therefore draw a general impression. There will probably be errors in several places. But, overall, it'll be more or less valid. Of course, it would be much better if the maps were reliable. But, with what we've got, it should be enough.

If you don't want to go into detail, you can skip all those maps and the evolution of kingdoms and sultanates and jump straight to the summary. This is because the simple fact that no Indonesian state colonized Australia for 1500 years is completely implausible in any configuration, given the proximity of these states to Australia and their ability to travel far by ship. Either we had one or more great empires that lasted over time. In which case, it's completely unnatural that they didn't extend all the way to Australia. Or we had divided kingdoms. And it's very odd that they lasted 1500 years like that. And even with a mix of the two, it's still implausible. And that implies a manipulation of history by the elite.

And by the way, the elite's strategy for Indonesia can be summed up in a few paragraphs. But for the sake of completeness, I've included this analysis of the maps, for readers who'd like more detail.

It's worth noting that before the 15th century, maps showing this or that area in a single color didn't necessarily show a kingdom, but rather ethnically homogeneous zones. And in this case, in reality, they are essentially tribes separated from each other, not necessarily obeying a single chief. So maps can be misleading (as well as possibly false).

The period before 500

This section covers the period after 500 A.D. But it's worth taking a quick look at the period before 500 A.D. There's an oddity here.


This [video](#) shows the situation on the island of Java in 445 AD.

The person who made it has done an enormous amount of work. Nevertheless, he's honest and says it's not quite right yet. Which is perfectly normal, given the

complexity of the subject and the vagueness of the sources (which must tend to change according to developments in historical "science"):

"I expect criticism and corrections, as this video is certainly not entirely accurate and still contains errors."


But, as it's the most accomplished work, it's mostly what I'll be basing myself on.



Apparently, the area in white is still uninhabited. And that's pretty amazing, because the aborigines colonized New Guinea and Australia 40,000 or 50,000 years ago, according to the official history, i.e. territories that were around 8,000 kilometers from Africa, or much further if we assume that they skirted the coasts of India, Indochina and Indonesia.


But in all this time, the Asians never managed to cross the 10-15 km separating southern Indochina from the island of Sumatra, and then the same distance separating Sumatra from Java (if we include the intermediate islands). Otherwise, by 445, they would have colonized the whole island of Java long, long ago. Clearly, Asians suck compared to blacks.

Again on Java, we have this same map in 758:



So, in 300 years, Asians have only advanced 150 km to the east. Incredible! They really weren't very good. But if they had progressed rapidly eastwards, then there would have been a problem justifying Australia not being colonized by Asians. So, they had to progress very slowly.

And something similar can be seen on the island of **Sumatra**, which is even closer to the Indochinese continent. Here's the [map](#) from 9,000 BC.




So we've got 2 tribes settled in. Ok.

But in 130, 9,130 years later, there are still large parts of the island that have not been settled. Incredible too. Especially since it's not as if the two original tribes were only located in the north. They were in the center and the south. But the southern half is still uninhabited.

And you can't even justify that by the fact that it's a mountainous, inaccessible region. It's essentially a lowland region, apparently very fertile.



And in 428, almost 300 years later, this part of the island was still empty.



Now, some might reply that there were tribes in these places, but they weren't under the control of the kingdoms in question. I agree. But tribes couldn't

normally stand up to a developed kingdom. Militarily speaking, they were no match. So it should have been child's play for the latter to bring these areas under their control. Even so, it's still very odd that for 300 years, the kingdoms in the center didn't invade them.


And, as mentioned above, the areas in gray are a priori ethnically homogeneous zones, but without constituted states. They're just tribes. So, in principle, this eliminates the idea that the white areas were inhabited. Otherwise, the video's author would have put them in gray and given them a name. Or, perhaps they were inhabited, but with a very low population density, i.e. just a few scattered tribes. So, the problem of the kingdoms not colonizing them remains very shady.

But then again, maybe the elite will tell us that these maps are wrong and that there were indeed kingdoms in these places. Or maybe they'll admit they're true. But they'll "discover" later that, in fact, there were such-and-such kingdoms in those places, which will solve this oddity.


Sriwijaya (Sumatra island)

Let's move on to the post-500 period.


On the island of **Sumatra**, there was the state of **Sriwijaya** between 650 and 1088 (some say 1482, considering that its successor was in fact the same thing as Sriwijaya). Here's what the situation was in 650 ([here](#)):




It began its expansion in 670:




By 690, in just 20 years, it had invaded two-thirds of Sumatra and part of present-day Malaysia in the Indochinese zone:




In 698, it began invading Borneo:




In 2 years, he has made significant progress:




After a pause of 39-year, it conquered half the island of Java in 739. A small additional part was taken in 753 (the northern center):




In 770, the situation was as follows:




In 781, just 11 years later, they had invaded southern Indochina:




By 792, they controlled most of Java. And in 795, they pushed a little further into Indochina:




They set foot in the Philippines in 800 :




But, in 851, they suddenly lost part of Java and Indochina:




In 882, they regained part of Java, and pushed a little further onto its neighboring islands:




In 897, a campaign of expansion began on Borneo and the Philippines. In just 7 years, much of the Philippines was conquered and the northern edge of Borneo as well. On the other hand, land was lost in Indochina (901-903) and Java (904-906):




Apart from a small expansion on the coasts of northern Sumatra (west side) in 943, nothing happened for 70 years. Then, suddenly, in 978, it lost the southern and northern parts of Borneo, followed in 982 by the northern Philippines:




At the end of the century, there were reshuffles on the island of Sumatra, with the loss of the south of the island and gains in the north. But, between 1001 and 1003, it spread again strongly in Indochina. And curiously, between 996 and 1000, it captured Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon), in the south of India.




The push into Indochina lasted a very short time, since the territory was lost as early as 1006:



In 1022, after several successive retreats which began in 1017, the north of Indochinese territory was lost, as well as the whole of Sri Lanka. On the other hand, South Sumatra is recaptured and a good part of East Java:




A period of significant upheaval then begins. Between 1024 and 1025, the Kingdom lost a large part of Sumatra, part of Indochinese territory and a small part of Java.




By 1027, all of Sumatra and Malaysia had been lost. On the other hand, the territories of Java, Borneo and the Philippines were retained. This is hard to understand, since the central power was supposedly located in Sumatra. In fact,


Sumatra must have suffered a civil war or something like that, and so must have descended into chaos:




Then, in 1028, the period of chaos apparently came to an end and the territories of Sumatra and Malaysia were once again under control. But all possessions in the Philippines and Borneo were lost. On Java, the situation remained more or less stable:



But it wasn't long before Java was lost. It began as early as 1030. And by 1036, only a small piece remained in the west:




Curiously again, the kingdom regained control of Sri Lanka between 1045 and 1049. It even managed to seize a small piece of southern India in 1053. And in 1046, it extended a little to the north of Malaysia:



By 1071, India and Sri Lanka had been lost.

And in 1088, the Sriwijaya dynasty apparently came to an end. It was replaced by the Dharmasraya in Sumatra, and the Tambralingga in Malaysia. That said, according to other maps made by the same person, it's a little less clear.




So the fact that the Sriwijaya state had been powerful for 700 years prevented the Indochinese states from taking its place. It was like having a lock on the southeast. And Sriwijaya, even though it expanded a little in the southeast, developed mainly in the north and northeast, which explains why it didn't colonize Australia. And historians can justify this by saying that it was in the north that trade took place and where there was wealth.


The 1088-1292 period

Between the end of the Sriwijaya kingdom in 1088, and the beginning of the Majapahit kingdom in 1292, there was a 200-year period when no state seemed to dominate the region.


In 1089, the state of **Dharmasraya** appeared:




And on the island of Java, we have Sunda and Janggala:




By 1093, Sriwijaya had apparently disappeared. It seems that it was no more than a vassal of Dharmasraya at this time. A few states to the north appeared:



On the Java side, the Dharmasraya controlled a small piece in the west (indirectly, via its vassal the Sriwijaya). The rest consisted mainly of the Sunda and Janggala kingdoms:




And on this map, we don't really know if Sriwijaya is independent or not.




In any case, the area is divided into several states. None of them dominated, as Sriwijaya had apparently done until then.


In Java, things changed in 1106, with the appearance of Panjalu, which took the place of western Janggala.



By 1135, only Panjalu remained. On Sumatra, nothing changes:




Janggala mysteriously rose from the ashes in 1160:



In Sumatra and Malaysia, things stayed as they were until 1174, when the Dharmasraya expanded again and took control of the whole island and Malaysia in 1179.




And here's the region in 1150. There are several differences from the 3 previous maps. But perhaps the author chose a year that seemed more representative of the period 1150-1200 than the year 1150 itself; so, perhaps the year 1186:




In 1184, Srwijaya, which had probably become a vassal state, was assimilated into Dharmasraya :




On Java, Panjalu and Janggala are replaced by Kediri :




Here is the general situation in 1200:




On Java, in 1226, Kediri was replaced by Tumapel:




In 1251, Dharmasraya lost a piece of Sumatra:




On Java, in 1255, the Tumapel was replaced by the Singhasari:




Here is the general situation (by the same author) in 1250:




Then, in 1259, Aru became independent. And in 1267, it was followed by several countries north of Sumatra:




Ten years later, Singhasari became independent:




In 1290, the Singhasari completely replaced the Dharmasraya:



But the domination of Singhasari was very short-lived, since Majapahit and Palembang replaced it as early as 1293:



On Java, Singhasari was replaced by Majapahit in 1293 as well:



We can see that during this period, too, there was no expansion to the south-east, either because:


- the most powerful kingdoms were at war with each other
- the most powerful kingdom extended mainly to the north and northeast
- there was significant political instability
- Java's most powerful kingdom was not powerful enough to extend far enough east


It's true that the Kediri did go quite far east. But not far enough to colonize Australia. And then, of course, it collapsed, so the opportunity to conquer Australia was once again missed.

Majapahit kingdom (1292-1527)


The Majapahit kingdom appeared around 1292. According to [Wikipedia](#), it lasted until 1478. But it was actually a little longer, as it more or less survived under the aegis of Kediri princes for another 49 years, until 1527.

In this [video](#), you can see that it starts like this:







For the next 11 years, the conquest continued at a furious pace. By 1366, they controlled almost all of Sumatra, all the coasts of Borneo, various areas of Sulawesi, and many of the islands to the east of Java.




All went well until 1378:




Then came rebellions (Pemberontakan in Indonesian), leading to the loss of Malaysia for a time (1380-1391) and a small part of northeast Borneo (1383). However, the kingdom compensated in western Borneo (1380-1385):




By 1407, the kingdom had lost northern Sumatra (1405). And northern Borneo rebelled:




The fall continued in 1412 with the loss of much of Borneo (1412) and central Sumatra (1411). Southern Malaysia was also lost (1409).




In 1429, the kingdom regained control of southwest Borneo:



In 1444, it expanded into northeast Borneo. A revolt broke out in Malaysia in 1445, which was defeated in 1446:




In 1459, a small part of Sumatra was lost (center), along with part of Malaysia. In 1465, the kingdom lost the rest of Malaysia:




In 1478, it lost eastern Borneo. It regained a small part of Malaysia in 1467. And in 1468, part of southern Java seceded until 1478.


According to [Wikipedia](#), in 1478, the kingdom came under the control of the princes of Kediri. In fact, Kediri was a province of the kingdom to the east of Java. So it was still more or less internal factions that took power:




From 1499 onwards, it was the beginning of a general ebb. Malaysia was lost and the kingdom began to retreat to the east, near New Guinea:



By 1512, most of the kingdom had been lost. All that remained was Java and southern Borneo:




By 1526, it no longer controlled Borneo:



In 1527, the kingdom disappeared.

So, in 1365, Majapahit began to control the eastern zone, in the red square. It even had a foothold in New Guinea.



It did not disengage until 1500. So, from 1337, this state managed to expand over considerable distances, in just 28 years. Then, it had 135 years to get to Australia. But, no. Here, with virtually no one around, and immense power, it can't go any further.

But you can see what all the fuss is about by reading [Wikipedia](#), which also gives this map:



In reality, the Majapahit kingdom controlled only a small part of Indonesia, namely East and Central Java. The rest was made up of **vassal states** that paid tribute to the kingdom (areas in pale orange). And given the kingdom's small size in relation to the whole, it was more like an agglomeration of small states.

"The Nâgarakertâgama lists almost 100 "tributary lands" of Majapahit. In addition to Bali, Madura and Sunda, the list extends from Pahang on the Malay Peninsula to Gurun in the Moluccas, via Malayu (Jambi) in Sumatra and Bakulapura in Borneo. Put on the map, they roughly cover the territory of present-day Indonesia."

So there were around 100 tributary states. That means they were essentially very weak states. And obviously, the cohesion of the whole must have been very weak.

But it didn't stop there. In fact, for a good part of its history, the kingdom was **divided in two**, with one court in the west and another in the east:

*"An embassy from Majapahit was sent to China in 1377. The Chinese noted that there were then **two courts in Majapahit, one "of the West" and one "of the East"**. The "King of the West" was none other than Hayam Wuruk himself. The "King of the East" was identified as Bhre Wengker, i.e. the Prince of Wengker, Wijayarajasa, Hayam Wuruk's uncle.*

In 1404, civil war broke out between the Western and Eastern courts. The western king was Wikramawardhana or Hyang Wisesa (reigned 1389-1429), nephew of Hayam Wuruk (1350-1389). King of the East is Bhre Wirabhumi, prince of Wirabhumi, son of Hayam Wuruk. The following year, Chinese admiral Zheng He landed on Java as part of his first expedition. The civil war ended with the defeat and ruin of the Eastern Court in 1406.

So even the heart of the kingdom was not unified. It was divided in two.

As early as 1404, **civil war** broke out, leading to the defeat of the Eastern Court in 1406. Wars of succession further weakened the kingdom:

"At the end of the 15th century, wars of succession weakened Majapahit. In 1478, its territory came under the control of the princes of Kediri."

So, the period of unification of the heart of the kingdom, after 1406, apparently didn't last long.

And we can see from the maps that from around 1400 onwards, territories were lost and then regained. This means that there were wars: either civil, or with other states.

So, as early as 1404, there were wars justifying this kingdom's non-colonization of Australia. In fact, the stability of this kingdom only lasted a little over 100 years. But stability during the apogee period lasted only about 50 years. This empire barely had time to expand and stabilize before problems began. So it makes sense that it couldn't colonize Australia.

And the fact that this kingdom was essentially just an aggregate of many small states also helps to justify that although it apparently controlled the region as far as New Guinea, in fact it controlled very little and had no ability to go all the way to Australia.

We're told that it was during the Civil War that Zheng He arrived in Java. So, the Civil War, then the wars of succession, would have been good opportunities for China to seize Java. Especially since China was at the height of its power (Ming period). And if it wasn't around 1400, it could have been around 1500, when the Majapahit kingdom was but a shadow of its former self. Yes, but no, since distant expeditions were banned by the Chinese emperor as early as 1424. Well, maybe Java wasn't considered a far-off destination. But, in any case,


China did not take advantage of these various moments of weakness to invade Java.

2.2.2) Sultanate and Portuguese period (from late 15th century onwards)


The Demak sultanate (1478-1555)

After the rise of the Kediri princes, the **Demak sultanate** took over the eastern and central parts of the island from the north between 1475 and 1554. It also conquered southern Sumatra. This was the first Islamic state in Java.

Here it is in 1478 (see [here](#)):



Then in 1485:




The kingdoms of Sunda and Galuh have disappeared and been replaced by Pajajaran.

Here's a global map in 1511 ([here](#)):




So, in 1511, the sultanate was still only a small state.

Around 1512, the Sultanate of Demak began its ascent:



On the island of Java in 1515:



In 1519, the Sultanate began the conquest of Borneo and Sumatra:

1519
Kesultanan Demak

- Kesultanan Demak Bintoro
- Negara Bawahan/Vasal
- Pendudukan/Pemberontakan
- Ibukota: Bintoro

Sultan: Pati Unus / Syah Alam Akbar II

Peristiwa:

- Raden Patah wafat
- Pati Unus naik tahta
- Serangan ke Jepara
- Serangan ke Kalimantan Barat

Legenda:

1. Bintoro	10. Tambak Wetan
2. Semarang	11. Kudus
3. Ampel	12. Jowo
4. Tembung	13. Rembang
5. Kendal	14. Prastowo
6. Batang	15. Seblay
7. Pekalongan	16. Karanganyar
8. Pemalang	17. Cirebon

The conquest of Borneo was almost complete by 1526:

1526
Kesultanan Demak

- Kesultanan Demak Bintoro
- Negara Bawahan/Vasal
- Pendudukan/Pemberontakan
- Ibukota: Bintoro

Sultan: Trenggana / Syah Alam Akbar III


Peristiwa:

- Penaklukan Negara Daha
- Penaklukan Banten Girang
- Serangan ke Sunda Pajajaran
- Banjar menjadi vasal Demak

Legenda:

1. Bintoro	10. Tambak Wetan	21. Bekasi
2. Semarang	11. Kudus	
3. Ampel	12. Jowo	
4. Tembung	13. Laras	
5. Kendal	14. Prastowo	
6. Batang	15. Seblay	
7. Pekalongan	16. Karanganyar	
8. Pemalang	17. Cirebon	
9. Tegal	18. Indramayu	
	19. Sukang	
	20. Candi	


In 1527, Central and East Java descended into political chaos. A new kingdom appeared, Blambangan:




By 1532, the Sultanate had conquered most of the central part of the island:




By 1545, the sultanate had expanded a little further to the east of the island:




By 1547, Demak was at the height of his power:



But as soon as 1548, he lost the island of Borneo entirely:




In 1551, he also lost Sumatra:



Meanwhile, on Java, Pajang begins to emerge in the south. It's the beginning of the end for Demak:



And indeed, by 1555, Demak no longer existed:



So, once again, we have a state that developed mainly in the north and northwest. It was only after 48 years (in 1526) of its 77-year existence that it really began to develop on the island of Java, which would then have enabled it

to expand eastwards and possibly towards Australia. But even at the height of its power, it was unable to control the whole island, and especially not the eastern part, which is the most important for the problem we're concerned with. And then, after just 22 years (in 1548), it began its decline, putting an end to virtually any possibility of the Indonesian states invading Australia, since by then the Europeans had already arrived and would only increase in power.

And conveniently, the Portuguese settled in the **Moluccas** around 1529, largely cutting off the route of the supposed Indonesian kingdoms and sultanates to Australia. See [Wikipedia](#):

*"Negotiations and Treaty of Saragossa (1529): a meridian of separation is defined in the Pacific Ocean; **the Moluccas return to Portugal**; the Philippines to Castile, although located to the west of the meridian."*


Another [Wikipedia](#) page lists the Portuguese colonies:

"Molucas

- *Amboina - colonization (1576-1605)*
- ***Ternate - colonization (1522-1575)***
- *Tidore - colony (1578-1605). Captured by the Dutch in 1605."*

On the island of Java after the Demak: the 1555-1677 period


In 1555, political chaos returned. The Pajang Sultanate expanded. Demak disappeared, Cirebon appeared. And Lampung (Sultanate of Banten) took over a small part of the west of the island:




Around 1569, the Pajand Sultanate seized all the small states to the east:




In 1580, Lampung seized Pajajaran:




1582, chaos returned to the East:



1589, Pajang was replaced by the Sultanate of Mataram:



1618, Mataram expanded to the west and east, and took over Cirebon, which only lived for around sixty years:



In 1638, the Mataram took over the rest of the eastern part of the island:



But in 1677, a new state appeared, the Trunojoyo, which took over the vast majority of Mataram territory. At first glance, this was just a coup d'état. It was still Mataram, but under a different dynasty. And there were two areas that remained loyal to the Mataram dynasty.

More importantly, the Dutch East India Company (VOC on the map) began its conquest of the island. This was the beginning of the end for the kingdoms and sultanates of Java:



With the arrival of the **Dutch** in 1677, the history of Java was virtually over. It was not reborn until 1945, with the independence of Indonesia.

So between 1555 and 1677, a period of 122 years, there was great political instability, with incessant boundary changes, the rapid rise of one state or another, followed by an equally rapid collapse, and hence constant warfare.


First, there was the Pajang Sultanate, which dominated the island between 1555 and 1589 (only 34 years). But it mainly controlled the center. Then came the Mataram Sultanate, between 1589 and 1677 (88 years). It came to dominate practically the whole island, but only halfway through its reign, in 1638, i.e. just 39 years before its downfall. Too short to contemplate a possible conquest of Australia.

And in any case, **Portugal** had controlled **Timor** since 1596 ([here](#)), cutting off this route to Australia for the Java states. As a reminder, Timor is here :



Sumatra and southern Indochina: 1475-1824 period

This is a map of Sumatra in 1475. We can see that Majapahit has already declined considerably. That said, it still owns the eastern part of the island of Java, as we saw in the previous section. And there are many new states: the Sultanate of Malaka, Pagaruyung, Siantar, Pasai, etc. So, once again, the island is disunited:



In 1485, the situation changed slightly, with the conquest of the south of the island by the Pajajaran kingdom, based in West Java:



In 1513, the configuration changed once again. The Sultanate of Malaka extended north of Indochina. The Sultanate of Demak replaces the Majapahit kingdom. And the Aru kingdom became independent and conquered Siantar.




Importantly, around 1514, **Portugal** seized a small piece of Malaka (actually, it was around 1511, but the Demak took over this territory for a short time). So, the Europeans were now present:



Several states clashed, and within 12 years, the following situation emerged. The Pasais disappeared, replaced by the Aru (presumably a Muslim kingdom) and the Sultanate of Aceh. The Hatorusan also expanded.



In just 2 years, the situation changed again, this time in the center, with the Sultanate of Malaka being replaced by the Sultanate of Johor. And Pajajaran is split into 3 entities:



In 1539, Aru came under Aceh domination. And the latter conquered territories in the center:



In 1542, Aru became independent again and Indrapura appeared:



In 1551, just 9 years later, Hatorusan became Bakkara. The Sultanate of Demak disappeared and was replaced by the Sultanate of Palembang. The Sultanate of


Johor took over the northern part of its territory. And several small states have sprung up in the south. Instability is extreme.




In 1554, the three territories to the south became the Sultanate of Banten :




Between 1554 and 1630, the Sultanate of Aceh conquered a few limited territories in the north. The rest changed very little. But from around 1615, it began its ascent. By 1630, Aceh had conquered a large part of the island. [According](#) to Wikipedia, Pagaruyung became an Islamic state around this time.



But by 1637, the Sultanate of Johor had strangely risen from the ashes, and the Sultanate of Aceh had lost most of its conquests.




From then on, things slowed down. In 1667, the Pagaruyung seized some of Aceh's territories. Jambi became independent. Palembang seized the islands to the east.




By 1687, Aceh had lost a few more territories.


But, most importantly, the Dutch East India Company (VOC) seized the south of the island. Actually, it's not quite a military conquest. It was the Sultanate of Banten that became a Dutch protectorate. But the sultanate never regained its independence, and on the contrary, came increasingly under Dutch control, until its outright disappearance in 1808 ([here](#)). So, from this date onwards, the **Dutch** can be considered to have been present on the island.




Things didn't change much for about thirty years. In 1718, Johor became Riau. But not for long, as in 1722, the Sultanate of Johor took over the territory. The English had seized the southwest coast (EIC) since around 1700.




But by 1727, Johor had been replaced by Siak on Sumatra:



For another 40 years, things changed little. But in 1770, Palembang and Jambi were apparently reunited.




Then, apart from a few small movements between the native states, came the rise of the Europeans. In 1814, while the territories of the Dutch East India Company had been temporarily handed over to the English (Inggris), the latter seized other parts of the island to the south.



In 1824, the Dutch seized Palembang. In the meantime, Padri had grown considerably.

From then on, it was the beginning of the end for the indigenous states. The Netherlands gradually took over the whole island (by 1834, they already owned half of it). The island was completely conquered in 1907.



So, for 349 years (1475-1824), there was almost constant political instability. And, apart from a few years with the Sultanate of Aceh, no single state dominated Sumatra. There has always been considerable fragmentation, with at least 7 or 8 states sharing the island.

Conflicts are mainly between states in the north and center of the island. The far south is left alone most of the time. In any case, it is never invaded by the central or northern states.

Obviously, under these conditions, colonizing Java, let alone Australia, was out of the question for the Java states. And this was of course even less the case as, from 1677 onwards, the Dutch began to control Java. So, for the last 147 of those 349 years, the road to Australia was closed to them. And even before that, as we've seen, Portugal had controlled the island of Timor since 1596.

2.2.3) The history of Sulawesi, the Moluccas, Papua and Timor

Here's the map of the region again.




We're going to analyze the zones from west to east for those on the same latitude. So, first Sulawesi, then the Moluccas, then New Guinea. We'll finish with Timor.


Sulawesi

In **Sulawesi**, the most important kingdom seems to have been that of **Luwu**, which emerged from the 10th century onwards, according to [Wikipedia](#).


In this [video](#) by Lazard Wong Jogja, we have the following map:




By the year 1000, the kingdom controlled most of the island:



And it held a dominant position until 1399. The rest of the island, however, was divided into multiple kingdoms and tribes. So, here again, wars between the various states or tribes explain why Australia was not colonized:



From then on, the kingdom declined. But by 1500, the kingdom was still relatively powerful.



That said, on the [English](#) version of the Wikipedia page, we are told:

"In 1889, Dutch administrator of Makassar Braam Morris placed Luwu's heyday between the 10th and 14th centuries, but offered no clear evidence. The La Galigo, an epic poem composed in a literary form of the Bugis language, is the likely inspiration of the dating. Morris' theory combined two older concepts

which were already common in the region, which are the so-called 'primordial age' as described within La Galigo, and the widespread belief of other Bugis polities in South Sulawesi, who viewed the rulers of Luwu as the most senior lineages of all Bugis rulers.

*However, historians and archaeologists **expressed doubts regarding these claims. They noted that any historical records and chronologies of Luwu were 'disappointingly shallow' and 'absent of any evidence'.***"

So the whole Luwu kingdom thing seems completely bogus.

Besides, on [Wikipedia](#), we have:

*"By the 19th century, Luwu was a shadow of its former grandeur. James Brooke, later rajah of Sarawak, wrote in the 1830s that "Luwu is the oldest Bugi state, and the most decadent. [...] **Palopo is a miserable town consisting of some 300 houses, scattered and dilapidated. [...] It is hard to believe that Luwu could ever have been a powerful state, except in a very low state of native civilization.**"*"

This can also be found on the English version of Wikipedia:

"By the 19th century, Luwu had become a backwater. James Brooke, later Rajah of Sarawak, wrote in the 1830s that 'Luwu is the oldest Bugis state, and the most decayed. [...] Palopo is a miserable town, consisting of about 300 houses, scattered and dilapidated. [...] It is difficult to believe that Luwu could ever have been a powerful state, except in a very low state of native civilisation."

So, in 1830, there was hardly anyone in the "city" of Palopo, supposedly the capital of the Luwu kingdom.

And if there was hardly anyone in Palopo in 1830, this was certainly also the case in this region in general. And logically, there must have been even fewer before then. Which supports my contention that the region was virtually uninhabited when the Europeans arrived.

The latest research suggests that they only arrived around the 14th century:

"Extensive surveys and excavations in Luwu have revealed that the Bugis-speaking kingdom is a century or so younger than the oldest polities of the southwest peninsula. The earliest textual reference to Luwu is in the Majapahit court poem Desawarnana (c.1365), which listed Luwu, Bantaeng in southern


part of the island, and Uda (possibly Cina) as the three major powers on the peninsula. However, there are no convincing archaeological evidence of Bugis settlement in Luwu region before c.1300."

So, according to the official version, before the 14th century, there was no advanced kingdom on the island. And even from then, until the 15th century, there apparently was almost nothing much evolved.


That said, it's not at odds with the elite narrative. The fact that there was only a relatively primitive civilization and a scattered population helps explain why the Indonesians didn't colonize Australia (and not even New Guinea, apparently).

In fact, here, the elite has the choice of either having small, relatively primitive kingdoms, or a somewhat large kingdom with several other kingdoms and ethnic groups as on the previous maps, or just primitive tribes. And since the elite have installed a great deal of historical vagueness with regard to all this, they can navigate from one theory to the other.

The ghostly kingdom of Luwu persisted until 1577, when the **sultanate of Ternate** began its rise:



By 1580, in just 3 years, it was already almost at its peak. Amazing... And it's worth noting that the Portuguese were expelled from Ternate.




This situation is confirmed by this [Wikipedia](#) map. But here, we also have the situation in the Moluccas and the far west of New Guinea. And we can see that the Ternate Sultanate took control of these areas right from the start of its heyday:



We have a slightly different map on this other Wikipedia [page](#), which is supposed to be the situation of maximum expansion in 1585:




Here it is in 1604, just before its fall:




It did not last long (around 28 years). But it did have time to impose Islam on a large part of Sulawesi. And also to introduce it to New Guinea. Those are the two important things here.


In 1606, the Spanish-Portuguese (the two countries were one at the time) regained possession of the Moluccas and seized the eastern part of Sulawesi. So, the expulsion of Europeans from the Moluccas only lasted around 30 years:




But it didn't last long, as in 1626 they lost part of Sulawesi to the Sultanate of Gowa-Tallo :



And in 1636, they lost the entire island:




In 1642, Spain (now separated from Portugal) lost other islands:




So, since the state of Gowa-Tallo was Muslim, this means that all the rest of Sulawesi became Muslim.


In 1647, the Dutch East India Company took possession of the island of [Buru](#).



And in 1657, they set foot on the main island of Celebes:




It is worth mentioning that the Spanish lost the Moluccas in 1663. We'll come back to this later:




In 1667, the Sultanate of Gowa-Tallo collapsed. We return to a division by ethnic groups, tribes, kingdoms, sultanates, etc. The Sultanate of Ternate took over the eastern part of the island. The Dutch East India Company took over a small part of southern Sulawesi. What we can say is that if the old organization came back so easily (even if in a slightly different form), it's because the Gowa-


Tallo sultanate must once again have been a fragile construction, with mostly vassals, clients, etc. But all these "provinces" very probably retained a certain independence. And as soon as the central power disappeared, they became fully independent again. All this, if we stick to the official theory, of course:




In 1681, the Sultanate of Ternate took over the north of the country:




However, it was replaced by the Dutch East India Company in 1684:



They took possession of a further part of the Moluccas around 1781:



The situation remained more or less unchanged until 1899, when the Dutch resumed their conquest of the island, taking full possession of it in 1908:



Moluccas

For the Moluccas, we have no chronological maps. And information is very scarce. We have this on [Wikipedia](#):

*"The names Ambon, Gorong Islands, **Maluku** and Ceram are attested as early as the **14th century** in the Nagarakertagama, an epic poem written in **1365** during the reign of Hayam Wuruk (1350-1389), king of **Majapahit** in eastern Java. The text mentions "Ambwan", "Gurun", "Maloko" and "Seran" among the kingdom's hundred or so "tributary lands".*

*In reality, the territory controlled by the kingdom of Majapahit covered only part of East and Central Java. The "**tributary regions**" were in fact **trading posts** forming a commercial network, with Majapahit at its center. Majapahit sent dignitaries whose role was to ensure that these trading posts did not engage in private trade that would escape the kingdom."*

So, we only have the first document on the Moluccas in 1365. And it's just a simple epic poem. Before that, we have nothing. Perhaps in the future, official history will invent backdated documents for us, if the elite feel the need; but for the moment, there's nothing.

In fact, [Wikipedia](#) acknowledges that written sources are rare before 1500:

"Written sources for the area are scarce up to 1512 when Portuguese colonizers showed up. "

"Though Ternate, also known as Gapi, is not explicitly mentioned in pre-1500 sources it was the leading local kingdom in Maluku since the beginnings of documented history, and attracted traders from afar."

If there are no archives, this means that the natives didn't know how to write.

Also:

*"In 1505 Ludovico di Varthema claims to have visited "Monoch" which probably means Ternate and was the center for clove production. He derides **the inhabitants as primitive and does not mention them as being Muslims.**"*

So, one of the only sources available says that in 1505 the inhabitants of Ternate were primitive and not even Muslim. As for the second point, official historians say that it was the rulers who were Muslims, not the people. At least at first.

But what interests us more here is the fact that they were primitive. This is totally in line with what we've seen in Sulawesi. And there's no reason why they

shouldn't have been so before. So, until 1500, the civilization of the Moluccas was primitive, like that of Sulawesi.

In fact, the elite were obliged to have very primitive islands there to justify Australia not being colonized by the Indonesians. They could invent civilized states in Indochina, west and central Indonesia, but not east of Indonesia. If there had been an advanced kingdom there long ago, Indonesian civilization would have come very dangerously close to Australia, so it would have been natural for it to colonize it all along.

Since New Guinea and Australia were supposed to have only slightly less advanced natives, the pre-1500 inhabitants of Sulawesi and the Moluccas could not have colonized them, because they were superior neither in numbers nor technologically.

That makes sense. But the problem is that, being primitive, they should have been colonized by the more advanced countries of Sumatra, Java or Borneo. This is where the elite's narrative reaches its limit. We arrive at the extremely dubious fact that the Indonesians had been present in Sumatra, Java and Borneo for 1000 years, that they had been developed for a long time, that they sent their ships to trade as far away as China, that the kingdoms militarily extended their territory to thousands of kilometers in just a few decades, but that in 1000 years, they never colonized the Moluccan Islands and New Guinea, which were still in a very primitive state and with a very small population.

So, one of the elite's solutions to this logical problem is to suggest that the kingdoms on the other large islands to the west weren't all that powerful militarily speaking, and operated mainly on a system of vassalage. Most of the regions they apparently controlled were at best vassals, at worst vague trading posts. But if that were the case, then the Indochinese kingdoms would have had to invade them. And if the Indochinese kingdoms weren't so powerful, then China would have had to. And it can't be said that China wasn't powerful (at least at certain times).

Continuing with the Moluccan chronology, the story actually begins around 1500, with the rise of the Ternate and Tidore sultanates.

We saw above that the Ternate sultanate had taken possession of a large part of Sulawesi. So, you'd think it was a sultanate that originated in Sulawesi. But in fact, no, it originally came from the Moluccas (from the small island of Ternate).

In the second half of the 16th century, the Ternate sultanate was clearly the stronger of the two, controlling most of Sulawesi. But from the early 17th century, the Ternate sultanate lost most of its territories. The two were then more or less on an equal footing. Both seem to have established themselves in Western New Guinea. The Sultanate of Ternate regained some of the lost territories in Sulawesi in 1667. But it only lasted 14 years, losing them again in 1681. So, by the end of the 17th century and throughout the 18th, they were once again on an equal footing in terms of power.

As a result, by 1681, they no longer represented much in the way of power. They controlled only the Moluccas, a small territory. The main island is 350 km long from north to south, and at most 150 km from west to east. And even then, from west to east, it's usually between 25 and 50 km. All in all, it's 74,500 km². That's the size of Ireland (70,273 km²). Obviously, it's not great for stretching all the way to Australia. With such weak states, it's only natural that they can't colonize it.

Well, they control Western New Guinea, which might make you think they're pretty powerful. But on this island, they don't actually control much of anything.

And the problem is that during the early 16th century, the Portuguese put obstacles in their way. So, it undermined any ability to take over at least part of Australia. Indeed, [Wikipedia](#) tells us that throughout the mid-16th century, there were power struggles between the Sultanate of Ternate and the Portuguese, who wanted to get their hands on the region. At first, the Portuguese fought more with influence than with weapons, through coups d'état. It was around 1560 that fighting began, as the hostile objectives of the Portuguese became clear to the sultans. The Portuguese came to dominate, then lost control, then regained it, and so on... This lasted until 1575, when they were finally expelled. So, for most of the 16th century, the Portuguese sufficiently destabilized the region to explain why there was no further colonization of New Guinea by the Indonesians, and of course, no colonization of Australia.

So, as we've seen, at the end of the 16th century, the Ternate Sultanate gained enormous power by taking over most of Sulawesi. But it didn't last long, just

thirty years or so (1577-1606). And as with everything we've seen so far, they didn't expand towards Australia, but westwards.

Next, the Dutch East India Company interfered in the political life of the Moluccas. So, apart from the 29-year episode, the Moluccas were constantly destabilized by the Europeans. See [Wikipedia](#):

"In 1605, the Dutch of the United East India Company (VOC) seized Ambon as part of their policy of controlling the lucrative spice trade. The next step was the invasion of Tidore and the defeat of the Portuguese garrison in May of the same year. This was the end of the Portuguese presence in the Moluccas."

And again on [Wikipedia](#):

*"The VOC allied with the new Ternatan sultan and launched their own expedition in 1607 that recovered part of Ternate. **As a result, Ternate became heavily dependent on the Dutch**, who also made incursions in Tidore over the next years and secured some coastal forts."*

In the 17th century, the Sultanate of **Ternate** was heavily dependent on the Dutch.

The Sultanate of **Tidore** remained under Spanish influence until their departure in 1662. It then became independent, but was still under the domination of the Dutch East India Company. It is not under their direct control. But it doesn't do everything it wants either ([Wikipedia](#)):

*"A relatively **pro-VOC sultan, Saifuddin**, came to the throne in 1657 by pushing the other royal lineage aside. He agreed with the Dutch to **eradicate all clove trees in his realm**, in line with the VOC monopoly policy on the spice trade. In return he received a yearly compensation.*

*The Spanish in the Philippines, who needed all available resources for their defense against the Sino-Japanese pirate lord Koxinga, decided to **withdraw from Tidore in 1662**. This was effectuated in 1663–1666.*

*With the Spaniards gone, a new contract in **1667** spelled out the relations between the VOC and Tidore. In the 17th century Tidore became **one of the most independent kingdoms in the region, resisting direct control by Dutch East India Company (VOC)**. Particularly under Sultan Saifuddin's rule (1657–1687), the Tidore court was skilled at using Dutch payment for spices for gifts to strengthen traditional ties with Tidore's traditional periphery. As a result, he*

was widely respected by many local populations, and had little need to call on the Dutch for military help in governing the kingdom, as Ternate frequently did."

Regarding the 18th century, we have this:

"Tidore remained an independent kingdom, albeit with frequent Dutch interference, until the late eighteenth century."

So, it's still independent, but all the same, the Company frequently interferes with its business. There's clearly a dominant-dominated relationship.

"The unrest caused the VOC authorities to depose Jamaluddin in 1779 and to force his successor Patra Alam to conclude a new contract that abrogated the old one from 1667. With this document (1780), Tidore was turned from an ally to a vassal and thus lost its independence."

This unrest led the Company to turn the Tidore into a vassal and thus lose its independence in 1780. From then on, both the Ternate Sultanate and the Tidore Sultanate were vassals of the Dutch East India Company, and later of the Netherlands.

So, the history of the Moluccas only begins around 1500. From around 1520, the two sultanates began to suffer interference from Portugal (which later became the Hispano-Portuguese Union, and then Spain). Then, from 1607 onwards, they were also subject to interference from the Dutch East India Company, which turned into domination for the sultanate of Ternate (circa 1607). The Spaniards left Tidore in 1662. However, the Dutch East India Company strengthened its domination over time, and Tidore became a vassal of the latter in 1780. So the two sultanates never really had a chance to expand into Australia. And in any case, when the Ternate Sultanate was in its ascendant phase, it expanded westwards, not towards Australia.

New Guinea


For New Guinea, there's no need for in-depth analysis. We know that it was populated by aborigines and that it was sparsely populated and still in the Stone Age, whether before or after the arrival of the Europeans.

And yet, it was they who colonized New Guinea and Australia 40 or 50,000 years ago from Africa. Incredible. We'll see what all the fuss is about.


And we know from what we've seen before that colonization by the Moluccan sultanates didn't begin until 1500.

In this [video](#) by Lazard Wong Jogja, we see that the sultanate of Ternate didn't invade New Guinea until 1580.

Here it is in 1579:



And here it is in 1580:



So it wouldn't have been until 1580 that the Ternate Sultanate took control of part of Western New Guinea. Having said that, perhaps the Tidore Sultanate was already there before 1580 and the Ternate Sultanate took these territories from it. So perhaps the west of the island had been colonized for longer than that.


In any case, before or after that, the two sultanates must each have owned part of New Guinea territory, since in 1660, the Tidore sultanate obtained an agreement to share Western New Guinea with the Ternate sultanate ([Wikipedia](#)).

"The Sultanate of Ternate and the Sultanate of Tidore controlled and maintained a sphere of influence over parts of western New Guinea throughout their history. In 1660, an agreement was reached between the Sultanate of Tidore and the Sultanate of Ternate to share the island of Papua. This agreement, concluded under the supervision of the government of the Dutch East Indies, resulted in the recognition of the possession of the island of Papua in its entirety by the Sultanate of Tidore."

The fact that Tidore either took over all the land owned by Ternate, or took over the whole island (it's not entirely clear since, until then, even the two of them had only owned the western part of the island) is of interest for the rest of the story.

But what we're interested in here is the extent of colonization by the Moluccan sultanates.

This map, available on [Wikipedia](#), shows the situation in 1800:



The sultanates of Ternate (in red) and Tidore (in orange) in **1800**. In light orange, the vassal sultanates of the Tidore sultanate. Both sultanates were then under the control of the Dutch East India Company.

So, towards the end of the 17th century, before becoming a vassal of the Dutch East India Company, the Tidore sultanate controlled this part of Western New Guinea.

And this is where the fact that the Sultanate of Tidore received the territory previously held by the Sultanate of Ternate in 1660, and remained independent until 1780, takes on its full significance. Assuming that the sultanates had been present in New Guinea since say 1520, that gave another 120 years to establish Islam in Western New Guinea. To add to the previous 140 years (1660-1520).

Now, on [Wikipedia](#), it says that Islam only began to spread in 1606:

"During the 17th century, certain regions of Papua (Waigeo, Misool, Waigama and Salawati in particular) had embraced Islam. Thomas W. Arnold reports: "Some Papuan tribes on the island of Gebi, between Waigyu and Halmahera, are Muslim. [...] In the center of the island itself, only a few people have adopted Islam. The religion was first introduced to the west coast by Muslim traders trying to preach among the population, and this has been the case since 1606."

But in this case, the period up to 1660 would be even shorter. There would have been only 54 years between the start of Islamization and the period when Western New Guinea was given to the Sultanate of Tidore. If the Dutch East India Company had replaced the sultan with its own government, that would have been the end of the island's Islamization. So the additional 120 years of Tidore's independence is all the more important in justifying the Islamization of the island.

So, the fact that the Tidore sultanate remained independent for so long according to the official story is once again a will of the elite. In the official narrative, it reinforced the colonization and control of Western New Guinea by these sultanates. This made it part of the future Indonesia. And the duration of this control helped legitimize the attribution of Western New Guinea to Indonesia. It also helped to justify the introduction of Islam into the population. Otherwise, the story of Islam in Western New Guinea would have been harder to get across.

Why was it important for Western New Guinea to become Muslim and part of the Indonesian state in the future? We'll find out in a moment.

Contacts between Indonesians and Australian Aborigines

Since elite historians couldn't say that there had been no relationship between Indonesians and indigenous Australians, they were obliged to invent vague and sporadic contacts. But they trace them back to the 16th century at best. They speak of more significant relations from the 1750's. But of course, with the

presence of Europeans in the Moluccas, it was already too late to initiate colonization. How convenient ([Wikipedia](#)):

*"Although some evidence suggests that sporadic contact between the peoples of the Indonesian archipelago and indigenous Australians took place as early as the 16th or 17th century, it wasn't until the start of the **trepang** trade in the 1750s that meaningful relationships were first developed. Trepangers set out from the ports of eastern Indonesia, mainly Makassar and Kupang, and on arrival in Australia built shelters and open-air factories to process trepang for trade with China. Although they did not establish permanent settlements in Australia, there was intermarriage with indigenous Australians and their descendants have remained in northern communities to this day.*

At the height of the trade, trepangers travelled thousands of kilometers along the Australian coast, arriving each December with the monsoon. Their boats (perahu) carried up to 30 crew members, and it is estimated that up to 1,000 trepangers arrived each year. The crews would set up temporary facilities at various points along the coast to boil and dry the trepang before returning home to sell their cargo. Marege, meaning "wild country", was their name for Arnhem Land, from the Coburg peninsula to Groote Eylandt in the Gulf of Carpentaria, while the northwest coast was known as Kayu Jawa."

(note, the trepang is the sea cucumber, a kind of large sea slug.

Makassar is a town in south-west Sulawesi. And Kupang is in West Timor.)

And if they say it didn't happen until the 16th century, that's because there'd be a problem if they'd done it before. In that case, it would have been abnormal for them not to colonize Australia, even though they knew of its existence and regularly visited it. So, elite historians are obliged to place the first contacts around the 16th century.

The advantage of placing them at this time is that, as the Portuguese and especially the Dutch were already here, or about to arrive, and would destabilize the region, the trade in question was unlikely to turn into colonization. Not to mention the great political instability prevailing at the time.

Timor

Timor is also important to consider, as it too is very close to Australia. In fact, it's even closer than the Moluccas.



One might think that since it's not very far from Java, and very accessible (the islands leading to Timor from Java are not very far apart), a Javanese kingdom should have taken control of it very early on. But this is not the case, as [Wikipedia](#) shows:

*"The earliest historical record about Timor island is the 13th-century Chinese Zhu Fan Zhi, where it is called Ti-wu and is noted for its sandalwood. Later on, in the 14th-century Javanese Nagarakretagama, Canto 14, Timor is identified as an island **within Majapahit's realm**. Timor was incorporated into ancient Javanese, Chinese and Indian trading networks of the 14th century as an exporter of aromatic sandalwood, slaves, honey and wax, **and was settled by both the Portuguese, in the end of the 16th century, and the Dutch, based in Kupang, in the mid-17th century.**"*

So, the first historical reports about Timor date back only to the 13th century. Before that, nobody had ever talked about it. So we don't know anything about what was there before then. Logically, it must have been very primitive. And as it wasn't incorporated into any advanced kingdom, there was little chance of them going to Australia.

After that, it would have been part of the Majapahit kingdom. So, normally, this one being very close to Australia should have been able to go there. But no.

What's also interesting is the ethnic groups present. [Here](#), we are told:

"The native Timorese are Melanesian. The most important are the Atoni, present mainly in West Timor, who were pushed into the mountains by the Tetum, who settled in the central valleys from the Malay region in the 14th century".

And the Melanesians are clearly black, as can be seen on [Wikipedia](#).

Well, with the arrival of more Indonesian populations, i.e., of a more Asian type, there was some interbreeding. But, apparently, the population was quite black, like in New Guinea.

This means that if there was any movement of people from Timor to Australia between the years 0 and 1500, it's impossible to know, since they had more or less the same physical type as Australian aborigines. The same can be said of the people of New Guinea.

And again, in the case of population movements to Australia, as these were primitive populations, they were unlikely to create one or more advanced kingdoms in Australia. They could only create tribes just as primitive as those of the aborigines.

And the presence of black people in Timor means that the Indonesian kingdoms never organized a colonial settlement on the island. This idea is reinforced by the fact that the population is overwhelmingly Christian (90%), which means that the Javanese sultanates didn't have time to conquer and colonize the island. So, as with the Moluccas and New Guinea, there was no state with an advanced civilization on this island, which justifies why its inhabitants didn't go on to colonize Australia.

Except that it's astonishing. Given that they were still in the Stone Age and must have been very few in number, it should have been easy for a kingdom like Majapahit or others on the island of Java to take possession of the island and organize colonial settlement. So, in Timor too, the elite's narrative found its limit.

And from the end of the 16th century, Europeans arrived and blocked the passage to Australia. First the Portuguese, then the Dutch in the mid-17th century.

Summary and thoughts

So, while there were advanced civilizations and powerful states in Indonesia for at least 1,500 years, they were unable to colonize Australia. And this despite the fact that some kingdoms (e.g. Sriwijaya and Majapahit) lasted quite a long time.

To justify this, elite historians have once again used the method of having kingdoms expand away from the area posing problems for the official theory. Here, they expanded mostly north to west and northeast rather than southeast. Or they stopped expanding, but were forced to defend themselves (attacks from other countries or rebellions) in the North, West and Northeast.

Another method of justifying this situation is to say that the kingdoms in question were agglomerations of numerous small states under the domination of a slightly larger state. In other words, either a kingdom with vassals, or a kingdom dominating a kind of federation, or a mixture of the two. All with a rather limited cohesion. So, the kingdoms were much weaker than the impression one might get from looking at the maps. And territorial expansions were often not really conquests, but voluntary incorporations into this kind of federation. And even in the case of true conquests, the central kingdom had only a limited ability to keep the conquered area under trusteeship. And it only controlled it to a limited extent.

But as a result, the small vassal states that made them up were unable to expand on their own. And they were even less so, as they were generally less advanced than the kingdom that dominated the whole. And since the latter was not very powerful or extensive, its capacity for expansion was limited. This explains why these seemingly powerful kingdoms were unable to push all the way to Australia. Add to this the fact that wars were mostly fought to the north and east, and you may not notice the oddity of not expanding to the south-east or south.

Another argument is that most commercial activity was directed towards Sumatra and Malaysia. So, since that's where the wealth was, it was the area of interest to the most powerful Indonesian states. So, logically, they tended to develop northwards rather than southwards. And since the east and south were undeveloped and sparsely populated, the kingdoms weren't very interested in these areas commercially.

That said, the closer we get to modern times, the more the elite justify Australia's lack of colonization on the grounds of **political instability in Indonesia**. Indeed, even with all the above arguments, it would have been odd to continue with no development to the south-east during modern times. So, from around the 15th century onwards, the elite invented a great deal of instability, with kingdoms and sultanates constantly appearing and disappearing. In this way, the elite can continue to make people accept the fact that no Indonesian state has extended as far as Australia.

Another element that enabled the elite to justify the lack of invasion of Australia in modern times was the **arrival of the Europeans**. As the dominant force quickly became European, there was no Indonesian state powerful enough to colonize Australia. And there were even fewer as the Europeans fomented or supported coups and rebellions, increasing the region's political instability.

And as luck would have it, the Europeans began their takeover by invading the areas to the south-east of Indonesia, namely Timor, the Moluccas, Sulawesi and then Java, creating a barrier between the Indonesian states and Australia, and justifying the fact that the indigenous states were unable to push that far.

Despite all this, the lack of expansion towards Timor, Sulawesi and the Moluccas, and ultimately Australia, remains highly questionable. There were, however, two powerful states capable of expanding eastwards, then south-eastwards. The kingdom of **Sriwijaya** had around 400 years to do so (650-1088). And the kingdom of **Majapahit**, whose expansion and apogee phase lasted 186 years, from 1292 to 1478 (and 123 years for the apogee phase itself, between 1355 and 1478), could have gone much further south-east.

Generally speaking, there was no need for kingdoms and sultanates. Since there were very few people in the Southeast, the inhabitants of the most populous and advanced regions, such as Java, should have migrated there naturally.

So the elite could solve the problem by saying that Timor, the Moluccas and Sulawesi had a fairly large population and that's why the Javanese didn't colonize them until 1500. But we've already seen that this is certainly not true, even within the official framework.

And even if there had been a somewhat large population, but primitive and splintered into various tribes independent of each other, it wouldn't have been able to resist advanced kingdoms.

So, because of the proximity of Timor, Sulawesi and the Moluccas to Australia and the impossibility of moving the problem further afield again, the elite are forced to leave a contradiction in their narrative. Fortunately for them, as this is an area where there aren't many people and not much happens, hardly anyone is interested in their story or asking such questions.

But then we arrive at this extraordinary situation where, over at least 1,500 years of history, there has not been a hint of colonization of Australia by Indonesians, whereas we are told that it was by Aborigines 40,000 years ago or more. And this despite the fact that there are lots of islands between south of New Guinea and Australia, which are generally only 10 to 30 km apart (the furthest being around 50 km). And Indonesians from Sumatra and Java have been able to regularly travel thousands of kilometers from island to island to the Philippines or the Moluccas.

It should also be noted that all these states, and the very regular changes in the political situation, create a considerable **complexity** for anyone interested in the region's history; a complexity that increases even more in the era of the sultanates. It keeps people from looking into it. And for the very few who do, they don't understand what's going on. In the end, practically only a few professional historians will study it. And even then, it doesn't lead to any questioning, because to discover the plan at work, you have to be a recentist, or even an extreme recentist. And of course, no professional historian is. In any case, since they're slaves of the elite, they're not going to question the official story. That would be the end of their professional careers.

Complexity obviously implied the presence of many small, weak states. And this was necessary to explain why the Europeans were able to establish themselves so easily. If there had only been one or two very powerful states, it

would have been very strange. Normally, they would have been thrown back into the sea. Because it's not with a few hundred men armed with inaccurate and slow-reloading arquebuses that they could have imposed themselves against a powerful state with tens of thousands of men at its disposal. The Europeans' technical military advance gave them only a slight advantage, which did not hold up for a moment in the face of a major numerical disadvantage. So, taking control of whole regions was very dodgy if there were one or two major states in Indonesia. But with small states and therefore small armies, this was easily explained.

And it was all the more possible because the presence of so many small states and the almost constant evolution of the political situation meant wars, revolts and palace revolutions, etc., which made it possible to justify a European takeover via support for one faction or another. So, complexity served two purposes: to make the situation incomprehensible, and to justify the gradual takeover of this part of the world by the Europeans.

That's why, as luck would have it, the great kingdoms suddenly ceased to exist with the arrival of the Europeans. We still had the powerful Sultanate of Demak in 1550. After that, nothing. All that remained were small and medium-sized kingdoms and sultanates.

The reality, as in Indochina, is that there were only scattered tribes in Indonesia when the Europeans arrived. The population was very small and there was no advanced state.

But the white race was still too weak and too busy colonizing North America and eastern Russia to consider colonizing Asia.

And even where there was no colonization of settlements, the elite hired armed forces and agents of influence to ensure that all countries would be at their beck and call in the future. This was the case in Africa and South America. In fact, the elite sent armed forces and agents all over the world. It had to be at the height of its deployment capabilities.

As Asians were also multiplying at a rapid rate, trying to colonize the whole of Asia would have led to a dispersal of forces throughout the rest of the world. So, in Asia, European settlers would not have been able to overwhelm the natives. They would have represented only a small percentage of the whole, which

would eventually have disappeared, or which would have had no capacity for influence. So something else had to be done.

It was better to have two completely white zones: northern Asia (Siberia) and southern Asia (Australia), and to manipulate the Asians so as to enable future nibbling from the north and south.

In this perspective, the development of the Muslim religion in Indonesia was intended to provoke external and internal conflicts in the future throughout the Asian zone, leading to the colonization of Asia by white people. Of course, that's not all. For example, the elite will ensure that China collapses and splinters into several entities. But it's nonetheless an important element.

And they've made sure that the Indonesians are becoming more numerous than they should be, so that they can weigh heavily on the geopolitics of Asia. Perhaps, too, the demographic figures are fudged to make it look as if there are more of them than there really are.

Some will say that it's impossible for Europeans to have imposed the Muslim religion on the natives. But most people have no problem with the fact that the first sultans imposed the Muslim religion on the natives, who were Buddhist or Hindu. Just as they have no problem with Henry VIII in England imposing the Anglican religion in 1534, or Emperor Theodosius imposing the Christian religion as the official religion of the Roman Empire in 392. As for Indonesia, you have to realize that these were primitive peoples, probably without religion, and therefore easily manipulated and coerced. In reality, it's the fact that advanced peoples change religion so easily that's bizarre. The fact that primitive tribes do so is much less so.

Note: to explain European interest in the region, historians talk about trade in spices and other local goods. But in reality, the goal was never trade. It was already the elite who were behind sending ships to Asia. And the elite of the time obviously didn't care about a few ridiculous spices or porcelain services. From the outset, the goal was colonization.


If trade had been the only goal, why bother colonizing Australia? All the elite had to do was let the Indonesians settle there, develop the country, and then trade with them. The same goes for the eastern part of Siberia. They could just as easily let the Chinese settle there and develop trade.

3) The Dutch East India Company

In Europe, we don't know the history of Indonesia, and we know virtually nothing about the history of the Dutch East India Company. We know it existed, we know the name. We know it traded with Asia. But that's about it. As a result, we tend to think that it had a few trading posts in Asia, who knows where, and that it didn't last very long. But that's not the case at all. The Dutch East India Company controlled a vast territory for a long time. And that's important for what happens next. It is therefore necessary to study the history of this company.

We'll pick up the maps where we left off. We'll start with Java, then Sumatra. And I'll complete this with maps showing the whole region.

So here's the one for Java. In 1618, the Dutch East India Company (VOC on the maps) only owned a tiny piece of territory in the north-west:




In 1638, the Mataram took over the rest of the eastern part of the island. The Company continued to control only a tiny, albeit expanding, territory:




In 1677, the Company significantly expanded its territory. But it remained very limited:




The Dutch conquest was very rapid, since in just 2 years the Trunojoyo was almost completely replaced by the Dutch East India Company (in 1679):




In 1685, the Mataram regained part of its territory. And Trunojoyo no longer existed:



In 1707, the Dutch East India Company increased its territory and Mataram became Pakubuwono (circa 1704). That said, it didn't last long, as by 1710 it was Mataram again:



Between 1739 and 1748, the Mataram expelled the India Company from the central part of the island. But by 1748, the Indian Company had reclaimed the lost territory and the situation was back to normal.



In 1757, the India Company took over the entire Mataram territory.



And in 1770, it took over the Blambangan territory:



Around 1800, the United Provinces (the Netherlands) were invaded by Napoleon's troops. And William V of Orange-Nassau sent instructions for the territories of the India Company to be ceded to the English. The East India Company was dissolved in 1799, never to rise from its ashes. Once the Netherlands became independent again, the Dutch government took control of these territories:



In 1811, the island was controlled by the India Inggris, which certainly referred to the English, who had taken control of the Dutch possessions to prevent them from being controlled by Napoleon:



But as early as 1817, the Dutch regained ownership of the site:



From 1825 to 1827, the Diponegoro launched a revolt and succeeded in taking over the central part of Java. By 1830, however, the Diponegoro had been totally defeated, and the Dutch were once again in possession of the whole island:




From then on, virtually nothing changed for over a century (apart from the capture of the eastern island, Bali, around 1848).




So, from 1679 onwards, the local kingdoms and sultanates only declined and succumbed to the Dutch East India Company, then to Holland itself. And they would never rise from their ashes, since when Indonesia became independent in 1945, they became part of it.

Let's take a look at **Sumatra**.


The Dutch East India Company (VOC) seized the south of the island in 1687, making the Sultanate of Banten a protectorate :



Things remained virtually unchanged for the Company for 137 years. It wasn't until 1824 that the Dutch seized Palembang.




Then, in 1827, the Dutch extended their territory a little further:




In 1834, they seized half the island:




It continues in 1840:




In 1858, they seized Siak :




In 1904, they conquered Aceh.



And in 1907, the whole island was conquered:



It is worth noting that towards the end of the 19th century, the British seized what is now Malaysia. The conquest was completed around 1915:




Let's take a look at the maps showing the entire **Indonesian zone**.

In 1650, the Dutch East India Company was present mainly on the eastern islands (Moluccas and Timor):




By 1700, the Company had greatly expanded its territory. It controlled part of Ternate and the Moluccas, as well as the islands to the east of Java, including Timor:




The situation in 1750 was as follows:



In 1800:



By 1850, its territory had expanded once again:



By 1900, it controlled almost all of Indonesia, apart from present-day Malaysia:



As mentioned above, Holland completed its conquest of Indonesia around the turn of the 20th century. As a result, a few more territories were annexed. We saw this with Sumatra and Sulawesi, which were fully conquered in 1907 and 1908 respectively.

Holland's role is important for the history of the destabilization of the region in the period 1600-1800. But it is just as important in relation to its gradual takeover of Indonesia. That's what we're going to see now.

4) Why Islam in Indonesia, and why have they increased Indonesia's population so much?

As we go on to study the history of the region, there's another oddity that comes to light, and which implies several future developments: **the fact that Indonesia is Muslim.**

This is not a historical impossibility. It's not a major inconsistency. But it's still very bizarre.

It's hard to see how Islam could have imposed itself so easily. Firstly, it didn't have the ethnic substrate to do so. The Indonesian population is essentially Asian, even if it differs slightly from the Asians of the continent. So you can't say it's a population replacement or anything like that. And there was already a long presence of Buddhism and Hinduism in the region before the Muslim religion took hold. So it's hard to see why people would have changed so easily.

The story of princes who convert, thereby forcing their people to do so too, without encountering too much resistance, and who, as luck would have it, enjoy immediate military success, enabling them to extend their kingdom and thus the Muslim religion throughout the region, is a little too good to be true. For one thing, it's hard to see why they would have done this (the explanation of commercial advantages isn't very convincing). And secondly, there should have been far greater resistance from the people and the clergy.

So, even within the official historical framework, this story is dodgy. That said, within that framework, we can say why not and leave it at that. But when you're a conspirationist and you know about the existence of the elite, there's no doubt that this isn't a natural situation, linked to the vagaries of history. It's necessarily the result of manipulation by the elite.

From what we've already seen elsewhere, it's clear that there were in fact no Muslims in Indonesia when the Europeans arrived. It was the Europeans who imposed this religion on the locals. And it's quite possible that there weren't any natives in certain parts of Indonesia, and that it was the Europeans who brought them in, and then gave them this religion. And behind the Europeans, there's the elite.

And of course, it's the elite who have managed to dramatically increase the Muslim population in Indonesia to around 270 million.

And as already mentioned above, it's quite possible that the official population figures have been manipulated upwards by the elite, to make people believe that there are more Indonesians than there really are. I saw on this [topic](#) that in many Third World countries, the authorities have an interest in overestimating the population in order to obtain greater aid from the IMF, Western countries and humanitarian organizations. So there's a considerable incentive to lie about the true figures. Moreover, when you look at the map of Java, for example, it doesn't seem to add up.

So, the question is: **why did the elite do it?** On the face of it, there's no point. The Buddhist or Hindu religion posed no problem in this region. But the elite don't do things like this for no reason. There are always one or more major political objectives behind it.

We saw in the previous paper that there would probably be an invasion of northern China by the white race in several centuries' time. And I said that, at the same time, the elite would make sure to destabilize the south by the massive arrival of Indians and/or blacks.

But it's possible that the Indonesians will also play this role. With 270 million Indonesians (of whom 230 million are Muslims), they represent a force large enough to invade Indochina. They could also migrate to southern China and Islamize part of it, destabilizing the region.

That's why Indonesia is so densely populated today, whereas 500 years ago there were probably hardly any people. The elite wanted Indonesia to become a threat to Indochina and China. And to do that, it had to be densely populated (as well as Muslim). So, from the 19th or 20th century onwards, the elite made sure to encourage the Indonesian birth rate as much as possible.

Now, many of these events would also be possible with a purely Buddhist and/or Hindu Indonesia. Indonesia could invade Indochina without being Muslim. And many Indonesians could emigrate to China. But the Muslim religion has a much more aggressive image than the other two. And as it's a different religion from those in China and Indochina, it has a much greater potential for destabilization. Buddhist Indonesians migrating to China would have no particular reason to be a ferment of subversion, whereas Muslim Indonesians would. The fact alone that it's a very different religion is a source of problems.

The Muslim religion may also explain a difference in demographic dynamism. The Muslim religion encourages people to have children. And there will have to be a lot of Muslims in this region to have enough men to wage war on Indochina and to have a lot of immigrants in China. And Indonesia will very likely wage war on Australia too. It would be possible to explain it differently, but it helps.

One possible explanation for Indonesian immigration to China is a difference in demographic dynamism. China won't be having any more children. It will return to a population of 500 million, and an ageing one at that. Indonesia, on the other hand, will have a population of 500 million, young and with a high birth rate. This will justify China's acceptance of immigration from Indonesia (and India too). Of course, China will be reluctant for a few decades, just for good measure. But it will eventually accept. And before long, Indonesian Muslims will represent 20 or 30% of the population in southern China, Indians 10 or 20%, and so on...

In fact, a few days after thinking about this (October 2023), I saw a report on the 8 o'clock news highlighting China's demographic problem, which was compared to India's situation. The forecast for China was 500 million inhabitants. And for India, it was 2 billion. I think it was a one-century forecast. So, the elite are already preparing us for a demographic collapse in China, and for problems in relation to its more or less immediate neighbors, still more prolific.


The elite can also point to the obscurantism of Islam to justify a technological collapse of southern China. And they may point to the tendency of Muslim states to fragment, to justify a political break-up of the south into several sultanates. But we'll probably also have regions that remain Buddhist, democratic, communist, etc. We'll have a veritable chaos that will last for hundreds of years. The elite will take advantage of this to have the territory gradually nibbled away by the whites, from the north. And it's likely that there

will be more and more interbreeding between Chinese and whites in central China.

5) Australia and the project to expand the white race in Asia

And it's not just against China that Muslim Indonesia will be useful.

In my opinion, the elite also have a plan for **Australia**. They're probably going to attack Asia from the south too. And Australia will be the one to do it. So, the elite will attack Asia both from the north (eastern Russia) and from the south (Australia):



What we can assume is that Australia will wage war on Indonesia and gradually take over its various islands. So that Australia appears as the innocent victim and not as the evil white colonizer, it will probably be Indonesia that starts the war. Perhaps it will win part of the war at first, to raise fears of Australia's disappearance. But in the end, after many setbacks, Australia will win. And it will take New Guinea, where it will be welcomed as a liberator by the natives and the Western media.

Later, further wars will lead to Australia taking over **Java**. At that point, it will be the whites who will have a galloping birth rate, while that of the Indonesians will be low. As a result, New Guinea and Java will be swamped by white populations. Perhaps this will also be helped by mass expulsions of Muslims to neighboring islands. And of course, the media will then present the whites as liberators and the invasion as desirable, even indispensable.

It's possible that Indonesia will attack one or more Indochinese countries at the same time as Australia, in order to appear even more like the bad guy. And when the coalition of Indochinese countries and Australia wins, and takes over Indonesian territories, it will help prevent the operation from being seen as the return of white colonialism.

With an Islamic state, the elite will be able to present it as a conflict of civilizations. As there will have been World War 3 before, which will have opposed Westerners against Arab and black Muslims, this will bring back very bad memories. Islam will once again serve as the villain of the piece.

Then, of course, there's the problem of the number of soldiers needed to win a war against an enemy vastly superior in numbers. On the face of it, it's impossible. But we have to reckon with the arrival of robot soldiers. This is in full development. For the moment, it's far from perfect. But in 200 or 300 years, it'll certainly be mature, and probably even before that. So, we could have a population of maybe 100 million Australians versus 500 million Indonesians. But with the contribution of robots, the balance of power will be completely reversed. It's true that you could say that Indonesians will also have access to robots. But the elite will ensure that this is not the case, or in much more limited quantities. They'll justify it with an economic recession, or the fact that Islam is fundamentally obscurantist, or other reasons. And as a result, the elite will be able to justify a military defeat despite a larger population.

And perhaps Australia will have 250 million inhabitants by then, while Indonesia will have regressed to 300 million, making its numerical superiority far less important. It's also possible that Indonesia will be broken up into several autonomous states, allied or not depending on circumstances, allowing Australia to have superiority at every turn. There may also be military assistance from the USA.

Since the elite want to eliminate non-whites, perhaps there really will be deaths on the Asian side. But it's possible that, there too, the battles will be largely phoney and that there will be few, if any, deaths. The important thing will be that the Indonesians will agree to leave their land because they believe they have been defeated, and that the land will go back to the whites, who will then be able to multiply and further increase their living space to the detriment of the Asians.

Originally, there was another possible scenario for Asia. One might have thought that the elite were simply trying to prevent the Asians from advancing westwards, without any desire to exterminate them. A sort of containment policy. But the presence of Muslims in Indonesia tipped the scale in favor of extermination.

By the way, again in relation to the discussion about who dominates, the Jews or another elite, the Jews could have decided to colonize Australia in the 19th century. There were no people and the territory was immense. And the English government was eating out of their hands. So they could have found any pretext to allocate a good part of Australia to the Jews, if not the whole country. It could have started with the deportation of many Jews to Australia and the restriction of non-Jewish immigration, and then, with the Jews being the most numerous group, the country could have seceded. And before long, the Jewish religion would have become the official religion and the country could have been called Israel. It would have been much more interesting than Palestine, demographically speaking. And it was also a much safer area.

You might say that it was because the Jewish leaders were determined to take back the historic territory of Palestine. But if nothing of the sort happened, it's not for historical reasons of religious fanaticism, it's because it's not the Jews who are at the top of the pyramid. It's a white elite. And as a result, they've put white (and particularly pure) people there.

In any case, what's certain is that if it were the Jews who were the real leaders of the world and wanted to exterminate the white race, insofar as this project was already enacted in 1800, and had been for a long time, they would never have had Australia colonized by whites, but by Indonesians.

And even if we wanted to prevaricate and say that the plan to exterminate the white race was a later one, dating back to 1850, here, it's absolutely certain that it had already been conceived. And, in 1848, there were still only 332,000 white settlers in Australia. So the Jewish leaders had no problem stopping white immigration and replacing it with Indonesians and eventually blacks to quickly achieve an almost totally non-white country.

If nothing of the sort happened, it's clear that it's not the Jews who are at the top of the pyramid.

You may wonder when this expansion into Asia will happen, and how long it will last. Given that the white world is going to have to digest the Middle East before doing so, it's safe to assume that it won't happen for at least 200 years, if not 300. And it's going to take another 300 years. So, that brings us to 2300 for the beginning of the operation, and the year 2600 for its end.

And that's if the elite haven't planned to absorb Africa first. Otherwise, it could delay the plan for another 500 or 600 years.

Of course, the elite could carry out 2 projects at the same time: Africa and Asia. But, given the huge chunks involved, it's safe to assume that they'll do them one after the other. A priori, they should do Africa before Asia. Indeed, as we saw in a previous paper, black-white half-breeds and some of their white allies will very probably be expelled to Africa after World War 3, in order to reverse-breed black Africans and create a bridgehead for future white colonization. So it's safe to assume that the elite will be obliged to launch Project Africa at that point.

But, as the Middle East project will have to be carried out first, progress will be relatively slow throughout this period. So it's only around 2300 that the Africa project will begin to reach cruising speed. And it will finish around 2600. So it's around 2600 that the elite will launch the Asia project. That said, they may not finish the Africa project in one go. Maybe they will pause it halfway through and start the Asia project then. The latter would then start around 2450. At this stage, many scenarios are possible.

5.1) Future fanatics in Australia?

We've seen how the elite like to have religious fanatics carry out their colonization work, when there are indigenous populations to expel. These fanatics are often themselves expelled from their countries for religious dissent.

In the case of Australia, there was no need because there was no one. So the elite were able to bring in normal settlers. At first, there were the prisoners. But economic immigration soon sufficed.

And if Australia is to colonize Indonesia, it's possible that the elite will give birth to such a movement, then expel its followers to Indonesia. Having a religious movement will also ensure that the colonists have as many children as possible.

6) Alternative reflections on the history of Sulawesi, the Moluccas and Papua

All this helps to explain a number of things about Sulawesi, the Moluccas and New Guinea.

The first thing that's strange is that there doesn't seem to have been any advanced state dominating the region before 1500. And while the Portuguese had already arrived in the area, all of a sudden, two sultanates appeared and began to control a large part of the region within a few decades. Rather bizarre. But it makes sense. The elite wanted Muslims in the area too.

But sultanates dominating the region meant a relatively advanced civilization. And that posed a problem for Australia. So, there had to be nothing but primitives until 1500, to justify the fact that Australia had not been colonized by advanced kingdoms from these islands. And there suddenly had to be two sultanates from 1500 onwards. Then, these sultanates had to expand rapidly, because in the elite's narrative, the Dutch were going to arrive quickly and dominate the region. If these sultanates had taken centuries to establish themselves, vast areas would have been untouched by Muslim influence. So the sultanates had to gain control of the region very quickly.

In fact, the sultanates arrived late enough to explain why they didn't colonize Australia, but early enough to justify the Islamization of all Sulawesi and the Moluccas.

And the fact that the Portuguese, then the Dutch, moved into the region around 1500 also helps to justify why the sultanates didn't expand into Australia.

That said, when the Europeans arrived, Islam had not yet been established for long enough to justify quite convincingly the fact that these two islands subsequently became Muslim. If the Europeans had simply annexed these territories and imposed a European-style, multi-faith government, the proportion of Muslims would have remained very low. This is why the elite ensured that, in the official narrative, the sultanates remained relatively independent for a long time, even when they were under the domination of the Dutch East India Company, thus justifying the continued establishment of Islam in the region.

And the fact that the elite had these islands colonized by a private company instead of the Dutch state itself helped to justify the fact that the Muslim religion was not a problem for the colonizers. If it had been the Dutch state itself that had colonized the region, it would have been normal for it to impose the Christian religion on the natives. It's true that the Netherlands was Protestant and therefore relatively liberal when it came to religion, but still. Here, with a private company, the elite could justify that religion was not an issue. And then, when the Dutch East India Company ceased to exist in the early 19th century and the Dutch state replaced it, Islam had been established long enough that it could no longer be questioned.

7) The Dutch period

The study of the **Dutch** period completes this analysis. The important thing here is that Holland colonized the whole of Indonesia. Why did the elite do this?

Well, colonizing all of Indonesia was necessary to create the Indonesian entity of today. Indeed, it created a sense of community between the inhabitants of the different islands. Feelings they had no reason to have in the official narrative, since Indonesia was supposed to have been a shifting constellation of states for over 1,000 years. It was hard to justify the proximity of Indonesia's inhabitants under these conditions. But with the oppression of the European colonizer, it became possible. All were united in their rejection of the Dutch tyrant.

Another problem that stood in the way of the creation of the Indonesian entity was **language**. The different islands of Indonesia were supposed to have many different languages. Indeed, as it was necessary for the elite to have a very chaotic history of the region, you couldn't have just one language, but on the contrary, lots of different languages and dialects. This posed a problem for the creation of a unified state. Dutch colonization made it possible to impose a common language.

In this [video](#), we can see that it was Holland that imposed Malay as a second official language alongside Dutch. Then, a derivative of Malay, Indonesian, became the official language of Indonesia.

As luck would have it, the alphabet was derived from Arabic. This reinforced the credibility of the thousand-year-old trade between Indonesia and the Arabian Peninsula. And it also reinforced the credibility of Indonesia's thousand-year-old history.

And the fact that the Netherlands colonized Indonesia slowly was used to justify a better establishment of Islam. It's true that, since Islam officially arrived around 1500, it would already have been well established if the Netherlands had colonized the whole of Indonesia around 1700. But by 1800/1850, the elite could make it seem inescapable - and this, almost everywhere. This wouldn't have been the case if the Netherlands had colonized all of Indonesia by 1700. Or at least, it would have been less convincing.

And it's likely that this is why the elite ensured that Portuguese colonization remained limited in the region, and was quickly ousted. They didn't want the colonization to be carried out by a Catholic, proselytizing state.

So, if the elite made sure the Dutch controlled all of Indonesia, it was to get what is now Indonesia. If they hadn't controlled Sumatra or Java or Borneo, etc., today's Indonesia would have been far less powerful. They had to extend their control to the whole region, to obtain a powerful, unified entity, so that it could wage wars against Indochina, China and Australia in the future.

And that's why **Japan** pushed all the way into Indonesia during the 2nd World War. It helped justify a global rebellion, the end of Dutch control over the region and the subsequent **unification of Indonesia**.

Indeed, [Wikipedia](#) tells us that Japan encouraged the nationalist independence movement during the period it controlled the island.

"The Dutch East Indies were occupied by the Empire of Japan during the Second World War from March 1942 to 1945."

*"The deepest and most lasting effects, however, were **more visible on the Indonesians** than the Dutch. Optimistic, they had initially welcomed the Japanese as liberators. This sentiment soon changed, as the Japanese occupation proved to be the most brutal and ruinous in the country's history. As a result, **Indonesians became politicized for the first time, even in the countryside.***

*Part of this political awakening was desired by the Japanese: in Java, and to a lesser extent in Sumatra, **they educated, trained and armed many young Indonesians and promoted their nationalist leaders.** Thus, by destroying Dutch colonial rule and aiding Indonesian nationalism, **they created the conditions for Indonesia's proclamation of independence.** After the end of the Second World War, Indonesians experienced five years of diplomatic, military and social struggle to ensure this independence."*

So, because of the Japanese, there was a politicization of the whole Indonesian people, and the emergence of a rebellion on a national scale and not limited to this or that island or even this area of this or that island; in other words, a rebellion on a national level and not a regional one. Without the Japanese, it was hard to justify. The natural tendency would have been to have local revolts. And assuming they all succeeded, this would have led to the creation of several countries in the Indonesian region, not the creation of present-day Indonesia. And that's not what the elite wanted. Here, with a united front, it was possible to justify a military defeat of Holland and then the creation of a huge country, namely Indonesia. And only Japan could justify the creation of such a united front at that time.

The elite could have justified a global rebellion via Chinese communism after the 2nd World War. But it wouldn't have been in China's best interest to encourage the emergence of a major political force south of the border. So it would have been suspicious. In fact, it wasn't in the Japanese interest either. But, in the hysteria of the great ideological movements of the time, and in the fury of war, it wasn't too suspicious.

If there had been no nationalist leaders and no Indonesia-wide rebellion, this would have posed a problem. Indeed, as there are different islands, if there had been isolated movements, it would have been easy to justify a victory for the Netherlands, which could have attacked them in isolation. Or, at the very least, the Netherlands would have been able to hold on to much of its territory. But the elite wanted the Dutch to lose all of Indonesia.

Not only did the Japanese create the conditions for popular support for the cause of Indonesian independence, and support the nationalist movements, they also **armed** them. Because without arms, they couldn't have done anything.

Finally, it was the Japanese who gave Indonesia its independence when they left, forcing the Dutch to fight with well-armed, united rebel troops with their own government.

But despite the particular conditions (Japanese nationalism, war), Japan's policy is highly questionable.

Firstly, it's hard to see why Japan would have sought to encourage the creation of a gigantic state to the south of its territory. Granted, this territory was already united, except that it was under Dutch control. But having a colony under the control of a small state 10,000 km to the west is not the same degree of danger as having the same territory, but independent. Especially since, in this case, Holland was only interested in exploiting the territory economically, not in colonizing it. And this was the case for all Western colonizers in the region (except Australia).

In fact, if the Dutch were unable to defeat a simple rebel movement after the war, it was far better to have this extremely weak country at the helm than a huge Indonesian state. Sooner or later, the latter could have hegemonic ambitions for the region.

Secondly, it's not clear why Japan developed Indonesian nationalism when it controlled the island. It had no reason to abandon this territory in the near future. So why fund and arm people who were likely to turn against Japan relatively quickly, especially given its tyrannical policy towards the Indonesians? With regard to this last point, [Wikipedia](#) states:

*"Perceptions of the Japanese occupation varied considerably according to one's place of residence and social position. Many of those living in areas of importance to the war effort were **subjected to torture, sexual slavery, arbitrary***

arrest and execution, and other war crimes. Many thousands were deported as forced laborers (romusha) for Japanese military projects, including the Death Railway between Thailand and Burma, and many died of ill-treatment and starvation. Between 4 and 10 million romusha were forced to work for the Japanese army in Java. Some 270,000 were sent to other parts of Southeast Asia, of whom only 52,000 were repatriated to the island, a mortality rate of 80%.

A belated UN report states that four million people died of starvation or forced labor in Indonesia during this period, including 30,000 European civilians who died in captivity."

Now, it's true that from 1943 onwards, it was clear that Germany was going to be defeated. So, Japan probably envisaged that it would be expelled from Indonesia before long, and that the Dutch would regain possession of the country.

But it's not clear why it was important for Japan to end Dutch rule. If Japan had to leave the region, what did it care whether the Dutch or the Indonesians controlled it? At that point, it was no longer its problem.

Especially since, in the basic history we're taught, Japan wasn't known for developing an attitude of uniting nationalisms in the region. Apparently, it was Japan uber alles, period. Japan sought only to protect its immediate vital interests, or to develop an empire. All its conquests were based on a purely nationalistic project.

The elite have anticipated the problem and created a story that is ignored by the general public, but which they can bring out again in the event that someone like me makes the argument I've just presented. That's what you can see in this [video](#). Apparently, part of Japan's aim in attacking the Philippines, Indonesia and part of Indochina was to expel Westerners from Asia. So there would have been an anti-Western intent behind it. The Japanese would have been the leaders of a revolt against European hegemony in the region. Now, it's true that the main objective was to conquer Western colonies and replace them as the dominant force in the region. But, if that wasn't possible, there was a secondary objective, which was for the West to lose its influence in the region. Under these conditions, support for the Indonesian and Indochinese rebels becomes logical.

Except that it's not believable. It's a very artificial story. It doesn't fit with the main objective, which was to conquer the Western colonies in order to replace them. That there was a little facade of altruism, ok, but a real will to do it, that's very implausible.

And then there's the problem: to make Japan look like the villain of the story, the elite made sure to invent massacres by the Japanese army and, in general, extremely harsh, even contemptuous, behavior towards the local population. For example, [Wikipedia](#) explains the Nanking massacre: "*The influence of imperial propaganda, which described foreigners and especially **other Asian populations as 'inferior beings' made to be dominated, even cattle (kichiku), was certainly also significant.***"

And the elite had Japan colonizing other countries (Korea, Manchuria, China) long before WW2. So it's not exactly the behavior of leaders who care about the independence of other countries. The "let's liberate our brothers from the yoke of the Western oppressor" aspect takes quite a hit.

So the original problem remains. Once the threat of defeat was well and truly present, as Japan had shown no great pan-Asian altruism, it had no reason to support rebellion movements. It didn't really care anymore about the future of Indonesia and Indochina.

Thirdly, the Japanese should have realized that if they were defeated, at least in the region, the nationalist movement or even the Indonesian government had very little chance of surviving their departure. If the Allies won in Europe (and they were in the process of doing so), they would come back and re-impose their authority in the region. And once defeated, the Japanese would no longer be able to fuel armed rebellion. The rebellion was therefore destined to disappear. True, the Netherlands didn't have a large population. But they had managed to hold the region for 100 years. And a rebellion with limited resources was no match for a modern official army. So there was little point in supporting this resistance.

When a state knows it's not in danger of disappearing and can sustain a revolt for decades, chances are it'll succeed. When the USSR supported communist rebellions in Africa, it made sense. But from a state on the verge of defeat, it's practically useless.

Since we know how things turned out, we have a biased vision in which we say to ourselves that it was logical for the Dutch to lose Indonesia after the war. But,

at the time, there was no reason for that to happen. So there was really no point in fuelling a rebellion.

So why did the Japanese leaders do it anyway? Well, because they knew the rebellion would win. Because behind Japan, as well as behind the rebellion and the Dutch government, were the elite.

And when it came to Asia's independence from the West, it really wasn't smart to provoke the latter, including the most powerful of them all, the USA. From the outset, they were almost certain to be defeated. And then, the only remaining independent state in the region would have been under foreign domination. So it was really stupid. And it was even more absurd to do it before being sure that Hitler had won against the Russians.

Regarding the timing, the rebellion had to take place at that time and under those conditions. Without the support of a powerful state, it couldn't happen. And without the ousting of the Dutch, it wouldn't happen either, because even with the support of a powerful state, the Dutch held the ground well enough that a rebellion had no chance of success. Besides, you can read that the Japanese helped unite the population against the Dutch. Without the invasion, it wouldn't have happened. The Indonesian rebels would have remained disunited against the Dutch. There would have been a rebellion in Sumatra, Java, Borneo, etc., but not a "national" rebellion. And it's logical to think that the Dutch would have refused to discuss a global independence for Indonesia. They would only have accepted local independence. And so, even in the event of a successful rebellion, it would have resulted in the creation of several independent states, not the current Indonesia.

Now, the elite could have imposed this kind of narrative (national rebellion leading to the creation of today's Indonesia) without Japanese intervention. But that would have been very dodgy. With Japan's intervention, it was less so. That is, if we didn't go into too much detail.

Other than that, given that the Dutch were very close to **Australia**, and stayed there for centuries, one wonders why they didn't colonize it. But they couldn't have been the colonizers, because they were desperately short of men. Besides, they already had their hands full with Indonesia. Again, the elite could have overlooked these problems and had them colonize Australia anyway. But that

would have introduced an awkward quirk. And it couldn't have been the Portuguese, because they were in full decline, and they too had too few men. So, it was preferable that it be **England**. England was sufficiently populated that a relatively rapid colonization would not be a problem. And there's a second reason why it had to be England, which we'll see in Appendix 2.

Incidentally, the elite have had historians say that some Portuguese and Dutch discovered Australia before the English. This is to avoid the oddity that the English discovered Australia first, while the Portuguese and Dutch had been in the region much longer.

As for who really discovered Australia, it's a mystery. Did the elite already know of its existence before arriving in Asia? Or was it the Portuguese or the Dutch or the Spanish who discovered it? It's hard to say. But unless the elite knew about it from other sources, it must have come from those who were in the region from the start, i.e. Portuguese, Dutch or Spanish. It's much less likely that it came from the English.

What is fairly certain, however, is that the story of Cook's discovery of Australia in 1770 is a lie. It must have been discovered before then. But they had to justify the fact that it was the English who colonized the continent.

8) New Guinea today and tomorrow

The case of New Guinea is also interesting. It is divided in two. The western part (Western New Guinea) is controlled by Indonesia. The eastern part, Papua New Guinea, is independent.



Both sides of the island are sparsely populated.

This can be seen for Western New Guinea ([Wikipedia](#)):

*"This region, which makes up 22% of the Indonesian territory, is very sparsely populated, with only **3,593,803 inhabitants in 2010**, compared with 237 million for the entire Indonesian archipelago (i.e. 1.5% of the total population). It is made up of a series of territories that are often very difficult to access, and, like the eastern part of the island, is populated by mainly Papuan populations. Its eccentric position and its cultural, historical and geographical features make it a region apart from the rest of Indonesia."*

Figures for 2020 are 5.5 million (see below).

And for Papua New Guinea ([Wikipedia](#)):

*"In **2015**, the population reached **7,619,321** according to the World Bank, a density of 16 inhabitants per km²."*

So, in all, we have around 13 million inhabitants (5.5 + 7.6), which is very few given the size of the island.

That said, when you look at the map, you wonder where the 13 million inhabitants could be. Even with such a small number, it doesn't seem to add up.

The biggest city has only a few hundred thousand inhabitants; the others only a few tens of thousands. And the rest are villages with just a few dozen inhabitants. So it's possible that the elite are lying about the actual number of people, and that there are even fewer than officially declared.

The figures for religion and ethnic groups are also interesting. The **eastern** part of the island is made up almost entirely of Christians, 70% of whom are Protestants ([Wikipedia](#)):

*"The government and judiciary uphold the constitutional right to freedom of speech, thought, and belief, and no legislation to curb those rights has been adopted. The 2011 census found that **95.6% of citizens identified themselves as Christian**, 1.4% were not Christian, and 3.1% gave no answer. Virtually no respondent identified as being nonreligious. Religious syncretism is high, with many citizens combining their Christian faith with some traditional indigenous religious practices. Most Christians in Papua New Guinea are **Protestants**, constituting roughly **70% of the total population**."*

Western part ([Wikipedia](#)):

"The main religions according to the 2000 census are Christianity (78%, of which Protestantism 54% and Catholicism 24%), Islam (21%), Hinduism and Buddhism (1%)."

The English [Wikipedia](#) speaks of 15% Catholics and 63% Protestants.

Apparently, Islam is in the minority on the western side. But the figures date from 2000. However, over the past 20 years, the Muslim population has increased significantly in the western part. This can be seen [here](#):

*"The second of these causes is due to the fact that West Papua is huge but sparsely populated. With a surface area of almost 422,000 km² representing 22% of the national territory, **the two provinces of Papua and West Papua combined had fewer than 5.5 million inhabitants in 2020**, i.e. around 2% of an Indonesian population that has surpassed the 270 million mark, and a demographic density of only some 13 inhabitants per km², compared with 140 for the country as a whole. The island of Java alone has almost 1,200 inhabitants per km² for over 150 million residents, i.e. 56% of the total. **This demographic imbalance has prompted the organized and spontaneous "transmigration" of several million Indonesians from overpopulated Java, but also from neighboring Sulawesi and the Moluccas, as well as from all over the***

archipelago, in search of work and the means to survive in a land full of opportunity.

*Papua may remain sparsely populated in absolute and relative terms, but its population, which was still **less than one million in 1970, has more than quintupled in fifty years, and will be well over five million by 2020!** This veritable "**invasion**" of Indonesian populations of **Malay and Muslim origin** into Melanesian and predominantly Christian lands, with all that this implies in terms of tensions, disposessions and conflicts of all kinds, poses enormous problems. In fact, it is estimated that **over 40% of Papua's population is now made up of non-native people**, who will become the majority in the very near future. As in New Caledonia, where the situation is *mutatis mutandis* very comparable, Melanesians no longer feel at home."*

The fact that Asians make up 40% of the population in West New Guinea is confirmed on this [Wikipedia](#) page (conflict in West Papua):

"It should be remembered, however, that the Javanese make up around 40% of the population of these provinces."

So, by rule of thumb, we can think that, now, we're more at 35% Muslims in Western New Guinea than at 20% in the previous census, since 87% of the Indonesian population is Muslim.

And Australia is predominantly Christian, even if a large proportion of the population now say they have no religion. But the background is Christian. And in any case, they're not Muslims.

So, based on what we've seen so far, we can expect the Muslim religion to spread to the eastern part of the island in the future. Eventually, there will be growing tensions between Muslims and non-Muslims. Of course, the Muslims in the western part will get involved and want to attack the eastern part. They may eventually claim that it was the non-Muslims who oppressed the Muslims.

Then the Australian government will intervene to support the Christians of Papua New Guinea, and take control of the island. In the end, white settlers will replace both Indonesians and Papuans.

You might think that's why the island is still so sparsely populated. It will be easier for Australia to invade and colonize it.

It is possible that Western New Guinea will become independent before these events take place, so that Australia can intervene in New Guinea without going to war with Indonesia, at least initially.

What we are told about the evolution of the proportion of Muslims in Western New Guinea helps us to understand certain things. There were 20% Muslims in the early 2000s. But, on the other hand, we've seen that there has been a continuous immigration of Indonesians over the last 40 or 50 years. So, if there were only 20% Muslims in the early 2000s, it means that there were very few in the 70s or 80s, maybe 5-10%.

What's interesting here is that 20 years ago, the proportion of Muslims in the west of the island was only 20%. And it must be 35% now. This just goes to show that the war plan between Australia and Indonesia is still a relatively long way off, since the elite seem to be making sure that the percentage of Muslims is rising quite slowly. If it only increases by 15% every 20 years, it won't reach 80% until around 2080. And then it's going to take some time for the eastern part to start being invaded and become a problem, maybe 40 or 50 years. So that takes us back to 2120.

Having said that, maybe the elite will take advantage of World War 3, which should happen around 2049, to speed things up, or at least create a first warning shot. So maybe the Muslims of Western New Guinea will be a problem even then. We shall see.

And there's a second reason why the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore never went further than a piece of Western New-Guinea. New-Guinea had to remain sparsely populated, so that Australia could colonize it in the future.

So, from the outset, the elite's aim was for the eastern and western parts to go to war with each other in the future. But for such a thing to happen, there had to be these two zones. But this wasn't obvious from the outset. The island could very well have been controlled entirely by one European empire or another. And without separation, it would have been very difficult to justify the type of war that the elite wanted, i.e. an almost civil war, but also involving Indonesia.

So the western part of the island had to be part of the Dutch empire, but not the eastern part. And that's why the two sultanates had to go no further than the western part. Indeed, as they were to become vassals, then mere colonies of Holland, the territories they controlled would pass into Dutch hands. So, if they had controlled the whole island, the Dutch would have controlled this territory. And then, no more possibility of separate development between the western and eastern parts; and no tensions between them.

And if the two sultanates hadn't set foot on the island, that would have been a problem. Whether Holland took control of the island or not, the whole island would have been colonized or not. And supposing the island had become independent afterwards, it's once again the whole island that would have been independent. So there would have been no tension between West and East, since the population would have been fairly homogeneous both ethnically and religiously.

But with the Dutch taking control of the western part of the island, one problem remained. Given the poor development of the eastern part in the 19th century, it would have been odd if Holland hadn't taken it over after a while. The eastern part was close at hand. And if Holland had invaded the eastern zone, then the problem would have been the same. Today, the whole island would be either Indonesian or independent. In the first case, future tensions between Muslims in the West and Christians in the East would be a matter for Indonesia. In the second case, they would be the responsibility of New Guinea. But in both cases, they would be internal affairs. And in that case, there would be no reason for Australia to intervene to support the eastern side against the western.

As a result, one or more other European countries had to take over the eastern part of the island. And that's exactly what happened. [Wikipedia](#) explains:

*"In 1884, the north of present-day Papua New Guinea was annexed by **the German Colonial Empire**, and **the south was made a protectorate of the British Empire that same year**. After the First World War, the entire territory came under British sovereignty, and was handed over to Australia. Papua New Guinea peacefully achieves independence, and becomes a member of the Commonwealth of Nations, in 1975."*

So, when Indonesia became independent in December 1949, there was no risk of the eastern part joining Indonesia.

Australia could then grant independence to Papua New Guinea in 1975. The question of possible assimilation into Indonesia was no longer topical. Even less so, given the different ethnic and religious make-up of the two areas.

Eventually, the western part may become **independent**. This will allow a simmering war between Indonesia and Australia to continue for many years, before a full-blown conflict occurs. Indeed, even if the Western part becomes independent, Indonesia may decide to intervene to defend the Muslim Asians of the Western part.

And indeed, after checking, we discover that there is an independence movement in Western New Guinea ([Wikipedia](#)):

"The Organization for a Free Papua (Organisasi Papua Merdeka / OPM), refuting the New York Agreement, has been waging a low-intensity war there since the 1960s. In addition to firearms, the movement also uses traditional weapons such as spears."

And we also discover that West New Guinea was not incorporated into Indonesia when the latter became independent in 1949 ([here](#)). There was an agreement between the Netherlands and Indonesia for Western New Guinea to join it in 1950. But the Netherlands did not respect the agreement and stayed. The pretext being that the Papuan population was not part of the Indonesian people, and that self-determination was therefore required, so that the inhabitants could freely choose whether to join Indonesia or be independent. So there was a short period, between 1949 and 1962, when the island was still under Dutch control. There was a small armed conflict (certainly completely fabricated) in 1962 between Indonesia and the Netherlands. The USA put pressure on the Netherlands to cede the territory to Indonesia. In the end, the region became part of the Indonesian state in October 1962 ([New York Agreement](#)).

But this episode introduced a justification for possible independence for the western part of the island in the future. Its attachment to Indonesia was not achieved via a referendum, i.e. with the consent of the people, but under military and diplomatic pressure. The elite can therefore justify the existence of an independence movement in this region.

The Indonesian government had scheduled a referendum on self-determination for 1969. And it did take place on that date. But, apparently, it was a parody of a referendum, as [Wikipedia](#) shows:

"In 1969, an "Act of Free Choice" was held, which was supposed to be this plebiscite. In fact, the participants were limited to 1,026 council members appointed by the Indonesian government and supposed to represent the territory's population. They vote unanimously to remain part of Indonesia."

There's a Wikipedia [page](#) dedicated to this plebiscite:

"The Act of Free Choice was officially constituted by a vote of 1,025 men and women, selected by the Indonesian army in Western New Guinea, who were asked to vote by raising their hands or by reading texts prepared for the attention of United Nations observers."

Of course, this gives the independence movement yet another reason to exist.

The elite obviously provide other justifications for the independence movement than this simple plebiscite issue. Otherwise, it wouldn't be convincing.

First, there's the **economic** aspect. The gigantic Ertsberg copper and gold mine was opened in 1973, followed in 1988 by the Grasberg mine nearby, and their operation was awarded to the **American** company Freeport Sulphur, now Freeport-McMoRan. It has a [Wikipedia](#) entry: *"Freeport-McMoRan Copper & Gold Inc. is an American company based in Phoenix, Arizona. Operating in the mining sector, it is one of the world's leading producers of copper and gold"*. Of course, behind this company are the elite. But we can see that it is particularly linked to the US military-industrial complex: *"The company includes among its principal shareholders or members of its board of directors some very influential figures in American political life: Henry Kissinger, Robert A. Lovett (former Secretary of Defense), John Hay Whitney, Godfrey Rockefeller (nephew of the billionaire of the same name), or Arleigh Burke (former Chief of Staff of the US Navy)."*

This mine (Grasberg) is very important for the Indonesian state, as can be seen on [National Geographic](#): *"This region of the world is home to one of the world's largest gold and copper mines: Grasberg. [In 2015, it was **the largest contributor to the Indonesian state budget**]"*. However, this mine obviously entails **environmental** problems, which justifies opposition from the Papuans.

The environmental aspect is not limited to the mine. There are also problems of deforestation linked to the exploitation of palm oil and the paper industry.

Mining also has a **social** component ([Wikipedia](#)):

"In addition, for this operation, Freeport mostly calls on personnel from other parts of Indonesia."

So Papuans feel aggrieved because the jobs generated by mining benefit others.

There is also a **racial** component, with increasing immigration of Asian Indonesians, as mentioned above. This is partly linked to the presence of copper and gold mining. But it seems to be due above all to the high birth rate of Indonesians, which drives many of them to try their luck in New Guinea. This can be seen on the National Geographic [website](#):

*"Many Indonesian islands are overflowing with people. For example, there are 1,200 inhabitants per km² on the island of Java. Western New Guinea, with its 13 inhabitants per km², appears to be a land to be populated. **The government has therefore financed the settlement of Indonesian migrants among the Papuans. In addition, there are more spontaneous migrations of Indonesians in search of opportunity.** Today, 40% of the population of Western New Guinea originates from outside the island. [Editor's note: **in 1960, they accounted for just 5% of the population**]. Non-natives are expected to become the majority soon, which will make the representation of Papuan interests all the more difficult."*

So the Papuans feel invaded, which creates an explosive situation (at least on paper).

And logically ([here](#)):

"Many Papuans feel discriminated against and see Indonesians as invaders. But their movement is repressed, even in the case of peaceful protest."

So, there are several reasons that justify the existence of an independence movement.

And the extremely ferocious repression by the Indonesian government justifies the existence of a **guerrilla war**. A guerrilla war that is pushing the Indonesian government to be even more ferocious. Hundreds of thousands of people have been killed by the Indonesian army since the 1960s. Incidentally, the Indonesian

government, because of its recent history, was supposed to be anti-colonial at the time. Go figure. Of course, this story of massacres is certainly a complete fabrication. But the important thing is that people believe it. Besides, there's apparently a very heavy police presence, and there's certainly discrimination of various kinds against Papuans. So there must be a slight oppression that makes the story of hundreds of thousands of deaths credible to Papuans. And there is real Asian immigration. This makes the Papuans believe that the Indonesian government wants to wipe them out. It justifies even more the guerrilla warfare (another invention certainly) and more generally the independence movement. And for the rest of the world, the fact that it's almost impossible to visit Western New Guinea obviously leads to the conclusion that the repression is as ruthless as the newspapers say.

So, the late annexation to Indonesia, plus the presence of independence movements, plus the so-called savage repression, suggests that the western part of the island will eventually become independent, allowing Australia and Indonesia to wage an indirect, covert war against each other, before moving on to open conflict. It's not a certainty, because the elite have several options at their disposal. But it is a possibility.

Note that this can also be found on [Wikipedia](#):

"In 2023, the Papua New Guinea government accepted an agreement with the United States to turn the archipelago into a gigantic forward base for the American army. The army will have "unhindered" access to six ports and airports, where it can station troops and equipment. The U.S. will have "exclusive use" of certain perimeters, where it can build its own facilities."

Why is the USA doing this? The official explanation seems to be that the USA is worried about the rise of China. It believes that China is seeking hegemony in the region. So it's stepping up its military presence to be able to intervene in the event of Chinese aggression in Taiwan, Indochina, the Philippines or elsewhere. The AUKUS tripartite military cooperation agreement between the USA, Australia and Great Britain, made public on September 15, 2021, also serves to counter China just in case. So, a priori, it's not Indonesia that's in the firing line.

However, Indonesia wants to join the **BRICS**. [Wikipedia](#) states:

*"As of **August 10, 2023**, 23 countries have officially submitted their applications to join the BRICS: Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Cuba, Egypt, Honduras, **Indonesia**, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Nigeria, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Senegal, Thailand, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela and Vietnam."*

This membership application in itself indicates that Indonesia is siding with China, and therefore against the USA and Australia. Of course, this is not a declaration of war. And Indonesia doesn't seem to have any desire to invade its neighbors. But it does show that Indonesia is moving away from the USA and towards China. Because of this, the installation of US armed forces in Papua New Guinea is not all that neutral towards Indonesia.

But whether neutral or not **now**, these bases will enable the USA to intervene in the event of war between Australia and Indonesia, thus justifying an Australian victory. Whereas, if Australia were to fight Indonesia on its own, its victory might look suspicious. And before that, the USA could intervene in the event of armed conflict between Papua New Guinea and Indonesia, or between Papua New Guinea and a possible independent Western New Guinea. And in the event of an independent Western New Guinea, it could even intervene if an internal conflict breaks out between the Asian and Papuan communities.

One problem linked to the installation of these armed forces is that if the USA becomes hostile to Indonesia, it risks losing the rights to exploit its copper and gold mines.

A first possible explanation is that, as Indonesia wants to join the BRICS, the USA considers that its local economic interests take second place and that it is better to position itself against Indonesia, even at the risk of losing the exploitation of the mines.

That said, when we dig a little deeper into the subject of mining, we learn from [Wikipedia](#) that:

*"Indonesian President Joko Widodo **had the Indonesian government buy out 51% of Freeport-McMoRan's Indonesian subsidiary**, which holds huge gold and copper deposits but whose revenues do not benefit Indonesia. The latter, denouncing a "**spoliation**", mobilized a number of American businessmen and*

politicians, including Vice-President Mike Pence, who openly criticized Joko Widodo".

This takeover was finalized at the end of **2018**, as can be seen on [Wikipedia](#):

*"In 2018, the company ranked at number 176 on the Fortune 500 list. During this year, Indonesian President Joko Widodo also planned to take control of 51% of Freeport Indonesia's equity, effectively handing over control of Freeport Control to Indonesian government. The Indonesian government will need to settle payments of \$3.85 billion during the takeover process. The Indonesian government finalized the process on **December 21, 2018**."*

And in this [article](#) from January 2019: *"Indonesian authorities and the Freeport - McMoran company have closed the takeover by PT. INALUM, the state-owned company chosen by the government to control the country's mining industry. With this **nationalization**, PT. INALUM now owns 51.23% of PT. Freeport Indonesia, compared with 9.36% previously".*

So, in 2019, the Indonesian state unilaterally imposed a 51.23% share buyback of Freeport's subsidiary, i.e., in effect, a nationalization.

And apparently, by the end of 2023, the buyout had risen to 61% ([here](#)):

"President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo met with Freeport McMoRan Chairman Ricard Adkerson at the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in Washington DC, USA, on November 14, 2023. During the meeting, Jokowi welcomed discussions on the increase of Indonesia's stake in PT Freeport Indonesia (PTFI) from the current 51% to 61%, along with the extension of the mining permit that has reached the final stage."

This way, the media can explain that, with the nationalization of the subsidiary, local American economic interests have been greatly reduced. Add to this the fact that Indonesia wants to join the BRICS, and the US will be justified in distancing itself from Indonesia.

The installation of American troops in Papua New Guinea could be seen as **neo-colonialism**. But, according to [Wikipedia](#): *"The country has experienced border conflicts with Indonesia"*. So it makes sense for the government to accept US aid

against the Indonesians. And so, the possible accusation of neo-colonialism disappears as if by magic. The media can argue that the Indonesian threat is far greater than the American threat to the Papua New Guinea government.

There remains the problem that the USA has let the Indonesian government ruthlessly repress the Papuans in the western part of the island in order to defend its political and economic interests. This should maintain a certain hostility on the part of the Papua New Guinea government. But the media will certainly emphasize that, for the latter, US aid against Indonesia is far more important than old grudges. The government will be presented as pragmatic and realistic, and those who harbor an aversion to the USA as backward-looking. And so, the argument will be swept aside.

In short, the situation the elite have created on the island of New Guinea will enable them to trigger conflict between Papuans and Indonesian Asians, leading in the longer term to open warfare between Indonesia and an Australia-US alliance. Perhaps the alliance will lose at first. But eventually it will win. From there, the alliance will either colonize one or more Indonesian islands first, then move on to New Guinea; or colonize New Guinea, then move on to Indonesia.

Note: We can be fairly certain that there are equally large deposits of gold and copper in many places on earth. And the elite know exactly where they are (at least for a good part of them). And that goes for all metals, of course. So, when one deposit is exploited, and not another elsewhere on earth, the choice depends on the elite's political objectives, not their economic ones. If the New Guinea mines have been exploited, it's because the elite have the political objectives presented in this section. Otherwise, it could have chosen a deposit elsewhere in the world, more interesting for its political objectives. The elite has so much power that it doesn't determine its policy according to various economic constraints. It invents false economic constraints to provide justification for its political plans. The elite adapts the economy to its political objectives, not the other way around. Here, the elite's long-term goal is to destabilize the region. And finding and then exploiting a very large gold and copper mine provides one of the reasons for this.

This is also the case with oil. If gigantic deposits have been found in the Middle East, it's to justify the destabilization of this region (with other causes, of course: nationalist, racial, religious, social, environmental, etc.). If it hadn't been for this political purpose, no oil would have been discovered there.

Note 2 :

We've seen that there were probably very few Muslims in West New Guinea in the 70s, maybe 5-10%.

It's hard to see how this could be the case, since Muslim sultans invaded the west of the island as early as around 1500. And, as we've seen, the Tidore Sultanate remained a vassal of Holland for a long time. It wasn't just a colony. It only became one in 1780. But when you read this [Wikipedia](#) page, you realize that even after 1800, the Dutch had virtually no presence on the island.

*"In 1660, the Dutch recognised the Sultan of Tidore's sovereignty over New Guinea. New Guinea thus became notionally Dutch as the Dutch held power over Tidore. In 1793, Britain attempted to establish a settlement near Manokwari, however, it failed and by 1824 Britain and the Netherlands agreed that the western half of the island would become part of the Dutch East Indies. **In 1828 the Dutch established a settlement in Lobo (near Kaimana) which also failed.** Almost 30 years later in 1855, Germans established the first missionary settlement on Mansinam Island near Manokwari. While in 1828 the Dutch claimed the south coast west of the 141st meridian and the north coast west of Humboldt Bay in 1848, **they did not try to develop the region again until 1896**; they established settlements in Manokwari and Fak-Fak in response to perceived Australian ownership claims from the eastern half of New Guinea. Great Britain and Germany had recognised the Dutch claims in treaties of 1885 and 1895. At much the same time, Britain claimed south-east New Guinea, later known as the Territory of Papua, and Germany claimed the northeast, later known as the Territory of New Guinea."*

As you can see, between 1793 and 1824, the island was possessed by the English, who probably didn't reduce the sultanate's influence. And then, it was only in 1896 that the Dutch tried to develop and colonize the region, after a failure in 1828. So, throughout the 19th century, the island remained as it was,

under the influence of the Tidore sultanate. The Dutch had to rule the country from quite a distance.

For more on the Tidore sultanate, see [Wikipedia](#):

*"Tidore was subjected to an increasing implementation of colonial rule in the 19th century. A treaty was signed in 1817 where the sultan and grandees received annual subsidies. Tidore was included in the Residency of Ternate together with Ternate, Bacan, Halmahera, and dependencies. The infamous hongi expeditions, which had eradicated unauthorized spice trees in Maluku and kept the Papuan lands in subordination, were finally abolished in 1859–1861. **The title of sultan lapsed in 1905 and was replaced by a regency.** The rights of Tidore in West New Guinea were formally upheld, but the Dutch Residents of Ternate **tried to diminish Tidorese's influence** in those quarters since it was not considered in the interests of the Papuans."*

Tidore remained a sultanate until 1905. So it had plenty of time to continue imposing the Muslim religion throughout the 19th century. And it had already had 280 years to impose it, between 1500 and 1780, when it became a colony of Holland. From 1780 onwards, it obviously wasn't as easy as before. But still, given that it had certain freedoms, it must have been possible to favor Muslims and bring Muslim Asians to the island. So there should have been 30% or 40% Muslims in the 1970s, or even more.

And the Dutch should have welcomed a natural influx of Muslim Asians onto the island (well, three-quarters Asians; the Moluccans apparently have some black blood), because the inhabitants of the Moluccas and Sulawesi were supposed to be more civilized and therefore better able to carry out complex administrative and technical management tasks. And it wasn't just these two islands. The Dutch could have brought in even more civilized Asians from western Indonesia.

Also, in the other islands where these sultanates were established at the same time, 87% of the population is Muslim. So it's surprising that here, there are only 5 to 10%. Particularly as the sultanates of Ternate and Tidore extended into western New Guinea at practically the same time as they extended into Sulawesi and the Moluccas. So, a priori, there was no reason why they couldn't get a high percentage of Muslims on this island too. Maybe not 87%, but at least 40 or 50%.

So there's an **oddity**. I think it comes from the following reason. We've seen that in the future, the elite want racial and religious conflict in New Guinea; we'll have Indonesian Muslim Asians against Christian or animist blacks. For such a thing to happen, it was interesting that, as soon as Indonesia became independent, the attachment of this part of the island to Indonesia was not a matter of course. And there had to be strong arguments on both sides.

On the **Indonesian state** side, the elite could justify the return of this part of the island, because it had been under the domination of the Tidore Sultanate, which had owned a large part of the Moluccas. And the Moluccas were now Indonesian. So, from this angle, it was logical that Western New Guinea should return to Indonesia. The Sultanate of Tidore, or in any case its possessions on the Moluccas, had been incorporated into Indonesia. In a way, it was only natural that the rest of its possessions, i.e. Western New Guinea, should become part of Indonesia.

Under these conditions, if Western New Guinea had been 50 or 60% Muslim, it would have been totally normal for it to become part of Indonesia, with no questions asked. So, in order for the attachment to Indonesia to be debated and for Holland to be able to present another point of view that was just as legitimate, if not more so, there had to be few Muslims. With only 5-10% Muslims and about the same number Asians, **Holland** could defend the idea that this region was neither racially, culturally nor religiously Indonesian, and therefore had no reason to join Indonesia. That's why the elite ensured that the Muslim religion concerned so few people on this part of the island, even in 1949, after centuries of sultanate.

And that's why the elite made Holland refuse to cede Western New Guinea at the beginning, and gave the explanation we've just seen for this refusal. Without Holland's refusal and its emphasis on the racial, cultural and religious problem, in the end, few would have noticed. Until then, everything had been going pretty well between the communities. Holland's reaction was to highlight the problem. Of course, the elite could have done without Holland's refusal. They could have subsequently stirred up aboriginal independence movements simply by using the economic, social, racial and other means we've just seen. But it was better with.

And the fact that both points of view could be defended helped to justify discord between the aborigines and the Indonesian state for decades, if not centuries, to come. Organizing a parody of a referendum was a step in this direction.

The fact that the Dutch re-established the Sultanate of Tidore in 1947 wasn't very clever, since it obviously favored Indonesian claims to Western New Guinea. And after verification, this is indeed what happened, as [Wikipedia](#) tells us:

*"It was only after the outbreak of the Indonesian revolution that the Dutch authorities allowed a new sultan to be enthroned, Zainal Abidin Alting (r. 1947–1967). After the gaining of Indonesian independence in 1949, old monarchical institutions were abolished. **However, the historical status of the sultan played a certain role in bolstering Indonesian claims to Dutch New Guinea.**"*

But obviously, it wasn't a "mistake" on Holland's part. It was organized by the elite, to give the Indonesian state one more reason to claim this territory. And the Netherlands had to do it in 1947, not 3 or 4 years later, because in 1949, Indonesia was independent. And it obviously wasn't going to re-establish the sultanate. And then, it would have taken away a reason for Indonesia to claim Western New Guinea.

We can assume that official historians will tell us that the Netherlands wanted to make local concessions at a time when they were in trouble with the independence movement. Or, sensing that they were losing the game, they wanted to undermine the new Indonesian republic by re-establishing local governments. Or perhaps they had already set their sights on keeping Western New Guinea, and thought that reviving the Tidore Sultanate would help them do so. But, far from helping them, it would have had the opposite result. But with what we now know, none of these explanations is convincing.

We might add that the small number of Muslims will allow the war between Aborigines and Indonesians to start much later, at a time more convenient for the elite. Indeed, the elite seem intent on starting the war towards the end of the 21st century.

If there had been 30 or 40% Muslims in 1970, raising that figure would have meant triggering the conflict as early as 2020 or something like that, which would have been far too early for the elite's agenda. But with just 5% or 10%, it could have been delayed until 2070 or 2080. We're up to 35% of the population

now, and perhaps 60 or 70% in the relatively distant future. And it's probably at this level of replacement that the conflict will start.

The fact that there were so few Muslims in the 60s or 70s is contradictory to the fact that the sultanates controlled the region for so long. But, for the elite, it's not a problem, because nobody is interested in the history of this part of the world and is going to pick up on the oddity. Also, since the elite agents have imagination, they'll be able to justify it in many different ways. Maybe they've already done it and I haven't found the documents explaining it. But, even if there's never been anything like this, the elite can invent backdated books and articles if the problem becomes embarrassing.

Note 3 :

You might find it odd that the Netherlands took so long to hold a referendum on autonomy for Western New Guinea. After all, they had 13 years to do it. And yet they never did. But, for the elite, it had to be that way. If the Dutch had organized a vote, whatever the result, it wouldn't have been in line with the elite's plan.

If the result had been **in favor of independence**, then it wouldn't have been possible to flood this part of the island with millions of Muslim Asians. And so, no reason to have a conflict with Indonesia afterwards.

If the result had been **in favor of integration into the Indonesian entity**, then the independence movement would have had much less legitimacy. The inhabitants would have decided democratically to join Indonesia. And so, the pro-independence movement would have acted against the will of the people as expressed in the vote.

Besides, such a result would have been extremely dubious. Indeed, given that there were still few Muslims and Asians in Western New Guinea, there was a 99% chance that the people would vote in favor of independence. So, if the result had been integration into Indonesia, it could only have been achieved by cheating. However, given the position of the Netherlands, they would have had no reason to cheat. On the contrary, if they had had to rig the elections, they would have ensured that the country voted for independence.

It was therefore essential that the referendum be held after Indonesia had taken control of the island. In this case, an extremely rigged referendum made it possible to legitimize the independence movements. And the fact that it was completely rigged in this way was not surprising, since the Indonesian government clearly did not want Western New Guinea to become independent.

And to make the absence of a referendum seem "normal", the Dutch government had to give the impression that it actually wanted to keep Western New Guinea, despite its rhetoric about giving the natives a choice, which suggested that it was willing to give up this territory.

So, of course, if you're not into conspiracyism, you can go along with this version of history and say that, in reality, the Dutch didn't want to abandon the island, so they invented a story about a referendum to gain time.

Only, as it happens, the Dutch government at the time was **Labour**, i.e., left-wing, as [Wikipedia](#) shows:

*"The 1948 elections led to a new coalition led by **Labor's** Willem Drees. He led four successive cabinets Drees I, Drees II, Drees III and Drees IV until 1958."*

In addition, this same government had organized **the autonomy of the Netherlands Antilles** (see [Wikipedia](#)).

"In 1948, the Netherlands approved the principle of autonomy for the Netherlands Antilles, proclaimed in 1954 (Autonomous Federal State of the Netherlands Antilles)."

So, there was a left-wing government, a priori in favor of decolonization, which had effectively implemented decolonization on islands it could have kept without any great power threatening reprisals. France, for example, retained its possessions in the West Indies without any problem. But for New Guinea, the same government would have been a devious colonizer desperately clinging to its colony. There's a bit of a consistency problem here.

But, if we stay with the official narrative, logically, the fact that it gave independence to the West Indies, added to the fact that it was left-wing, means that the Dutch government was honest when it said it was concerned about the fate of the Papuan people and wanted to organize a referendum. On the face of it, this was not a reactionary government intent on keeping its possessions at all costs.

Furthermore, if they hadn't intended to leave, then, when they were forced to do so, they should have organized the referendum, to be in line with the principles they had put forward. And if they had really wanted to keep this part of the island, they could have organized the referendum just to take revenge for being ousted. A vote can be organized quickly. So, in a few months, or even a few weeks, it could have been set up. And if nothing of the sort happened, it's because, as mentioned above, it didn't suit the elite at all.

And the reason the USA didn't press for a referendum before 1962 was, once again, that the referendum had to take place after the Indonesian takeover, so that Western New Guinea couldn't become independent.

Yet it would have been in the USA's interest to have an independent government in Western New Guinea, since it would have been much easier to negotiate with it over mining. Not only would it have been much less powerful and therefore easier to control, but as the country was still underdeveloped, the new government would have needed the USA for its various infrastructures.

Moreover, the Indonesian government was aided by the USSR in its mini-war against Holland, as can be seen on [Wikipedia](#):

*"In 1962, the Indonesian army invaded Dutch New Guinea (the only territory the Dutch had been able to maintain from the Dutch East Indies). Although the Dutch navy won the battle of the Arafura Sea, **Soviet support** forced The Hague to sign the New York Agreement on July 31, 1962..."*

And if that's the case, it's because the Indonesian government was itself communist. So, for the USA, it was better to have a small independent country that could be easily manipulated than a country belonging to Communist Indonesia, which was hostile to them. So it's hard to see why the USA pressured the Netherlands to hand over Western New Guinea to Indonesia.

So you might think that, at the time, the USA didn't know about the existence of mining reserves in Western New Guinea, and therefore had no interest in the territory. But yes, they did, because the mine's reserves were "discovered" two years before the Dutch left, as can be seen on the Grasberg Mine [Wikipedia](#) page: *"The expedition he leads with Del Flint discovers huge copper deposits in 1960"*. Knowing this, the USA should have preferred Western New Guinea to be independent rather than part of Indonesia, since, as mentioned above, they could obtain much better mining conditions with a small, undeveloped country than

with communist Indonesia backed by the USSR. And so they should have asked for a referendum to be organized by the Dutch.

And as luck would have it, the Indonesian government swung to the right in 1966, 3 years before the referendum. Why did the elite do this? Well, if the government had remained communist, the USA would have had no reason not to denounce this parody of a referendum. But, as the Indonesian government was now on the side of the USA, and on top of that, had given the rights to operate the mine to an American company, the USA had reason to say nothing.

Here's what [Wikipedia](#) has to say about the policies of the Soeharto government (1966-1998):

*"The new regime **returned to the Western camp**. Indonesia rejoined the UN, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which Soekarno had made it leave, and put an end to the Indonesian-Malaysian confrontation (called *Konfrontasi* in Indonesian) in 1966.*

*Violent repression swept through Western New Guinea, killing 30,000 people. **American economic interests were given priority. In April 1967, the regime granted Freeport Sulphur the right to prospect the immense copper and gold deposits of the Ertsberg and Grasberg mines - the world's largest gold mine and one of the world's leading copper mines.**"*

It's also suspicious that the Indonesian government was so determined to take over Western New Guinea. Normally, given that communists in general were against colonization and that Indonesians had just been freed from the Dutch, they should have been in favor of self-determination. Especially as the Dutch government's arguments were absolutely correct. Racially, culturally and religiously, Western New Guinea did not belong to Indonesia. What's more, the original treaty did exclude Western New Guinea from the independence agreement. So it's not clear why the Indonesian government was so keen to get it back.

9) Aborigines in Australia and New Guinea

We've seen that there probably weren't many people in Indochina and Indonesia when the Europeans arrived. In Australia, either there were no people at all, or there were a few Indonesians who were expelled, or exterminated, or simply miscegenated.

As a result, we can think that the **aborigines** of both Australia and New Guinea were brought over from Africa by the Europeans. It was the latter who settled them in these territories when Australia was colonized, around the 18th century.

Why do this? Because if there had been Asians in these places, but they had been very few in number and very undeveloped, it would have been very odd, since the populations of nearby Indonesia or Indochina had been developed for at least 1,000 or 1,500 years.

But if there had been more or less developed, more or less vast kingdoms in New Guinea and Australia, then the presence of Europeans would have been illegitimate. I'm not talking about simple military colonization, but rather settlement colonization.


So the elite couldn't settle Asians in these two places. Either that was weird, or it made colonization illegitimate.

But, if there were absolutely no people, that was weird too. Given that the Indonesian kingdoms were not far from New Guinea and Australia, and that they were quite developed, they should have colonized these places.

The solution was to settle **blacks**. As Africans were highly underdeveloped at the time, it seemed only natural that New Guinea and Australia should still be in an ultra-primitive state at the time of colonization.

To differentiate them a little from the blacks of Africa, they had to take a tribe that was already slightly different physically, like the pygmies. And they had to select individuals with a particular physical type from within this tribe and have them multiply. In this way, they obtained an ethnic group that was sufficiently different physically from the Africans to make the story of an ancient migration credible. It's also conceivable that they used a few men with very distinctive physical characteristics to impregnate hundreds or thousands of women, which obviously resulted in a population with faces a little different from those of the Africans.

For example, you take someone with an odd physique like Ron Perlman. You breed him with 1000 women. You take the offspring who have the most of that face type; you breed them together, and you get a new "ethnic group".



And for the elite, it was very easy. They have deported millions of Africans to the USA and South America. So sending a few thousand to Australia was no problem at all.

By the way, since this project to settle black populations must have taken 50 or 100 years to be carried out (the time it took to obtain a population with a distinctive physique), this means that Australia wasn't discovered in 1770, but at least around 1720 or 1670, and possibly earlier.

For different languages, all you had to do was take small children and teach them the language you wanted. And of course, there were never hundreds of different languages, as they would have us believe. The agents of the elite must have created only a dozen languages. The trick here is to tell us that there were hundreds of languages, but that most of them have disappeared and that now there are less than a dozen.

Now, it would seem that in addition to the ten or so languages in question, there are another twenty or so, each spoken by a few dozen speakers. But, in my opinion, when they show old people speaking them on TV, they have to use actors. It must be a lot easier than creating languages. The actors will throw out a few phrases invented for the occasion, and that'll be enough. It's not impossible that they've created another twenty or so languages. The elite's language division seems quite productive. And in the age of computers, it must be easier than it used to be. But, on the face of it, I'd go with the idea that they use actors.

This explains the great oddity of having black people in Australia, New Guinea and a few other islands in the region. Because we don't at all understand how they could have got there 40,000 years ago, as the official story goes. And many people don't really understand this mystery. Especially since they never traveled anywhere else. So they would never have emigrated anywhere. But here, 40,000 years ago, they went almost 10,000 km from home in dugout canoes. Amazing, to say the least.

9.1) The real reason for their low numbers in the early 20th century

French [Wikipedia](#) states that the aboriginal population numbered 400,000 when the English arrived in 1788:

*"The aboriginal population was around **400,000** in 1911".*

On the English [Wikipedia](#), it's far less precise, ranging from 300,000 to 1 million.

"At that time, the indigenous population was estimated to have numbered between as few as 315,000 and as many as 1,100,000"

[Here](#) (Criminalité économique et atteintes à la dignité de la personne: Tome VII, Mireille Delmas-Marty, p.245):


*"In 1911, only 31,000 Aborigines remained on reserves, whereas their population was estimated at between **250,000 and 750,000** in 1788."*

In the absence of a precise figure, I'll arbitrarily take that of 400,000.

But, for a variety of reasons, in just one century their population has plummeted to around 117,000. [Here](#):


*"Experts estimate the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders at more than 770,000 at the time of the invasion in 1788. It fell to its low of around **117,000 people in 1900**, a decrease by 84%."*

We also have this graph, which gives a slightly different estimate at the lowest point (less than 100,000 Aborigines from 1900 until 1950):



So, let's say there were 100,000 aborigines in 1901.

And this one:



By 1850, there would have been only 200,000 Aborigines left. By extrapolation, assuming that the decline had been linear, there would have been only 150,000 by 1875, falling to 100,000 around 1900.

According to the official story, the population declined over a century to just 100,000 in 1901. That's an incredible 85% collapse if you start with 400,000 individuals; and even more (90%) if you start with 1 million.

But what we've just seen shows what all this is about. There was no fall in demographics. In fact, in 1788, the starting population was not 400,000, but probably around 10,000. So it didn't decline, but rather grew to 100,000.

Europeans settled only a few thousand people in New Guinea and Australia. So, even though they had a high birth rate, they remained few in number for 100 years.

And they had to be few in number, because if there had been millions of them, they would have competed with white colonization. With a few tens of thousands of individuals, their numbers remained marginal enough not to hinder the latter.

9.2) Problems with the official explanation of the aborigines' demographic collapse

To explain this collapse, [Wikipedia](#) tells us:

*"The first governor, Arthur Phillip, was charged with establishing relations with the Aborigines and **living in friendship and kindness** with them, **but European diseases, alcohol and colonial expansion** soon exerted a destructive effect on the indigenous population."*

So there would have been no hostility on the part of the English, unlike in the USA towards the Indians. It was disease, alcohol and colonial expansion that decimated the aborigines.

In any case, there doesn't seem to have been any intention to exterminate them. Indeed, [Wikipedia](#) states:

*"The role of **Protector of the Aborigines** arose from a recommendation in the Report of the Select Committee of the House of Commons of the **United Kingdom**. On January 31, 1838, Charles Grant, Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, sent the report to Governor George Gipps. The report recommended the appointment of **Chiefs to protect the Aborigines**. These chiefs should learn the Aboriginal languages of Australia, and their job would be to **look after the rights of the Aborigines, protecting them against the dispossession of their land and against all acts of cruelty, oppression and injustice**. The Port Phillip Protectorate is set up with George Augustus Robinson as Chief Protector and four full-time protectors."*

Not really the attitude of people who want to exterminate or even just despoil the natives.

But the English government could play it liberal, because it knew the truth about the Aborigines. It knew that, in reality, the so-called Aborigines numbered only around 30,000 at the time, and that they posed no demographic threat to the colonization of Australia.

That said, in this age of white guilt, there are nonetheless accusations of massacres perpetrated by the colonists. There may not have been an outright policy of extermination. But, locally, there would have been many spontaneous massacres. And the Australian government would often have allowed this to happen, which would have encouraged the settlers. We'll see later that, even using the official figures, this figure is derisory compared to the demographic collapse of the indigenous population. The supposed massacres cannot therefore be the cause of this fall in the number of aborigines. That's why the official story justifies it with other causes such as disease, alcohol and colonial expansion.

As a result, one wonders how the virtual disappearance of the aborigines was possible, given the 3 reasons given by official historians.

As for **microbial diseases**, advanced conspiracy theorists now know that they don't exist. Therefore, the hypothesis is invalid. Which means that official history loses its best argument.

And even if you believe it, the problem is that in the simulations, it's said that it was at the start of colonization, at the end of the 18th century, that the vast majority of the demographic collapse caused by disease took place. Except that most aborigines still had very little contact with the settlers. And they were probably isolated enough from each other that contagious diseases didn't spread between the different tribes. With 1 million individuals divided into small tribes in an area twice the size of Europe, they probably didn't meet very often. And the few settlers who came into contact with them weren't all going to get sick every time they met them. So it can't have come from there.

It should be noted that, apparently, Indonesians were not particularly affected by the microbes in question, nor were Filipinos or Japanese. It must have been microbes of varying pathogenicity. It's true that you could say that the Indonesians had been in contact with pathogenic European microbes for a long time, because they traded with the Arabs. But, as we've seen, some official historians say that Indonesians had been in contact with Australian aborigines since the 16th century. So European diseases should have reached the aborigines long before the arrival of the Europeans, and they should have been immune to them.

It's also worth noting that the indigenous Australians had no particular transmissible diseases that could have decimated the European settlers. Yeah sure!

As for **alcohol**, I don't really see the problem. We all know that alcohol promotes sexual relations. It doesn't inhibit, it disinhibits. So, on the contrary, it should have led them to have more children. In fact, in Europe, we've never heard of alcoholism leading to a low birth rate. Given how much our ancestors drank, if it reduced the birth rate, Europe would only have a few hundred thousand inhabitants.

Alcohol does kill. But it does it slowly. It takes at least 20 or 30 years for it to do so. An alcoholic can die at 50 of liver failure. But in the meantime, he or she will have had plenty of time to have children. So the drop in the number of aborigines clearly doesn't come from that.

Finally, it can't be due to **colonization** either, because Australia is very vast, and very rich in food resources, and it took a long time for settlers to reach more than a million inhabitants. It didn't happen until a little after 1850. So,

throughout the demographic collapse (1790-1900), the Aborigines had plenty to eat. All the more so since the government was feeding them.

The reality is that there was never a demographic collapse because there were never any aborigines to begin with, and imported Africans numbered only around ten thousand in 1800.

We'll challenge the famine and massacre arguments in more detail in the next two sections. And we'll see that they did consume alcohol, but in a different context from what we're told.

9.3) The explanation that colonial expansion caused famine

The third explanation is colonial expansion. This would have deprived the aborigines of their sources of subsistence, leading to famines that decimated a large proportion of them.

The problem would have been exacerbated by the fact that they didn't practice agriculture, as [Wikipedia](#) explains:

"The aboriginal peoples did not practice agriculture and were nomads feeding on the product of hunting and gathering"

But there's no reason why there should have been a shortage of food, since there was always plenty of room for both natives and settlers throughout the 19th century.

What's more, in the early days, settlers were very few in number and didn't yet need much land. By the end of the 19th century, on the contrary, it was the natives who were very few in number and no longer needed much land. And by the middle of the 19th century, the settlers were not yet very numerous (332,000), and the number of natives had already declined sharply (to less than 200,000). So, even when the curves crossed, there was enough land and food for everyone.

To put things in perspective, in 1850 we had around 500,000 inhabitants (settlers + aborigines), on a territory 14 times larger than France, and 2 times larger than Europe. And in 1850, France could easily feed 36 million people. It's true that most of Australia has a desert climate. But there must be the equivalent of at least 2 times the size of France available for cultivation. So there was absolutely no problem for the 500,000 settlers and natives to live together.

Also, at the time, half the aborigines were located in the northern half, while the settlers were mainly in the south. So, in the south, there must have been only 100,000 Aborigines in 1850. This further limited the competition for food.

What's more, since farming required a lot of manpower, it wasn't possible to cultivate huge tracts of land. If this had happened at the end of the 20th century, when mechanization meant that only 2% of the population worked in the fields, fine; a few white farmers would have been able to monopolize vast territories at the expense of the natives. The same would have been true if white farmers had brought in lots of slaves from Africa or elsewhere to farm their land. But they didn't. So there was no point in the colonists having huge estates. Given that, there was no problem for the two communities to cohabit.

Now, there's the problem of the herds of cattle and sheep that supposedly devastated the areas where the aborigines fed. But these areas are so vast that, even there, there was room for everyone. What's more, as with crops, the herds couldn't have been extremely large. Nowadays, this is possible because farmers have cars and even helicopters. This makes it possible to control very large herds. But back then, with just horses, herd size was limited.

Moreover, as shipping was still very expensive, meat was not exported abroad. So the market was still purely national, at least for cattle (cows). Inevitably, this limited the size of cow herds, which had to be the most space-consuming. To feed 300,000 settlers, you didn't need millions of head of cattle. Even in 1878, there were still only 2 million settlers. By then, the Aboriginal population had practically reached its minimum. So, once again, there was room for both populations, and it wasn't famine that kept the aborigines down.

There was also a **sheep** trade, which was apparently already flourishing internationally in the 19th century. But then again, there was the problem of staff to look after them, and the maximum flock size. And there was the problem of transport. There were no huge container ships back then. And the merchant navy remained mainly sail-based until the end of the 19th century. So transport

capacity was still low. So sheep farming probably didn't consume all the available space.

On the [Wikipedia](#) page devoted to Australian agriculture, we are told:

"In 2018, Australia was the world's largest producer of tramousse (714,000 tonnes), the world's second largest producer of chickpeas (1 million tonnes), the world's 4th largest producer of barley (9.2 million tonnes) and oats (1.2 million tonnes), the 5th largest producer of rapeseed (3.9 million tonnes), the 9th largest producer of sugar cane (33.5 million tonnes) and wheat (20.9 million tonnes) and the world's 13th largest producer of grapes (1.66 million tonnes). In the same year, the country also produced 1.2 million tonnes of sorghum and 1.1 million tonnes of potatoes, in addition to small-scale production of other agricultural products such as rice (635,000 tonnes), corn (387 thousand tonnes), tomatoes (386 thousand tonnes), orange (378 thousand tonnes), broad beans (377 thousand tonnes), banana (373 thousand tonnes), peas (317 thousand tonnes), carrot (284 thousand tonnes), onion (278 thousand tonnes), apple (268 thousand tonnes), lentil (255 thousand tonnes), melon (224 thousand tonnes), watermelon (181 thousand tonnes), mandarin (138 thousand tonnes), etc."

No less. And that's with herds of cattle and sheep that are now gigantic, consuming space where, at least in some cases, there could be agriculture. However, as mentioned above, in 1848, there were only 332,000 settlers ([Wikipedia](#)). This suggests that there was still plenty of room for both populations to survive. Especially as we're told that in the **1950s**, agriculture accounted for 80% of exports (this was later reduced to 18%, but only because mining products grew so strongly). This meant that Australia was producing far more than it needed. In 1950, the population was 8 million. So, in 1850, with around 500,000 inhabitants (settlers + aborigines), and even in 1900, when there were 3.7 million settlers, there was more than enough to feed everyone. So it's not clear why the natives would have starved.

An interesting piece of information can be found [here](#):

*"On the second half of the 19th century, in an attempt to reduce the violence on the frontiers, devastation by disease and to provide a "humane" environment for Aboriginal people, **perceived as a dying race**, the colonial governments passed*

*legislation designed to "protect" them. The idea was that by legislating to create **certain territory** for Aboriginal people, the clashes over land would stop, and the Aboriginal people would become **less reliant on government rations** by using the land to farm."*

So, the reserves were supposed to give the aborigines the opportunity to feed themselves and no longer depend on **government-supplied rations**. One wonders why, since they were supposed to have mastered life in these lands perfectly. And, as we've seen, there weren't yet enough settlers to take over all the land. So there was more than enough left over for the aborigines to feed themselves.

In any case, if the aborigines were fed by the government and given land, there's even less reason for them to have starved to death.

As I continued my research into rations, I came to understand several things.

[Here](#), we have more details on rations:

*"The distribution of government rations to Aboriginal people, **begun in the earliest days of European settlement, continued well into the twentieth century**. In November 1838, to celebrate the arrival of Governor George Gawler, a ceremonial meeting was arranged with the Kurna people in the Adelaide Parklands. Colonists made speeches, the Kurna performed songs and dances, and baked beef, and biscuit, rice, sugar and tea were provided. This event set the precedent for an annual distribution of rations in Adelaide, coinciding with the Queen's Birthday on 24 May, which continued until about 1861.*

*In 1841, after the violent clash between Aboriginal people and overlanders on the Rufus River, Governor George Grey appointed the explorer Edward Eyre sub-protector of Aborigines and resident magistrate at Moorundie on the River Murray. He was to bring peace to the district, **in part by periodically distributing rations of flour and blankets**. A similar system was instituted at this time in the Port Lincoln district on Eyre Peninsula. The distributions became **more systematic by the late 1840s with new depots being established in frontier districts, usually at police stations**, in response to outbreaks of violence. As settlement spread, denying Aboriginal people access to their country and resources, rations were distributed as both a form of compensation*

and a means of influence. ***In 1859 there were about 14 depots in operation. The daily food ration was one pound of flour, two ounces of sugar and half an ounce of tea, with other foods, clothing and material items (such as nets and fishing lines) issued on an occasional basis. Issues were restricted to the old, sick or infirm, orphan children and women with children under 12 years of age. The able-bodied were only given rations if they could not obtain work or subsist by fishing and hunting.***

*One of the few tangible outcomes of an 1860 Select Committee into Aborigines was to expand the system of ration distributions so, **by 1867, 58 depots were operating throughout the colony.** In the southern settled districts most depots, as before, were located at police stations, while in the northern districts the majority were located on pastoral stations. **Rations continued to be issued to Aboriginal people well into the twentieth century.** The amount and quality of rations issued on missions and in the settled districts **improved gradually** over that time, but in the remote regions flour, tea and sugar remained the staples. The practice of distributing rations **came to an end in the early 1960s** when Aboriginal people became eligible to receive the same government benefits as other members of the community."*

So, in the beginning, they didn't give rations all the time. It was only once a year. But soon it became more and more frequent. That said, it was intended for the elderly, the infirm, orphans and women with children under 12. Or people who couldn't find work or survive on fishing and hunting.

On the face of it, you'd think that since the men weren't being helped, maybe they were actually starving. So food aid would have been a mere façade. That said, they could have argued that they couldn't make a living from fishing and hunting, and that they couldn't find work either, which should have given them access to the food distributed by the Europeans. However, perhaps they were still denied food aid. But in fact, as we'll see later on, they didn't need the aid in question, simply because they weren't starving.

What we have [here](#) is a key element (Rations, coexistence, and the colonisation of Aboriginal labour in the South Australian pastoral industry, 1860–1911, Robert Foster, *Aboriginal History*, Vol. 24 (2000), pp. 1-26):

*"By the close of the nineteenth century **Aboriginal people were the principal source of labour in the South Australian pastoral industry.** The value of their labour derived from the unique type of relationship that developed between Europeans and Aborigines on pastoral stations. This paper examines the contribution of two hitherto neglected aspects of government policy in the shaping of these relationships: **the systematic distribution of rations, and the protection of Aboriginal customary rights on pastoral lands.** That pastoralists considered these factors significant is demonstrated in the final section, which examines how they successfully resisted government attempts to regulate the employment of Aboriginal people and disturb the status quo."*

So the Aborigines were the main source of workers in South Australia's pastoral industry. The pastoral industry is animal husbandry.

First of all, we need to take stock of what the official history seems to say about the situation of the natives at that time. Their numbers were declining rapidly, due to disease and alcohol, and also because of the famines linked to the settlers' takeover of their territory. As you read this, you think that the native tribes were gradually being driven out of their territory and could no longer feed themselves for lack of living space. So, it seems, rations were necessary for their survival. And not only for women with children or the handicapped, etc. All aborigines needed these rations. In addition, they were given reserves to enable them at last to have sufficient living space to continue living as before. And this was done because the government thought they were a dying race. But then, if they were confined to reserves, they no longer had any contact, for the most part, with settlers.

But with this extract, everything changes. In fact, they weren't confined to their reserves at all, since they were the main source of labor in the ranching industry.

So, you might think that maybe it didn't amount to much in terms of numbers of workers. But by the end of the 19th century, the Aboriginal population had dwindled to just 100,000. And in southern Australia, there was apparently never more than 5% of the total indigenous population during that century. Which means there were only 5,000 in all in South Australia, including 2,500 men. So it's safe to assume that most of the Aborigines present in this region were employed in this industry.

This means that most of the aborigines in this region lived in contact with the settlers. They didn't live far from them, cloistered in reserves. At least during the day, they mixed with the natives, since they worked for them.

And if they had a job, they were necessarily paid for it. So, once again, it's hard to see how they could have starved.

All of a sudden, another story emerges. In my opinion, this is how things were.

In addition to falsifying Australia's history, another use for Aborigines in the elite's plan was to serve as semi-slaves. In fact, the Australian state had no intention of killing them at all. Their immediate purpose was to serve as cheap laborers. So starving them and seeing their numbers dwindle was out of the question.

This explains why the rations were intended for women with children, the handicapped, etc., but not for men capable of working. In the previous explanation, if all the aborigines were starving to death on their reserves, we don't see why the state wouldn't have helped the adult men too. Not to do so would be tantamount to starving them to death.

Now we understand. If rations weren't given to men capable of working, it's simply because the overwhelming majority of men were working and had money to buy food.

So the state had a normal solidarity system. The weak were helped. But most of the population was able to survive on its own. So the government didn't help them. This is classic social policy.

We also understand the real reason for the **reserves**. They were intended to prevent the two peoples from mixing. Since they worked together and frequented the same places, couples could form. So the elite put them on reserves. In fact, they put them in ghettos, but with a positive spin. It wasn't presented as a racist measure, but on the contrary, as a measure to preserve the aborigines, who were supposedly on the verge of extinction.

Reserves allowed the two populations to interact almost exclusively in the workplace, limiting the possibility of couples forming. This limited the threat to the purity of the white race in Australia. It also limited miscegenation by Aborigines. And since the elite needed them as cheap laborers, they couldn't be replaced by half-breeds who wouldn't have agreed to work for so little.

The problem with this semi-slave role was that, as the settler population grew much faster than that of the aborigines (thanks to massive immigration), after a while the latter were no longer numerous enough for the most arduous jobs. So it became necessary to use non-white, non-aboriginal immigrants.

And if the aborigines weren't farming or hunting and gathering on their land, it was because they were employed elsewhere. It wasn't that they'd lost their knowledge or had bad land. It's that they didn't have the time. That's like saying of a skilled worker with a big garden that the fact he doesn't cultivate it means he's not fed enough. No, it's that he doesn't need it to feed himself.

Returning to the original subject, we see that the justification of demographic collapse by famine doesn't hold water. Aborigines have never suffered from famine, and no one has ever starved to death. So the supposed collapse doesn't come from there.

Otherwise, it's easy to see why women with small children, the handicapped, etc. were given rations and not money... A number of men would have taken the money and squandered it on alcohol, tobacco, prostitutes and other pleasures and distractions. And there wouldn't have been much left over for the women and children. So, rations were given directly. Well, eventually, the men could take the rations and exchange them for alcohol. But the ease of exchange was a little less.

In any case, we can see that the white colonization project was more important than having semi-slaves. Indeed, the elite must have needed a cheap labor force willing to do the hardest work in far greater numbers than that. So, if the purpose of the aborigines had simply been to serve as semi-slaves, then the elite would have brought in many more non-white immigrants later on. But that would have diminished Australia's racial purity. The elite preferred to have a white country and therefore mainly white immigrants. So the role of semi-slave was secondary to the goal of white colonization.

9.4) Australia's so-called frontier wars

A fourth, more unofficial reason for the fall in Aboriginal numbers during the 19th century is that the Aborigines were killed by the settlers.

However, it is acknowledged that there was apparently no desire for extermination on the part of the Australian authorities. On the contrary, they seemed to have a fairly respectful attitude towards the natives. But that doesn't mean the subject is closed. In fact, the problem has been revived by saying that there has been a kind of latent war, initiated most of the time at local level, but more or less covered up by the central authorities. So, there would have been a hypocritical situation on the part of the government, where officially, it seemed to be protecting the natives, but unofficially, it was allowing massacres to take place at local level.

Continuing my research on the subject, I came across the [Wikipedia](#) page on Australia's frontier wars. The title makes it sound like there was an armed conflict on the frontier between settler-controlled land and native-controlled land. Except, problem, it contradicts what we've seen elsewhere about the fact that aborigines were quite well protected by the Australian government already in the mid-19th century.

But, we better understand what it's all about with this excerpt:

*"Long suppressed by official white Australian memory, the frontier wars began to be the subject of public debate with the publication **in 1981** of historian Henry Reynolds' book, *The Other Side of the Frontier*. Until then, the myth of "peaceful colonization" had prevailed, obscuring the process of land dispossession, and the very existence of indigenous peoples."*

In fact, this border war story essentially dates back to 1981, with the publication of historian Henry Reynolds' book "The Other Side of the Frontier". Before that, apparently nobody had ever heard of it. The prevailing thesis then was that colonization had been essentially peaceful. And indeed, it was. Aborigines were essentially used as cheap labor. They were therefore integrated into the society of the time, albeit at the bottom rung of the ladder. And as they were still very few in number, they posed no problem to white colonization. Nobody wanted to exterminate them.

So, the theory is recent. And it's hard to see how no one could have heard of it before, and then, all of a sudden, a historian would discover it. The idea is that

the truth has been suppressed until now, like something shameful. Except that we can't see why the authorities would have hidden it. It would have been difficult for them to do so anyway. And there should have been numerous accounts and books written on the subject even back then. But the timing is clear. 1981 marked the beginning of the modern hysterical anti-racism imposed by the elite throughout the Western world. And so, as if by chance, a book suddenly appeared explaining that white Australians were evil, despoiling, even exterminating colonists. A theory that still prevails today. It's obviously a book created by agents of the elite.

By the way, [here](#) it states:

*"On the whole, neither the Europeans nor the indigenous peoples approached the conflict in an organized manner, **the "frontier war" being more a conflict between separate colonizer and indigenous groups rather than a systematic war**, even if it sometimes involved British soldiers and later police units. Not all indigenous Australians resisted European encroachment on their lands; many also served in police units and were involved in attacks on other tribes. The colonizers often reacted with violence, resulting in **a number of indiscriminate massacres**. European activities that provoked significant conflict included pastoral squatting (the annexation of grazing land, see [Squatting \(Australian history\)](#) (en)) and gold rushes in Australia."*

So there you have it, we've gone from talking about border wars to mere local disputes.

As for indiscriminate massacres, the mountain also gives birth to a mouse. We have a [Wikipedia](#) page listing the massacres of indigenous people. I've put together a table to make it easier to calculate the death toll.

Year	Number of natives killed
New South Wales	
1791	?
1794	4
1794	7
1795	8-9
1795	5
1797	?, 5
1799	4

1806	9
1816	16, maybe 25
1818	6
1824	16
1826	20 (source, Henry Wilson's diary)
1827	12
1827	6
1832	4
1835	? (1922's report)
1835	2
1836	7
1838	8 to 50 (official sources, 120, or 200-300, or 40-70 from other sources)
1838	28 (the only massacre to have led to the condemnation of the settlers. This explains why the settlers subsequently concealed their murders)
1838	?
1838	9
1838	14
1840	20
1841	30-40
1841	?
1842	100
1838-1851	15 massacres, number of victims unknown
1847	23
1849	5
1849	?
1854	40
1895	6 (only one settler involved in a poisoning case)
Total	428-480
Victoria	
1830-1834	60-200
1838	100
1838	10
1839	49
1839	35-40
1839	10
1840-1850	300-1000
1840-1860	442

1840	20-51
1840	40-75
1842	5
1843	100-150
1846	7-9
Total	1238-2141
Western Australia	
1830	1 (several more in the following days)
1834	14-25
1836	12
1841	Hundreds
1854	?
1865	20
1867 (rather 1869, Battle of Minderoo)	20-50
1868	15-150
1872	1
1887	?
1888	6-70
1890-1926	Hundreds?
1893	53
1895	20
Total	162-402 (more like hundreds. Let's say 550-800 in all)
South Australia	
1842	?
1848	9-11
1849	10
1880s	200-500
Total	219-521
Queensland	
1842	30-60
1847	50-60
1848	4
1849	100+
1849	?
1850s	?
1850	Hundreds
1856	100?
1857-1858	300
1860s	15-20
1860	15
1861	2-40

1861	6-8
1861	170
1863	15
1864	8-9
1865	18
1867	300 (testimonies 30 years after the event)
1867	200
1867	7
1869	?
1872	200
1872	Almost an entire tribe
1873	?
1874-1875	No massacre, apparently
1878	75
1879	300 (estimated 22 years later)
1879	28
1884	200 (21st century allegation)
1884	?
1884	40?
1884-1885	?
1888	200 (maybe)
Total	2283-2569
Northern Territory	
1827	5, plus perhaps 0-30 from another attack
1874	10-40
1875	150
1878	17
1882	? several
1884	$50 + 3 + 150 + 14 + 7 = 224$
1885	21
1886	64
1880s-1890s	Several massacres, ?
1890	60
Total	551-581
Massacres after the federation	
Western Australia	
1906-1907	?
1911	10
1915	Several
1922	12 (based on the oral testimonies of

	old aborigines)
1924	? based on oral testimonies collected in 1989
1926	10-20
Total	32-42
Queensland	
1918	50 (based on oral testimonies collected in the 80s)
Northern Territory	
1911	30
1918	7
1928	31 officiels (100-200 according to aboriginals' testimonies collected apparently well afterwards)
Total	68

So we're talking about between 5,000 and 6,700 deaths at most during the 19th century. And that's an apparently fairly exhaustive list. But even supposing there were others, we're talking here about the most notable massacres. So, if the average death toll for these was only 30 or 40, what was it for the unlisted "massacres"? 5 or 10 deaths? Fewer? In any case, assuming that there were a few other small-scale, unrecorded massacres, the official figures should not exceed 8,000 or 9,000 dead. Slightly problematic for a "war" that supposedly claimed 100,000 victims. Indeed, we are told on the English [Wikipedia](#) that:

"The first conflict took place several months after the landing of the First Fleet in January 1788, and the last frontier conflicts occurred in the early 20th century, with some occurring as late as 1934. An estimated minimum of 100,000 Indigenous Australians and 2,000-2,500 settlers died in the conflicts. Conflicts occurred in a number of locations across Australia."

And in fact, since it didn't add up, I think they took everything they could get their hands on for the Wikipedia [list](#). Some were even clearly invented later. So, there must be very few other supposed massacres, even on a small scale. Perhaps the elite will invent more in the future, possibly with backdated sources. But, if they don't, we can assume that there's not much else.

And given that there were 400,000 natives at the outset, that's only 1.4% of the initial total. But of course, the original 400,000 weren't there for the whole of the 19th century. There were several successive generations. We can estimate that

there were around 800,000 Aborigines in all during the 19th century, given the rapid decline of this population. This divides the previous figure by two, and gives us 0.7% of natives killed by settlers in the 19th century.

Again, this is clearly not where the demographic collapse comes from.

Stories of massacres invented at the time or after the fact?

Of course, apart from a few murders linked to conflicts between individuals, most of these massacres were completely invented. This is particularly true of those involving hundreds of deaths, including women and children. But it's also true for most of those with a few dozen victims. It's possible that there have been a few with 10 or 15 victims, as a result of conflicts that got out of hand. But it must have been very rare.

The question is whether these stories of massacres were all invented a posteriori (with backdated false sources, or "testimonies" gathered long after the so-called events, etc.) or whether they were already being told at the time. Indeed, this implies different reasons for the invention in question.

In my opinion, both are possible.

It's possible that the main thing was invented **in the 20th and 21st centuries**, when the anti-racist project began to gain momentum. The aim would then have been to make white people feel guilty.

And in my opinion, it wasn't very difficult to do. Almost all these so-called massacres took place on the frontiers of colonial Australia (hence the name "frontier wars"), i.e. in places that were still undeveloped, and which must not have had local newspapers at the time. So, "testimonies" were essentially those of officials: the police or the army. Which means they may well have been created a posteriori, since only agents of the state - in other words, agents of the elite - have access to police archives. In any case, some events seem to have been told long after the fact. For example, for the battle of Minderoo in 1869,

the [source](#) given by the government is a newspaper dated October 20, 1918 (The Sunday Times of Perth).

But they may well have already started inventing massacres **back then**. Since the elite plan for the very long term, they knew they'd be launching the anti-racist movement at the end of the 20th century. So they could have been creating false flags as early as the beginning of the 19th century.

But, in addition to serving the elite's future plans, it could serve the plans of the time. The elite obviously didn't want the two populations to mix. Now, here, it was the whites who massacred the natives. So, a priori, the colonists had nothing to fear from the natives, since they were the stronger ones. But the reasons for the supposed massacres were often that the natives had attacked the settlers. So, the aborigines appeared naturally hostile. And of course, regular massacres implied that, in response, the natives must not like the settlers. So, even if the settlers were the strongest, the supposed hostility on the part of the aborigines did nothing to bring the communities closer together in everyday life. Ordinary settlers had to be afraid of the aborigines and had to limit contact with them as much as possible in border areas. This kept the two communities apart.

The inconsistencies of the frontier wars

What we can think is that, like today, the settlers must have been mainly in a few towns. So, in the countryside, they must have been very few at first. It was the aborigines who were the most numerous (if we stay within the official framework). So, seeing what the settlers were doing to them, they should have joined forces. And there would have been more than enough of them to push the settlers back into the cities.

And there shouldn't have been just 400,000 of them, but easily 3 or 4 million, given how long they'd been there. But 4 million was a lot to justify settler domination. So there had to be only 400,000. That's why it was said that they were only hunter-gatherers, and therefore didn't have access to much food. This not only justified their small numbers, but also their scattered distribution.

Had they been farmers, they could have formed much denser groups, large villages, even small towns. And of course, as farmers, they would have owned their land. Or the community or a lord would have owned it. And there, it would have been difficult to drive them out. Whereas nomadic hunter-gatherers have no notion of ownership.

That said, even if they were hunter-gatherers, they should have numbered much more than 400,000, given the size of the country. There should have been at least 3 million. The agents of the elite saw the problem, and now, the estimate of their number in 1790 is more like 800,000 to 1 million among some historians. But, as they were beginning to be numerous enough to pose real problems for the first settlers, the historians in question say that there was an initial collapse in the number of natives in just 10 or 20 years, due to microbial diseases. So, we're back to a number of around 400-600,000 at the very beginning of the 19th century.

And you can see why the elite invented 40,000 years of antiquity for them. For one thing, if they had arrived 1,000 years ago, they should have left traces of their presence in Asia. Whereas in 40,000 years, this presence could have completely disappeared. But what's more, if they had arrived there 1,000 years ago, via Asia, they would have had to learn agriculture from the Asians. This would have once again raised the problem of the number of aborigines in 1790, their population density and land ownership.

Another problem with frontier warfare is that, until the advent of multi-shot, quick-reloading weapons, settlers' firearms were actually a liability. They were good for pitched battles (if at all). It was neutral if both opponents had the same weapons. But it was a disadvantage against the natives. Weapons were very slow to reload, and very inaccurate. It would take several shots to kill the opponent because of misfires. So the natives had plenty of time to make contact and kill a number of colonists.

It's true that there weren't really any massive battles. But, during certain "massacres" perpetrated by the colonists, when they didn't outnumber the aborigines, the latter should have been able to inflict significant losses on the colonists. But we hardly ever hear about this. The settlers would arrive, and through the magic of firearms, they would slaughter the settlers. At worst, there were one or two wounded or dead settlers. But even that seems very rare.

Finally, we can take up one of the arguments used for the famine problem. There were only around 500,000 settlers plus aborigines in 1850. And there must have been the equivalent of at least 2 times the size of France available for cultivation. So, the 500,000 settlers and natives could cohabit without any problem. And all the more so as a good proportion of the settlers were in towns, so concentrated in a very small part of the territory.

9.5) Stolen generations

To add a further argument to the above explanations, the elite have come up with the story of a policy of physical and cultural assimilation. These are the famous "**stolen generations**". The Australian government is said to have taken mixed-race children from their families and placed them with settler families, so that they would have a Western culture. The government is also said to have intended to whitewash these mixed-race children by breeding them with settlers.

[Wikipedia](#) explains:

*"The term "Stolen Generations" refers to the children of Australian Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders forcibly removed from their parents by the Australian government from **1910 until 1970**. Most of these children were of mixed race, with Aboriginal mothers and white fathers, or vice versa. They were placed in orphanages, boarding schools, or entrusted to Christian missions or white foster families."*

*"In 1997, a report entitled *Bringing them home* details the history of these practices, publishes testimonials, and suggests that around **100,000 children** belong to the "stolen generations"."*

Even within the official framework, there are serious doubts about the **reality** of this policy. For a start, the internal logic of the whole thing is problematic. Half-

breeds would have been removed from the aboriginal population in order to make it disappear. But it's rather the opposite that should have been done as part of a policy of extermination. By making the aborigines have mixed-race children, and keeping them in the tribes, the former were gradually whitened. By removing them, the racial purity of the aborigines was maintained.

Well, the idea was that the pure-bred Aborigines would die out, given their plummeting numbers, and that by whitewashing the half-breeds, the Aboriginal race would finally disappear. But, if they lived in the aboriginal tribes, there was no reason why the half-breeds should survive any longer than the pure-breeds. And as we've just seen, this would hasten the disappearance of the latter.

And in any case, there was the risk that the aborigines wouldn't disappear, as planned, and that their numbers would start to increase again. In that case, it was far more interesting to have a people who were becoming increasingly mixed. And in fact, from around 1930 onwards, their numbers began to increase again. So, for two-thirds of the time this policy lasted (1910-1970), i.e. 40 years, the basic premise (disappearance of the aborigines) no longer applied.

Moreover, it didn't really fit in with the eugenics theories of the time. Indeed, the theories in question didn't say at all that whites should mix with non-whites. Non-whites were seen as a danger to the purity of the race. And if it took 6 whites to turn a native into a white over 6 generations, the ratio was not good at all. Except for mixed-race women, of course, since a white man could have a child with them and have whites with his official wife. But if they fathered boys, the problem would revert to the next generation. So it was absurd.

And we don't see why they would have done that, since the number of aborigines was collapsing anyway. At that point, they didn't need to do anything to make the aborigines disappear. They just had to wait. And if the aborigines disappeared, the mestizos would certainly disappear too, either for the same reasons as the aborigines, or through miscegenation. And this without any state intervention. So the policy in question was of little use.

Besides, virtually no racist could possibly think of voluntarily mixing whites and mestizos.

There is also serious doubt about the **number** of these half-breeds. In 1910, there must have been a very limited number. In those days, reputation was still

very important for women. So a woman wasn't going to take the risk of marrying an aborigine or having a mixed-race child out of wedlock. This practically limited the problem to settlers/Aboriginal women relationships. But most white men wouldn't marry a native woman.

This left only sexual relations outside marriage, essentially prostitution and relations with domestic servants. But there were a number of limitations. At the time, white men found native women ugly. So most of them didn't want to sleep with them. Secondly, when it came to domestic workers, reputation was important to men too. And having a child out of wedlock, with an Aboriginal woman to boot, would have been scandalous. So men avoided such situations.

Prostitution was actively opposed in the early 20th century. Firstly, because of prevailing Puritanism. And also because antimicrobial hysteria was at its height. The spread of syphilis and other STDs was feared, which logically led to a desire to limit prostitution as much as possible, which was seen as a major vector for the spread of venereal diseases. And indeed, [Wikipedia](#) shows:

"Federal period 1901–1970s

*After federation, criminal law was left in the hands of the states. But criminal law relating to prostitution only dates from around 1910. These laws did not make the act of prostitution illegal **but did criminalise many activities related to prostitution**. These laws were based on English laws passed between 1860 and 1885, and related to soliciting, age restrictions, brothel keeping, and leasing accommodation."*

Also, in the early 20th century, with whites vastly outnumbering aborigines, there were more than enough white prostitutes. And since white men certainly preferred to sleep with whites or Asians (there were Japanese prostitutes, apparently), they slept with prostitutes of those races; not aborigines. There were probably aboriginal prostitutes. But they had to sleep mainly with aboriginal men.

Besides, in those days, prostitutes had to use spermicides, vaginal douches and other methods to avoid having children (see this [article](#)). And when they did get pregnant, they probably resorted to abortionists. And this must have been all the more the case given that, at the beginning of the 20th century, free prostitution was so strongly opposed that brothels were the only ones left. So the managers of these establishments had to know very well how to avoid unwanted

pregnancies and who to contact to perform clandestine abortions. Inevitably, this greatly limited the number of children fathered by prostitutes. And indeed, in the same [article](#) on contraception in 19th century brothels, it is said:

"Are prostitutes less fertile than the average woman?"

The paradox is that contraception is tolerated in brothels, but we really don't know how it's actually applied. The hygienists of the time had a completely skewed view of what prostitutes went through.

*For example, those who studied their anatomy in detail, such as Parent-Duchâtelet (a hygienist known for his monumental book *De la Prostitution dans la ville de Paris, considérée sous le rapport de l'hygiène publique, de la morale et de l'administration* in 1836), **did indeed observe that these girls are significantly less fertile than respectable married women.**"*

"The reality is, of course, that brothel girls resorted to contraception and were careful not to explain how they did it to the doctors who came to check them out. Mum's the word, there's no such thing! That said, as you'll see below, it's also true that some of them really weren't fertile, or were no longer fertile, for a whole host of reasons."

So there you have it. Even the main source of half-breeds, namely prostitution, must have provided a very small number.

In the end, given that aborigines numbered around 100,000 at the time, we can reckon on a few thousand half-breeds, maybe 5,000 at most, between 1910 and 1950. After the 2nd World War, with the liberalization of morals, there may have been a few more. But all in all, there can't have been more than 15,000. And most of them must have been born after the 40s.

In fact, the English [Wikipedia](#) cites another source, which gives a much lower estimate:

*"The academic Robert Manne has stated that the lower-end figure of one in 10 is more likely; he estimates that between **20,000 and 25,000** Aboriginal children were removed over six decades,"*

Clearly, all this is completely false. There may have been a few thousand mixed-race children placed in orphanages, boarding schools, Christian missions, etc.,

but this must simply have been because white parents didn't accept their mixed-race children, who were generally conceived out of wedlock. Given the stigma of the time, this was understandable. Besides, aborigines were the lowest class in society at the time. So, as mentioned above, mixed-race children were to come largely from the prostitution of aboriginal women. Apart from that, it could have come from white men and women who were also at the very bottom of society. And given the stigma attached to aborigines, most of the white men and women who fathered a child with them were social outcasts.

So educating the children in question in boarding schools was, in reality, often an act of humanity. It could give them a much better future than in their families, when there was a family, of course. As for the children of brothel prostitutes, we can read once again [here](#) that they were generally placed with foster families. And in this context, they were probably very often child exploiters (slavery, begging, prostitution, etc.). Compared to such a sordid fate, being in a state boarding school was generally a huge improvement. That's the most likely reality. The story of the systematic policy of seizing half-breeds to make the aborigines disappear is an invention after the fact. But not an invention that came out of nowhere. It comes from the elite.

Incidentally, the whole thing seems to have started in 1981 with a pamphlet entitled "the stolen generation", written in a single day by Peter Read, a postgraduate history student. So, once again, just as we were moving into hysterical anti-racism. And we note that it didn't come from the Aborigines, who'd never mentioned it before. For example, we learn [here](#) that there were radical indigenous activists in the late sixties. But they never raised the issue.

*"The idea that the removal policies had a racist component and were aimed at ending Aboriginality did not originate in Aboriginal testimony. Indeed, until the term "stolen generations" first appeared in 1981, **there had been no popular tradition among Aboriginal people that employed either the term or the concept.** In the 1910s and 1920s, parents on some state-funded Aboriginal stations in New South Wales and South Australia did disagree with the government finding employment for their teenage children as four-year indentured apprentices. But these complaints were not about the removal of babies or young children. Moreover, these parents knew their children would be gone for a fixed term and then return."*

Apparently, the first book to give quantified estimates, and therefore a bit serious, was the "Bringing them home" report published in 1997, 27 years after the end of this policy. So, obviously, most of the evidence had been erased, and all that was left to rely on was testimonials. How convenient. So, after the fact, it was easy to make people forget that the problem stemmed from parents who didn't take responsibility for their mixed-race children, or who were receiving help for people in great difficulty (extreme poverty, marginal people, alcoholics, various social cases), and to make people believe that the policy was racist.

But it's important for the elite to make people believe in a policy of extermination, or at least a racist policy. For one thing, it serves its current anti-racist policy. But it also helps them hide the fact that, far from wanting to exterminate them, they've actually brought them over from Africa and made sure they multiply. If people think that the elite wanted to exterminate the aborigines, they'll find it absolutely impossible to believe that it was they who brought them here in the first place, invented their entire culture and ensured that their numbers increased dramatically.

Regarding the demographic collapse of the 19th century, we're told that the policy in question was carried out from around 1910 to 1970. So it was after aboriginal demographics had reached their lowest point that it began to be carried out. There can therefore be no connection between this policy and the fall in aboriginal numbers from 1790 to 1900.

It's true that Wikipedia says that the practice began in 1869, with the "[aboriginal protection act](#)", in the state of Victoria (and only in that state). But this state has never contained more than 5-6% aboriginals. So it had no impact on the demographic collapse of the Aborigines. And in any case, by 1869, the collapse was already well advanced. What's more, the act in question only gave the **possibility** of fostering certain aboriginal children (presumably orphans). And it did so completely indirectly, saying that the governor had the power to choose where aborigines would live and how their children would be raised. There was no active policy of confiscating mixed-race children. So, the situation in 1869 was nothing like what we're led to believe.

Note that with this kind of propaganda, there are of course the articles devoted entirely to the subject, which give the details that make it clear that the problem wasn't that serious. But alongside this, there are 100 times more articles and books where the subject is dealt with in just a few sentences, or at best a whole paragraph. And sometimes there's no mention of the fact that it essentially only concerned mixed-race children, so the general public believes that the government wanted to wipe out the Aborigines by forcibly mixing all their children. So, here, people believe in a policy of physical extermination.

Or it's made clear that it only concerned mixed-race children, but it doesn't say how many there were. As a result, people believe that there were many of them, and while this is not strictly speaking a genocidal policy, it does show a racist and hostile attitude towards Aborigines, which casts doubt on the rest of the government's policy towards Aborigines. Add to this the partial information on the so-called massacres, and people can easily believe that there was a genocidal policy, perhaps partly hidden, but real. And even if all the information is provided, it will often be spun in a certain way to make people believe that there was hostility on the part of the authorities towards the natives.

9.6) Indigenous reserves

The problem of indigenous reserves is not immediately clear. The first difficulty arises from the fact that we tend to think of them as Indian reservations in the USA. But that doesn't seem to be the same thing at all.

Apparently, it wasn't a few large territories, like the American Indians had. Rather, they were numerous small estates of a few dozen hectares, but often less. This can be seen on this [Wikipedia](#) page listing the reserves in New South Wales.

And most of the time, these weren't autonomous territories, but areas administered by clerics or government agents. So they weren't free zones, like the American Indian reservations were. They were areas under white control.

What did this control consist of? We have an [answer](#) here:

*"The reserves and missions had strict rules regarding what Aboriginal people could and could not do. Aboriginal people **were not allowed to speak language or continue traditions and ceremonies** and were punished if they were seen doing these things. **As a result, a lot of language, culture and traditions were taken from us by the acts of colonisers.**"*

And [here](#):

"Missions, reserves and stations were designed to erase peoples' cultural identity. People were separated from their land and their families, and were not allowed to speak their languages, continue their cultural practices or teach them to their children."

So we now understand where the explanation for the disappearance of hundreds of aboriginal languages comes from.

Indeed, [Wikipedia](#) tells us that in 1788, there were some 250 Aboriginal languages:

*"In 1788, the First Fleet of British settlers arrived in Sydney. At that date Australia was populated by **250 tribes**, occupying the entire continent, **each with its own language**, laws and tribal boundaries; this is the oldest surviving culture on earth."*

As a result, we can envisage answers to three problems:

1. How could aborigines work for the settlers if they lived in isolation from them?
2. Why is it difficult to find maps of the reserves?
3. Why have the overwhelming majority of the 250 languages disappeared?

For the **first problem**, knowing that we actually had micro-reserves helps us understand how it was possible for the aborigines to work for the settlers. Indeed, if there had been large reserves, they would have been isolated from the settlers and too far away to work for them, except for those located right next to their reserve. With micro-reserves all over the place, there was no such problem. Aborigines were not isolated from settlers.

As for the **second problem**, it's easy to see why we have so few maps. Because there were hundreds of reserves, it's difficult to list them all. And it's difficult to make maps of the whole of Australia with the location of the reserves. With a few large reserves, that's no problem. But here, it's not so easy.

As for the **languages**, in reality, the elite have indeed suppressed their culture, but in fact, they have suppressed their **African culture**; not their aboriginal culture, since it never existed. If there's not much left of the 250 aboriginal languages, it's because there never were 250 languages in the first place. In fact, probably one or two (African) languages were taken from them, and then a dozen or so Aboriginal languages were created for them.

But, as they were supposed to have been in Australia for 40,000 years, few in number and isolated from each other, each large tribe had to have its own language. Given that in 19th century Europe there were still hundreds of local dialects and patois, despite a far more advanced civilization and much higher population density, it would have been odd for the aborigines to have only a few languages.

And the reserves serve to explain how the so-called 240 languages came to be lost. Otherwise, it would have been very strange for the aborigines to have forgotten so many. But now it makes sense. Officially, the various Australian authorities have forbidden them to speak them, so most of them have been lost.

In fact, the agents of the elite directly taught English to a good proportion of the aborigines, so that they could work in the service of the colonists. No need to bother teaching them a false aboriginal language, then teaching them English. First, they built villages with only children, and taught them English directly. Then they probably used the excess population of one reserve to set up another reserve with natives who spoke only English. Another, much smaller, group of natives was taught only a false aboriginal language, as proof of the reality of the aborigines. For the most part, these were aborigines who had been settled in areas where there were few or no colonists. And for a third part, they were taught both a false language and English, so as to have both proof of aboriginal "history" and natives who could work for the colonists.

What we can also think of is that the reserves made it possible to bring in aborigines who weren't actually there before, and who spoke English. A reserve was created, and a contingent of so-called aborigines was brought in, having been acculturated by the reserve managers. As a result, the settlers didn't wonder

how it was that they no longer spoke their language. Whereas if they had been in the wild, there would have been no reason for them to speak only English.

And for the elite's purposes, this system of multiple, small reserves was very convenient, because it enabled them to have a population both separate from the settlers, and working for the settlers. After work, the aborigines lived in isolation from the whites. But during the day, they worked for the whites. And anyone who didn't have a salaried job stayed on the reserve, like mothers and children. It was both isolated and in contact.

And the reserves solved the problem of land ownership. When the settlers arrived somewhere, the aborigines had already been put on reserves. That way, the settlers could take over the land without opposition. And also without suffering any moral problems. Because some might have thought that the land didn't belong to them. And they might not want to expel the aborigines. But here, as the aborigines were already on reserves, there were no such problems. All the land around the reserves was free of aborigines, so there was no moral concern about taking it over. What's more, the aborigines were already there to offer their labor force to the settlers.

And to explain why the reserves were already there when the settlers arrived, there were the Christian missions. The missionaries arrived in areas untouched by settlers and supposedly evangelized the aborigines in the reserves. In reality, they brought in surplus aborigines from other reserves, or children from the large reserves where aborigines were being "manufactured", and settled them there.

Indeed, there were 3 types of reserves, as can be seen [here](#):

"Broadly speaking, there were three types of spaces set aside by different governments specifically for Aboriginal people to live on. These definitions varied between each state and territory, but they can loosely be defined as:

- ***Missions** were often created by churches or religious individuals to house Aboriginal people, convert them to Christianity and prepare them for menial jobs. Most of the missions were developed on land granted by the government for this purpose.*

- *Reserves were usually parcels of land set aside for Aboriginal people to live on and were not managed by the government or its officials. People living on unmanaged reserves might receive rations and blankets from the state or territory government, but often remained responsible for their own housing.*
- *Stations or 'managed reserves' were generally managed by officials appointed by the government. Schooling (in the form of preparation for the workforce), rations and housing were provided, and station managers tightly controlled who could, and could not, live there. The managers usually had total control over Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander lives including legal guardianship of their children."*

This remains to be verified, but it's safe to assume that **Christian missionaries** arrived first. The authorities brought them aborigines. At first, it was mostly children; then a mixture of children and mothers with children; then adults. And since, at least in the beginning, they didn't know how to fend for themselves in the wild, they depended entirely on the colonists for food. So the authorities provided them with food. This helped to keep them from rebelling.

The missionaries got them used to working and conforming to Australian society. As a result, when the settlers arrived, the Aborigines were readily available to provide their labor force. And of course, the missionaries had taught them English.

The **unmanaged** reserves were intended for "natives" who had been taught a false aboriginal language. They too probably arrived before the region was colonized. And their role was to have proof of the ancient presence of the aborigines. That said, a certain number must have been taught English, as well as an indigenous language. So, some of them could work for the colonists. And even those who didn't speak English had to be able to perform simple tasks.

Then, once the settlers were present in numbers, the **managed** reserves had to take over. This enabled tougher authority, which was probably necessary, once the natives came into contact with modern life.

The order of arrival was probably flexible. You could have a reserve first (managed or not), or a Christian mission. But, overall, it was more likely to be a Christian mission or a non-managed reserve, then a managed reserve. But that's for further study.

Incidentally, the [list](#) of reserves in New South Wales shows that the earliest settlements were created around 1880. Before that, the majority of Aborigines didn't live in reserves or missions. And the system gradually took shape. In 1890, there weren't many of them. So, official history cannot attribute the demographic collapse of the aborigines during the 19th century to the creation of reserves. And in any case, since they were fed by the settlers, it would have been difficult for them to decline for lack of food.

It's true that official history mentions the existence of missions and reserves before the large-scale introduction of state reserves. [Here](#), they speak of missions and stations as early as the 1780s:

"Aboriginal reserves, missions, and stations were an important part of Australian history.

They were established to help Indigenous people transition into European society, and to provide them with access to education and medical care.

Unfortunately, many of these institutions were plagued by racism and discrimination.

The first ones were set up in the 1780s and they created a long-term legacy of harm to the First Nations communities."

[Here](#), they talk about missions and reserves established from the **1840s** onwards.

*"Prior to the introduction of missions and government stations there was a small time in which Protectorates were set up in a few locations - the key idea of this system was the 'protection' (and the eventual assimilation) of mob. **Multiple Protectorate Stations were set up from 1840** including the Merri Creek Protectorate and the Loddon Protectorate in Fraklinford. For a short time these stations thrived however these stations **were not supported by the local colonists and government** so the protectorate system was seen as a failure and dismantled in 1848."*

The article lists five missions and one reserve created before the end of the 1860s. Here are two of them:

"Ebenezer (1859 – 1904)

Ebenezer Mission was established in 1859 by Reverend Friedrich Hagenauer and Reverend F.W. Spieseke, German Moravian Missionaries. The mission was situated near the Wimmera River on Wotjobaluk country. The aim was to 'civilise' the local Aboriginal people and convert them to Christianity. After the Aborigines Protection Act 1886 passed in Parliament forced those considered to be 'half-caste' off the missions and stations the numbers at Ebenezer dropped and it was eventually closed due to the low numbers with most residents being forced to Lake Tyers.

Lake Tyers (1861 - 1971)

Lake Tyers Mission was established in 1861 by John Bulmer, a missionary of the Church of England and is situated on Lake Tyers, on GunaiKurnai land. As other missions and stations closed around Victoria the residents who were living there were moved to Lake Tyers. In 1971 Lake Tyers mission was handed back to the Aboriginal community and is now known as Bung Yarnda."

But these missions and reserves were obviously limited in number. So, before 1880 and even 1890, most aborigines lived in free zones.

Now, that's if you stick to the official story. But if we analyze it according to my theory, the story that the reserve system was massively implemented from 1880 onwards is certainly false. By 1790, virtually all aborigines were on reserves. It's highly unlikely that the elite sent the first few thousand aborigines out into the wild, let them multiply for around 100 years until they numbered around 80,000, and then herded them into reserves. So this 1880 limit is surely a lie.

And it's easy to see why. In the official story, aborigines couldn't have been virtually all on reserves by the early 19th century. Given that the aborigines officially numbered 400,000, it would have been impossible for a few tens of thousands of Europeans to have found most of the tribes and forced them to remain on reserves. In the official narrative, the reserve system had to be established on a massive scale long after the arrival of the Europeans. But, in reality, from the outset, most indigenous people were on reserves. Perhaps the elite left a small percentage of aborigines in the wilderness, to give them an air of reality vis-à-vis the settlers. But, for the most part, they were already on reserves. But, as at the beginning there were only 10,000 of them, there were obviously very few reserves. There were never 400,000 aborigines in the wild.

As the elite impose their version of events on the world, they obviously hid this. And that was easy, since few people could know what it was all about. And anyway, the fact that they were reserves could be hidden. They could appear as simple villages or tribes. And the presence of a white chief could also be disguised under the name of missionary.

What is the difference between a reserve and a village or group of villages apparently free, but in reality under the control of a colonist? Not much; simply an official title and mandate for the white person in charge, and therefore official recognition. But in such a place, there could easily be a village or several villages ruled by a colonist with no official title.

And the fact that the number of reserves gradually increased over the course of the 19th century, and then the 20th, is simply due to the fact that there were more and more aborigines, and so the number of reserves had to be adapted.

9.7) Geographical distribution of Aborigines in 1788

Regarding the distribution of the native population at the start of colonization, the elite didn't make any mistakes. At the start of my research, I thought they did. But they didn't. They distributed the population relatively evenly and logically.

Here's how the population was distributed in 1788 ([Wikipedia](#)):

Estimated minimum Indigenous population by 1788 (based on Prentis 1988)^[17]

State/territory	Population in numbers	Population in percentage
Queensland	300,000	37.9%
Western Australia	150,000	20.2%
New South Wales	160,000	18.9%
Northern Territory	100,000	12.6%
Victoria	45,000	5.7%
South Australia	32,000	4.0%
Tasmania	5,000	0.6%
Estimated total	795,000	100%

And here is the map of the modern Australian states:



Here are the Google maps:



So the elite invented a distribution that more or less respected logic, with a large proportion of aborigines living in the most fertile regions.

9.8) Aboriginal myths about their arrival in Australia

Elite agents like to play with hidden humor. Here, they've winked with aboriginal myths about their arrival in Australia. See [Wikipedia](#):

*"In Gumbalania, Arnhem Land, a legend recounts the **sea voyage** at the end of which the first men set foot on the southern continent and accounts for the origins of its settlement: Yingana, the mother of creation, came from far away, from the **far north** (Keukpi) carrying with her many babies in baskets. When the sea calmed and the wind died down, she came close to a shore, stopped, **laid down a first baby, giving it a language, a Moyeti, a skin name, a clan, a rite.** It was her first. Then she continued her journey, **depositing a second, giving him a different clan and rite.** And so on south and east."*

And indeed, apart from Yingana, that's more or less what happened. Elite agents took Africans by boat to Australia, New Guinea and other Pacific islands. They took children to such-and-such a village (actually more of an unofficial reserve), gave them a language, a clan name and rituals. And they did it again in other places. In fact, even in the case of Yingana, there's an element of truth, since the elite agents who took them came from the north.

9.9) Usefulness of aborigines in the future

It's likely that the aborigines will serve as soldiers in the war against the Indonesians. The Indonesians will torment the aborigines of New Guinea. And logically, Australia's aborigines will stand in solidarity with their northern brothers. So, when Australia gets the upper hand over the Indonesians, it will justify their being on the front line doing the dirty work and possibly getting slaughtered, while the white soldiers will benefit from a phony war with a minimum of casualties. That said, maybe they'll benefit from a fake war too. The elite will be able to get rid of them afterwards in other ways (low birth rate and miscegenation). But they will certainly be on the front line.

In 2023, there are around 1 million. And it's safe to assume that there are around 500,000 mestizos. When the wars break out, there will probably be at least 2 million of them, and 1 million of mixed race. That's 1.5 million men, of whom let's say 50% will be of fighting age. With a 100% recruitment rate (compulsory enlistment), there will be 750,000 soldiers available to be sent to the front line.

So there's a second reason why the elite let them multiply in Australia. They needed them to be relatively numerous for future wars in the Indonesian zone. Whereas if the elite had wanted them to disappear altogether, and if there were only 100,000 of them in 1900, it would have been very easy for the elite to do so. They just had to reduce their fertility and make them totally interbreed.

And if the elite put aborigines on other islands (New Guinea, Timor, etc.), it was there too to serve as a pretext for future regional wars and as cannon fodder.

And the fact that the elite now facilitate interbreeding between whites and aborigines also serves the purpose. In fact, the mestizos will serve as bridgeheads for white colonization in New Guinea and Timor.

The Jewish people were created in much the same way a few centuries ago. The elite included whites, Arabs and Turks. And, of course, there are a good number of Arab-White and Turkish-White half-breeds. So they're Arab and Turkish enough to have the legitimacy to settle in the Middle East without it being seen as white colonization. And the false history created for them is also credible, motivating them to fight against the Arabs. Whereas it would be much less credible if they were all white. So they can serve as a bridgehead for white colonization in the Middle East. And the presence of mestizos and whites will make the link with the non-Jewish whites who will arrive later.

Summary

So there was no reason for aborigines to see their numbers plummet. And if official history has lied about it, it's because their numbers haven't actually fallen, but risen. If they numbered around 100,000 in 1900, it's because they must have been only 10,000 in 1790. This is impossible within the official

framework. But if, in reality, there were no people in Australia and the elite brought in Africans, then it's entirely possible.

And if they did, it's because there had to be a human presence in Australia, but it had to be non-Asian.

There had to be a human presence, because otherwise it would have been very odd that, with the antiquity of Asian civilization in Indonesia, they hadn't reached Australia. So some people might have started to get the wrong idea about the antiquity of Asian civilization, and worse, of human presence on earth.

And it couldn't have been Asians, because otherwise, given their advanced civilization, there would have been many more of them. They would have had the notion of individual property. They would have one or more constituted states, cities. Etc... A whole host of things that would have made it much harder to justify colonization.

With primitive, nomadic aborigines, with no notion of ownership, few in number and widely dispersed, it was much easier.

And besides, aborigines kept in a state of low development could serve as semi-slaves for whites for hundreds of years. Whereas, given the advanced civilizations that Asians were supposed to have developed, and the even more advanced ones that the elite would have them build in the 20th century, it would have been hard to justify such a thing with them. So having aborigines was useful for that too.

Conclusion

So, the elite falsified the history of Indochina, Indonesia and Australia.

For Indochina, it was to explain why China didn't totally invade it, and why China didn't invade Indonesia, and then Australia.

For Indonesia, it was to explain why China and Indochina didn't invade it, and why it didn't invade Australia. And also to explain why there are Muslims there, which will help explain several future wars.

And for Australia, it was to explain why there are black people there (the so-called aborigines). The presence of aborigines in New Guinea and other islands in the region will, in the future, lead to wars with Indonesia. And these same aborigines (including those from Australia) will be at the forefront of these wars.

And if the elite had Australia colonized by whites and not Asians, it's because their objective is to attack Asia from the north (Russia) and the south (Australia) to eventually replace the Asian population with a white population. If the elite's objective was purely economic, they wouldn't have bothered and would have populated Australia with Asians.

With the present publication and the previous one on the history of China, we now have a complete view of the history of the Asian region; and also of what is likely to happen there in the next 500 or 1000 years. Whether this happens in either period will depend on the elite's agenda, i.e. whether they have white man colonize Asia before Africa, or afterwards.

What we've seen here gives us a better understanding of what the elite want. Indeed, this is **THE** main question once you've understood that there is an elite running the world.

Some (Anthelme Arvière) think that the objective is **economic**. They want to develop every corner of the earth, to make more and more money. But if that were the case, then the elite would have decided to colonize Siberia and Australia with Asians. There are plenty of them right next door. No need to laboriously bring in white people.

The question of who is the elite comes into play here. At present, if we stick to an earthly hypothesis, there are two possibilities: either it's the Jews, or it's some other group.

If the **Jews** are the elite, the main hypothesis concerning their goal would be that they hate white people, because white people have martyred them over the last 2

millennia (expulsions, pogroms, ghettos, etc.). As a result, they would like to exterminate them through immigration and miscegenation.

Another reason given is that Jewish leaders would like to rule the earth. But white people would compete with them. So, by miscegenating them, they would be the only ones to rule over miscegenated, acculturated and dumber-down peoples. But given that, in this hypothesis, the whites are already totally under the thumb of the Jews, there's no point in doing this. So it's the revenge hypothesis that should be retained.

But in the hypothesis of the Jewish elite, they've clearly been in power since the end of the 18th century and even before. And for the English, that would be as early as Cromwell. And the plan to exterminate whites would have been conceived by Jewish leaders before they took power.

So, if the goal was indeed the extermination of whites, then Jewish leaders would never have had white English colonize Australia in the 19th century, since England had long been under control. And since Russia had also been under control since easily 1800, they wouldn't have sent very pure whites to Siberia during the 19th century. And even if we believe that the seizure of power only took place in 1917, during the Russian Revolution, then the USSR should not only have stopped white immigration, but even replaced it with Asians. But it continued white immigration. So the Jewish hypothesis doesn't hold water.

So, the goal is not economic. And it's not to exterminate white people.

Another hypothesis could be that the elite want to mix the whole world, which obviously includes Asians. And it would like to do so with a white element, hence the presence of whites in Siberia and Australia. But if that were the case, all it would take is immigration. There's no need to have white regions near Asia. On the other hand, if the aim is outright replacement, there's bound to be a need for white-populated areas close to Asia. Because there, ethnic cleansing can be imposed after military victories. With immigration alone, it's much more difficult.

And if the aim were to mix Asians with whites (in addition to Indians, Indonesians, etc.), it would take hundreds of years to achieve. However, given that the white race is being interbred at high speed by blacks and Arabs in Europe, and by Latinos and possibly blacks in North America, this plan would be unfeasible. The Russians of Siberia would be long gone before it could be

implemented. It's hard to see why Russia should be kept out of the mainstream of miscegenation for so long, just to be able to partially miscegenate Asians with whites.

What's more, it's hard to see why the elite would want to crossbreed the world, since they already dominate it as it is. Miscegenation is of no interest in terms of population control.

So, the only remaining hypothesis is that the aim is to exterminate Asians and replace them with whites. The elite are not Jewish. They're white. And they want to replace non-whites with whites. And for Asia, it has positioned white populations in the North and South. So, by destabilizing the region for hundreds of years, they will eventually succeed in replacing Asians with whites.

Appendix 1: Chinese porcelain

Anthelme Arviere was the first to mention it in the following [message](#) (June 16, 2020):

"Lettre du père d'Entrecolles de 1712. publiée par du Halde en 1735, exposant les détails de la production de porcelaine chinoise à Jingdezhen... The famous Jesuit Father François-Xavier d'Entrecolles, "born in Limoges", went to China and discovered porcelain. From China, he launched the porcelain trade in Europe..."

As luck would have it, on his return to Limoges, where kaolinite had already been brought in from a deposit in the Haute-Vienne region, he launched porcelain production. So you get the plot of this juicy little story...

In reality, the father of Entrecolles has gone off to exploit the Chinese people and put local producers in competition. A transfer economy was set up, enriching the merchants and leaving the producers with nothing... We're

reliving exactly the same configuration at the end of Time, with the same Western-Chinese trade pattern."

Now, some of Arviere's knowledge comes from the Russian Recentists. So it's possible that this idea didn't originate from him. But I'd be surprised if the Russians were interested in the father of Entrecolles and French porcelain. So, I think it was he who first thought of it.

So, officially, the father of Entrecolles supposedly discovered the Chinese porcelain manufacturing process and imported it to France.

In fact, the opposite is true. The process was known to the elite, and was exported to China. So, it's possible that the elite had the porcelain produced first in China, then in Europe. But it's just as possible that they had it produced first in Europe, then in China. In the latter case, Chinese porcelain would only date from the early 18th century. But even in the first case, Chinese production would not be very old. It would probably date from the mid-17th century, or something like that.

As for Chinese porcelain imports, the elite probably actually had them produced in Europe. This way, they could sell them at a very high price while saving on the cost of transport.

If porcelain and lacquer had been invented in Europe, then produced in China and exported to Europe, we might well ask ourselves the following question. Why invent such a story? Financially speaking, it made no sense to the elite. If porcelain was developed in Europe, there was no point in the elite pretending it came from China and selling it for a fortune.

Because the problem here was that the trade was a closed circuit, from the elite to the elite. Indeed, only members of the elite had enough money to buy these items. They couldn't resell them to the people, because of their extremely high price. So they had no pecuniary reason to invent this story. By buying things at a high price that were actually worth much less, the elite would have been swindling themselves. When the elite sell themselves, in other words, when the economic circuit is exclusive to the elite, the goal cannot be profit. Of course, one could argue that some members were ripping off others. But, obviously, such a thing can't happen in the elite. They don't swindle each other.

So the reason for inventing this story can't be financial. And in this case, the only possible aim was to validate the official history of Chinese civilization.

And if it had been conceived in Europe and produced in Europe, that's obviously even clearer. The only possible reason for lying about the origins of the product was to validate the historical lie.

It's like **Greek, Roman, Egyptian or Chinese antiquities**, etc., produced by members of the elite (e.g. the Viscontis, according to Arvière). The other members of the elite know full well that these are forgeries produced by some of them, and that they don't have the officially estimated value. But the real aim is to maintain the official lie about history.

That said, in this case, the situation is a little different. These days, antiques can be used to save taxes in a number of countries. So, the elite can justify maintaining this trade with the explanation of enrichment. What's more, the market for antique art is steadily expanding, as the value of antiques continues to rise. So, the elite were able to put in place a financial reason for buying antiques. But there was no such thing in the 18th century.

Appendix 2: why it was England that colonized Australia and the USA

With what we've seen of Australia's future, we understand another reason why it had to be the British who colonized it. The elite needed a country that could count on the support of the USA in future Asian wars. Because Australia alone against Indochina isn't very convincing. But with the help of the very powerful USA, it's much more convincing. And the fact that Australia is Anglo-Saxon, like the USA, makes it much easier to justify this support. We have two countries that are brothers in culture and civilization. So it's only natural that they should support each other. As we can see at the moment, there is a proximity of interests between England, the USA and Australia, which is justified by the fact that they are Anglo-Saxon countries. It's a situation that's not hidden.

And the principle obviously applies in both directions. Since Australia and the USA had to have the same language and culture, the USA had to be Anglo-Saxon. If Australia had been Anglo-Saxon but the USA had not, the justification in question would have fallen apart.

Moreover, the fact that the USA was Anglo-Saxon made it easier to justify helping England in the First and Second World Wars, and then intervening directly against Germany.

The USA and Australia could have been French. But it's possible that there are issues of distribution of zones of influence between the different European countries. And it's likely that a large part of Africa will go to France. So the USA plus Africa would have been a lot for France.

It was also easier to justify the fact that England was a great maritime power. As an island, it could afford to develop its navy. But since France was destined to play an important role on the continent, it was less easy to make it a major maritime power. At least not on a permanent basis.

And, in the 18th and 19th centuries, there had to be a country with great maritime power to justify the colonization of the USA, Australia, India, Burma and other countries. And even in the 20th century, a Western maritime power in addition to that of the USA was needed to justify fighting in South-East Asia during the 2nd World War. And even in the 21st century, England could play an interesting role as a maritime power, as it will probably help Australia in its wars against Indonesia. So it had to be England that colonized the USA and Australia, not France.

And we also understand why it was necessary for the USA to become independent of England. It would give the elite more flexibility in their objectives. Otherwise, Europe, via England, would have seemed too hegemonic. An England-USA bloc would have been far too powerful, and the goal of domination too visible. What's more, in both world wars, this would have posed a problem, since the USA was supposed to intervene at the end of each war. If England and the USA had been one, the latter would have intervened from the start of the war. In fact, Germany might not have entered either World War I or World War II, given the formidable powers it would have faced.

Appendix 3: Chinese manufactured objects

If there was no Arab trade with the Orient, at least not until the 19th century, then it must have been the Europeans who first opened up trade routes with China and Indonesia. A false trade in fact, at least at first, since there were only tribes in Asia. It was the Europeans who developed the agriculture and technology of these countries and initiated the production of agricultural and manufactured goods, which were in fact exported from the 17th or 18th century onwards. Before that time, there was no trade between Europe and Asia. History has been falsified in this respect.

As for China, it exported agricultural products such as cassia, star anise and jasmine (tea came later). Well, according to the official story, of course. That might have been enough to explain European trade with China. But, since the elite also wanted to invent a brilliant, technically advanced Chinese civilization, it was obviously preferable to validate its existence by trading in manufactured goods that Europeans hadn't mastered. So, the elite made people believe that certain inventions that were actually European were Chinese.

Of course, they had to be very high value-added goods. Indeed, China was so far away, and ships were so limited in transport capacity, that only resources of this type could be of interest. In the end, the elite pretended that porcelain, silkwork, lacquerware and a few other such products were Chinese inventions.

But this small technical advance was limited to China. For the other Asian civilizations, the elite didn't want any civilization more advanced than ours. So, these civilizations were limited to plant or animal products, or mining. That's why the elite invented the story of the **spice** trade.

It was a high-value-added agricultural resource that could justify trade. And there were spices unique to this or that area in various parts of Asia (India for pepper and cinnamon, Southeast Asia for ginger, etc.), which justified the presence of Europeans in many Asian countries.

This was also the case for Indonesia, which had three spices that only grew there: cloves, nutmeg and mace. And, of course, they were highly sought-after. This made it possible to justify trade with the Europeans, but also with the Arabs, and then, to justify the adoption of the Muslim religion in Indonesia.

In the end, what's clear is that European expeditions to Asia have always been about colonization. It was never about trade. Trade was just a pretext. It's a story to better advance in disguise and place pawns.

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March 5 2024